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Introduction 
 
Abstract, Methodology and Contribution to Existing Research  
 
The core of this thesis is the study of NATO’s Comprehensive Approach strategy to state 
building in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2011. It argues that this strategy sustained 
operational and tactical practices which were ineffective in responding to the evolved 
nature of the security problem. The thesis interrogates the Comprehensive Approach 
along ontological, empirical and epistemological lines and concludes that the failure of 
the Comprehensive Approach in the specific Afghan case is, in fact, indicative of 
underlying theoretical and pragmatic flaws which, therefore, generalize the dilemma.  
 
The research is pragmatic in nature, employing mixed methods (quantitative and 
qualitative) concurrently. Qualitative methods include research into primary and 
secondary literature sources supplemented with the author’s personal experiences in 
Afghanistan in 2008 and various NATO HQ and Canadian settings. Quantitative research 
includes an empirical case study focussing on NATO’s Afghan experience and its attempt 
at state building between 2006 and 2011. This study incorporates a historical review of 
NATO’s evolutionary involvement in Afghanistan incorporating the subject timeframe; 
offers an analysis of human development and governance related data mapped to 
expected outcomes of the Afghan National Development Strategy and NATO’s 
comprehensive campaign design; and interrogates the Comprehensive Approach strategy 
by means of an analysis of conceptual, institutional and capability gaps in the context of 
an integrated investigational framework. 
 
The results of the case study leads to an investigation of a series of research questions 
related to the potential impact of the failure of the Comprehensive Approach for NATO 
in Afghanistan and the limits of state building as a means of attaining security for the 
Alliance. 
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This thesis contributes to existing research on the comprehensive approach, NATO, and 
international security theory. With respect to the comprehensive approach, this concept 
became the focus of much inquiry from approximately 2003 onwards as NATO 
attempted to implement it in Afghanistan. To date, three lines of inquiry have pre-
dominated the literature. The first line of inquiry relates to a definitional emphasis, i.e. 
attempting to situate the concept in a context of existing theories of conflict management 
or resolution. Frequently, this approach conflates the concept with national-level attempts 
to improve effectiveness via increased coordination amongst government departments. 
This thesis broadens this perspective significantly to the extent that the analysis situates 
the concept in an international arena that necessarily implicates a vast array of civil and 
military actors. Further, it examines the concept as both an archetypal model of 
exogenous state building and as a strategy type. 
 
The second line of inquiry emphasizes an institutional approach. This literature is 
concerned with why institutions (such as governments or alliances) should adopt the 
concept; in this approach, the concept is viewed as a “solution” to some theoretical 
dilemma, normally related to complex international security problems. This thesis places 
the concept squarely in the light of history and shows, at least in the context of 
Afghanistan, that the application of the theory into practice not only failed, but offers 
credible explanations for that failure.  
 
The third line of inquiry focusses on structural issues, that is, examining or offering 
mechanisms or processes by which the comprehensive approach may be operationalized, 
and this is certainly prevalent in literature related to NATO specifically. In this category, 
the stress is on coordination deficits or resource scarcities, and finding solutions to these 
in order to make the concept “work.” This thesis shifts the debate beyond mere critiques 
of the concept and proposes instead that efforts to implement it be abandoned altogether.               
 
Supporting this research is a series of subtexts that seek to explain why the strategy failed 
in the Afghan context beyond that of generalized descriptions or historical narratives. 
While the paper presents empirical evidence of NATO’s failure to achieve its strategic 
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objective in Afghanistan, the primary objective is the explanation for that failure in 
theoretical terms.  
 
 
 
Key words: comprehensive approach, NATO, state building, counter-insurgency, 
strategy, campaign assessment.    
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Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis seeks to address a series of questions related to NATO’s intervention into 
Afghanistan, its attempt at state building between 2006 and 2011, the results of this effort 
and the impact of its failure to achieve its strategic objective on the Alliance itself and for 
future cases wherein NATO may be called upon to intervene again. In order to satisfy 
these questions, the thesis contains five chapters as follows. 
 
Chapter 1 is a literature review of the Comprehensive Approach which is at once an 
archetypal model of state building and a formal strategy which was adopted by NATO in 
Afghanistan in order to attempt to leverage non-NATO actors and resources necessary to 
stabilize the country. I argue that this strategy developed in response to changes in the 
international security environment following the end of the Cold War and has conceptual 
lineage with other state- building-related theories such as civil-military cooperation, the 
effects-based approach to operations and counter-insurgency.  
 
Chapter 2 establishes the historical narrative of NATO’s intervention into Afghanistan in 
2003 and traces the rationale and process by which the Alliance adopted the 
Comprehensive Approach strategy. I argue that NATO’s decision to absorb the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission was the result of a complex 
mixture of external and internal pressures including those from Alliance nations which 
had accepted leadership roles in the pre-NATO ISAF mission and which desired to 
expand ISAF’s leadership pool and increase military force capacity by transferring 
responsibility for the mission to NATO at the institutional level. I show that the adoption 
by NATO of the Comprehensive Approach strategy occurred haltingly and over time but 
was ultimately reflective of the desire of some Alliance members to undertake state-
building activities based on a normative principle that the mission in Afghanistan was 
consistent with broader humanitarian values and not specifically tied to the US global 
war on terror. That the Alliance did not itself possess the necessary capacity to undertake 
these state-building activities generated a strategic-level requirement to adopt the 
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Comprehensive Approach in order to leverage the capacities of non-NATO actors and 
organizations. 
 
Chapter 3 provides evidence as to why the Comprehensive Approach strategy was not 
successful in Afghanistan. This research establishes as a starting hypothesis that the 
dominant feature of the strategy is the ability of military and civilian actors and 
organizations (particularly non-governmental organizations [NGOs]) operating in the 
same engagement space (in this case Afghanistan) to coordinate and collaborate in order 
to achieve commonly held objectives. In order to investigate how the Alliance attempted 
to actualize the strategy and to understand why such levels of coordination and 
collaboration were not achieved, an integrated interrogational framework provides for 
analysis at strategic, operational and tactical levels and describes how NATO attempted 
to actualize the strategy at each one. It concludes that conceptual, institutional and 
capability gaps were present at all levels and that these gaps contributed to the strategic 
failure previously illustrated. 
 
Chapter 4 provides the results of a detailed analysis of Afghanistan following five years 
of NATO’s state-building project. It establishes a conceptual framework through which 
civil and military evaluation and assessment regimes may be understood in order to allow 
for an analysis based upon two important indicative models—the Afghan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS) and ISAF’s campaign design. These two models 
incorporated specific time- and condition-based objectives for both the Afghan 
government and NATO, and the analysis identifies the status of these objectives in 2006 
(when the Alliance adopted the Comprehensive Approach as its formal strategy for the 
Afghan mission) and then again in 2011, by which point the state-building project had all 
but ended and the transition towards an exit strategy was initiated. This analysis revealed 
that in 2011 the majority of the desired state-building objectives had not been achieved 
and that Afghanistan remained a failing, if not failed, state.  
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Chapter 5 examines the potential impact of NATO’s strategic failure in Afghanistan on 
the international community as a whole and the Alliance itself and considers how or if 
this failure will impact on future cases wherein NATO may be called upon to intervene 
again.  
 
Chapter 1: The Comprehensive Approach: A Literature Review 
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Chapter 1: The Comprehensive Approach: A Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a literature review of the Comprehensive Approach as both a model 
of integrated approaches to complex crises and as NATO’s strategy in the context of 
NATO interventions into fragile, failing or failed states for the purpose of engaging in 
stabilization, reconstruction and state-building activities.
1
 While the concept remains 
contested in several domains, there is now a significant body of research available to 
permit exploration and systematization of the concept as distinctive within the broader 
field of international security studies. Although there has been an expansion of interest in 
the comprehensive approach in scholarly circles, the extant contributions to identifying 
and analysing the related literature did not benefit from this expansion: this is the gap that 
this chapter seeks to close.
2
  
 
The comprehensive approach is interconnected theoretically and historically to several 
other concepts, and as such, it may be useful to describe it as a distinctive node within an 
expansive conceptual network that implicates theories of crisis management, conflict 
termination, peace building, civil-military relations and state building amongst others.  
 
Some of the literature identifies the comprehensive approach as merely an extension of 
national- level strategies to improve inter-departmental coordination (for example, whole-
of-government, inter-agency and so on). This thesis posits, however, that the 
Comprehensive Approach is of a significantly more complex order of magnitude given 
the vast array of actors implicated by the strategy, its desired outcomes and its 
                                                 
1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization may also be referred to as the “Alliance.” When 
capitalized the word refers specifically to NATO; when lower case it refers to a generic alliance. The 
capitalized version of Comprehensive Approach will, throughout this thesis, refer to the NATO strategy 
specifically; this may also be abbreviated to “CA.” The non-capitalized style comprehensive approach will 
refer to the generic model or to the concept as utilized by non-NATO entities.  
2. See, for example, Julian Brett, “Recent Experience with Comprehensive Civil and Military 
Approaches in International Operations,” (Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Report 2009), 
and S. Blair and A. Fitz-Gerald, “Stabilisation and Stability Operations: A Literature Review” (Centre for 
Security Sector Management, Cranfield University, 2009). 
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manifestation in an alliance setting and, therefore, it will not attempt to scope the full 
range of material available given that literature surveys which focus on national-level 
inter-agency coordination issues have already been published.
3
  
 
Given that we explore the adoption, evolution and application of the Comprehensive 
Approach in the specific context of the NATO mission in Afghanistan in later chapters of 
this treatise, the intent of this review is to provide a more expansive overview of the 
subject while, as indicated earlier, not straying too far from the core concept as it is 
understood in the context adopted by NATO.  
Sources 
 
The literature review is intended to be inclusive, although not exhaustive, as indeed the 
volume of available material is beyond a singular effort. As the focus is NATO’s 
Comprehensive Approach, it is not surprising to determine that some of the material 
emanated from within military or military-related organizations, including military 
colleges, institutes and defence publishers. At the same time, a large portion of the 
material was published in scholarly and peer-reviewed journals or as online reports 
published by recognized research institutes or professional associations focused on 
international relations or security affairs. In addition, there has been an increase in 
academic interest in the subject, and the review includes both undergraduate and 
graduate-level theses that address some aspect of it.  
 
In order to present the material in a coherent fashion, I decided to organize my review 
around a series of questions as follows, and it will more or less address these questions in 
order: 
                                                 
3. See, for example, Andrea L. Brown and Barbara D. Adams, “Exploring the JIMP Concept: 
Literature Review,” Humansystems Inc., on behalf of the Canadian Department of National Defence, as 
represented by Defence Research and Development Canada (Toronto, 2010); Leni Wild and Samir 
Elhawary, “The UK’s approach to linking development and security: assessing policy and practice,” 
Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 347 (2012); and Carolyn R. Earle, “Taking Stock – 
Interagency Integration in Stability Operations,” Prism 3, No. 2 (Centre for Complex Operations, National 
Defense University Press, Washington, D.C, 2012). 
Chapter 1: The Comprehensive Approach: A Literature Review 
 
 
9 
 
What evolutions in the international security environment caused the 
comprehensive approach (and other variants of integrated 
approaches to crisis management) to appear? 
Is the comprehensive approach a new idea or did it evolve from 
other, earlier, concepts? 
How and why did the comprehensive approach become NATO’s 
official strategy in the context of its mission to stabilize 
Afghanistan?  
Is the comprehensive approach as adopted by NATO an effective 
strategy for so-called state-building ventures? 
 
Origins of the Comprehensive Approach 
 
I turn first to the question of evolutions in the international security environment with a 
temporal focus initiating at the end of the Cold War. Following the break-up of the Soviet 
empire and a reduction in East–West tensions due to a clearly exhausted Soviet Union, 
the United States, attended by its Western allies, was poised for a “unipolar moment.”4 
This supposition assumed that the largely bi-polar structure which had characterized the 
international security environment following the Second World War would morph into a 
multi-polar one or that emerging powers, such as Japan, would contest the now singular 
position of the United States. Krauthammer believed that this evolution in the 
international security environment was the beginning of a new US-dominated period of 
history:  
The unipolar moment means that with the close of the century’s 
three great Northern civil wars (World War I, World War II and the 
Cold War) an ideologically pacified North seeks security and order 
by aligning its foreign policy behind that of the United States. That 
is what is taking place in the Persian Gulf. And for the near future, 
that is the shape of things to come.
5
  
 
                                                 
4. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990/91): 23–33.  
5. Ibid, 25. 
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While the new environment heralded a significant diminution, if not elimination, of the 
threat of major war, the unfreezing of the security situation generated the potential for 
conflict in states and regions that would have previously been considered de-stabilizing to 
the otherwise frozen bi-polar structure. This potential was actualized in the Gulf (1990), 
Bosnia (1992–1995), Rwanda (1994) and Kosovo (1999), amongst other settings. As 
such, by the mid-1990s it was clear that while the threat of major war had receded, 
complex emergencies would continue to rise in the future and that this would require new 
forms of responses from governments, militaries and civil actors including NGOs.
6
  
 
Given the founding mission of NATO as defender against a threat of potential Soviet 
aggression, the dissolution of the Soviet empire had a profound effect on the Alliance. 
The events of 1989–1991 signaled the beginning of a protracted period of Alliance 
transformation from an organization which was focused primarily on defence to one 
which was increasingly concerned with security in a broader sense. For example, a 1984 
survey of NATO-related literature revealed that most analyses had so far dealt with the 
military functions of the Alliance and its role in the defence against external aggression.
7
 
That said, analysis of earlier periods in NATO’s history revealed an underlying stratum 
of security orientation that occasionally manifested during periods of détente with the 
Soviet Union.
8
  
 
An important internal debate occurred during an interval of détente in the 1960s in which 
France, led by Charles de Gaulle, proposed that the bi-polar security dilemma could be 
resolved through dissolution of NATO altogether. This proposal was rejected by NATO, 
and France left the Alliance military structure which “multiplied the challenge 
represented by the sense of a declining threat.”9 The crisis of legitimacy created by this 
combination of internal discord and subsiding external threat resulted in a revitalized 
                                                 
6. Lisa Witzig Davidson, Margaret Daly Hayes, and James J. Landon, “Humanitarian and Peace 
Operations: NGOs and the Military in the Interagency Process,” in NDU Pressbook (National Defense 
University, December 1996), 27. 
7. Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO, The Formative Years (Kentucky: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 189. 
8. Frederic Bozo, “Defense versus security? Reflections on the Past and Present of the “Future 
Tasks” of the Alliance (1949-99) in A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years, Vol. 2, ed. Gustav Schmidt, 
(New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd., 2001), 66. 
9. Ibid, 71. 
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examination of the “transatlantic bargain” and the leadership role played by the US in 
NATO’s political dimension.10 The Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance, or 
Harmel Report, published in 1967, acknowledged the evolving security environment and 
confirmed that the Alliance had both a defense and security role. As Bozo explained: 
Yet NATO’s security functions had been implicit and in many ways 
passive during the first two decades; they were now explicit, and the 
pursuit of an active role in the management of East-West relations 
would, from then on, be the test of the Alliance’s being, in the words 
of the Report, “a dynamic and vigorous organization which is 
constantly adapting itself to changing conditions.”11  
 
The transformation process resulted in two major initiatives: engaging and cooperating 
with former adversaries including establishing institutional mechanisms to do so and 
projecting NATO into peace-making and crisis-management operations; actions in the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1992, 1993 and 1995 are the primary examples 
of this latter initiative.
12
 In December 1995, United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1031 authorized the stand-up of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) to be 
deployed into Bosnia, and this mission represented a significant milestone in NATO’s 
transformation process. Far from maintaining its traditional defensive posture, NATO-led 
troops engaged in a proactive peace agreement implementation action that involved non-
NATO troop contributing nations (including Russia) and a team of civilian specialists 
which provided technical advice to various actors in the Balkan theatre, including 
NGOs.
13
  
 
The IFOR mission underscored the reality that these types of engagements would, by 
necessity, require NATO to work alongside a diverse set of non-NATO actors. With 
                                                 
10. Karl Kaiser, “Characteristics of the Transatlantic Bargain During the Cold War,” in The 
Transatlantic Bargain,  ed. Mark Ducasse, (NATO Defense College with the Centre for Transatlantic 
Security Studies, Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University, January 
2012), 65. 
11. Bozo, 74. 
12. Ibid, 77. 
13. Larry Wentz, contributing editor, Lessons from Bosnia, The IFOR Experience, (Washington, 
D.C: United States Department of Defense, Command and Control Research Program, Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, 1998), 31. 
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respect to the civil-military interface, IFOR established a robust civil-military 
cooperation (CIMIC) capacity that was assigned to: 
conduct civil military operations in support of the military 
implementation of the peace plan; promote cooperation with the 
civilian populace, various agencies, and national governments; 
leverage capabilities of NGOs, international organizations (IO) and 
national governments; create a parallel, unified civilian effort in 
support of the peace plan implementation; and assist governmental, 
international, and non-governmental humanitarian, public safety, 
and health contingencies.
14
  
 
IFOR CIMIC teams engaged in a full spectrum of activities, including re-building 
infrastructure, training police and working alongside NGOs to support work with 
internally displaced persons. While considered successful at the tactical level, the IFOR 
CIMIC campaign suffered from a series of institutional and organizational shortfalls, 
including incompatible CIMIC doctrine amongst various troop-contributing nations; 
disorganization with respect to the deployment of CIMIC assets, particularly reservists; 
and a lack of unity of command which resulted in “turf battles” between various military 
headquarters as well as between civil and military actors. A related issue was the strained 
relationship between IFOR CIMIC assets and NGOs which was the result of mismanaged 
expectations on both parts following the transition from the preceding UN mission United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to IFOR.
15
  
 
Prior to IFOR, NATO’s understanding of CIMIC was limited to host-nation logistic-
support issues and ensuring that the civilian population did not interfere with military 
operations. Experiences in Bosnia emphasized, however, the critical interface between 
military and civil actors across many other dimensions in the context of complex 
operations.
16
 Important lessons (such as the elastic nature of civil and military roles, the 
                                                 
14. James J. Landon, “CIMIC: Civil-Military Cooperation,” in Lessons from Bosnia, The IFOR 
Experience, 121. 
15. Ibid, 122–135. 
16. For a detailed discussion of how the Bosnia experience influenced US Army 
counterinsurgency lessons learned, see David Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget – US Army 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2013), 106.  
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primacy of the political nature of such missions, the value and roles of non-national 
actors such as NGOs, and the importance of engaging host nation actors in order to 
facilitate mission transition) were relevant at the time and are arguably enduring.
17
  
 
Throughout the 1990s humanitarian crises continued unabated, and the international 
community was confronted with conflicts in Liberia (1990), Kuwait (1990), Northern 
Iraq (1991), Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1995), Sierra Leone 
(1997), Congo (1998), East Timor (1999) and Kosovo (1999). In most instances, these 
conflicts were of an intrastate, rather than interstate, type, and as a result, the international 
community struggled with concepts, both legal and normative, related to the right to 
intervene into sovereign states for the purpose of ending violence and enforcing 
international (i.e., UN) resolutions.
18
  
 
This debate was particularly active following the failure to intervene into Rwanda in 
1994 in order to forestall a genocide which ultimately saw between 500,000 and 
1,000,000 deaths. Ultimately, the right to intervene evolved into the international norm 
“right to protect” which was introduced by Canada in 2001, pioneered as a principle 
objective of the newly founded African Union in 2005 and affirmed by the United 
Nations Security Council in 2006. While considered a highly important and valuable 
emerging international norm, debates continued surrounding the authority for military 
intervention into sovereign states as well as why and how nations choose to intervene, or 
not, into specific crisis scenarios.
19
  
 
The nature of the intervention debate was altered radically by the decision of the United 
States to intervene in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. In both cases, military 
actions taken were designed to facilitate regime change which was viewed by the 
prevailing US administration as a unilateral right based on a fundamentalist neo-
                                                 
17. Ibid, 137–138. 
18. Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Right to Protect,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 
(November/December 2002): 100. 
19. See, for example, William A. Boettcher III, “Military Intervention Decisions Regarding 
Humanitarian Crises,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 3 (June 2004): 331–355. 
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conservative view of America’s power and pre-eminence in the international system.20 In 
both cases, the military actions were successful in defeating the adversary’s military 
forces and ousting regime leadership from power. In both cases, however, what was 
foreseen as short, focused campaigns to address the immediate threats emanating from 
those states evolved into protracted, costly and damaging exercises in state (re)building.
21
  
 
In spite of the dissimilarities in motivation between the Afghan/Iraq cases and the 
previous examples of so-called humanitarian intervention, all of these events pointed to a 
fundamental change in the international security environment: that is, a recurrent 
propensity to generate complex crises that required some form of response in order to 
contain immediate or potential threats to persons, states or the international system.  
 
As such, the international security environment was configured on the basis of potential 
threat types which invariably include large-scale conventional aggression by a peer or 
near peer competitor; instability resulting from fragile, failing or failed states; the spread 
of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons or weapons- grade 
materials into the hands of aggressor states or non-state entities such as terrorist groups; 
the proliferation of conventional weapons and weapon systems into unstable regions or 
states thereby exacerbating potential or ongoing conflicts; and threats posed by 
disruptions to information or cyber systems that may have military or economic 
repercussions. With respect to the threat posed by failing or failed states NATO doctrine 
asserts: 
Failing states are likely to become a more persistent and pervasive 
threat to global security. For example non-state actors may exploit 
the vacuum caused by their deterioration. There is potential to 
undermine the security of the Alliance in a world where concern for 
personal and collective security is gaining prominence over the 
defence of territory against conventional attack. A failed state that 
has little strategic significance in the traditional sense of resources 
or geographical location can take on strategic importance as a 
potential base for non-state actors. The Alliance may therefore 
                                                 
20. John G. Ikenberry, “The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment,” Survival 46, no. 1 (Spring 
2004): 8. 
21. Ibid, 19. 
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choose, or be called upon, to intervene more frequently to stabilize 
dangerous situations in poorly or ungoverned territory.
22
  
 
These developments occurred in a context of changes to underlying structural conditions 
in the international system (including globalization, shifts in political geometry that 
emphasize non-state entities, demographic changes, poverty and growing income 
disparity, environmental degradation and proliferation of new civil and military 
technologies). All of these conditions have the possibility for generating conflict or 
supporting potential adversaries including state actors, factions within states, or non-state 
actors any of which could resort to conventional, non-conventional or “hybrid” forms of 
warfare.
23
  
 
This general description of the security environment integrates three important 
characteristics. First is the focus on human activity which recalls Rupert Smith’s “war 
amongst the people.”24 Second is the spectrum of conflict, the nature of which, in the 
contemporary context, is frequently characterized as layered and simultaneous vice linear 
and sequential. Third, references to complexity and chaos are ubiquitous throughout 
contemporary security environment literature, and a complete volume focused on this 
subject and its varied implications for NATO highlighted the expectation that complexity 
is likely to remain a hallmark of Alliance operations in the future.
25
  
 
In order to generate appropriate responses to these complex scenarios, Western military 
planners frequently view these states from a systems’ perspective in order to identify and 
analyse relationships and dependencies amongst various sub-elements that make up the 
system (i.e., the state) as a whole. This analysis, in turn, theoretically provides planners 
with information needed to identify how the system should be improved on the basis of 
actions taken or resources expended.  
 
                                                 
22. NATO, AJP-01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine, Issued December 2010, 2-4. 
23. Ibid, 2-6. 
24. For a fulsome explanation of this term see Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (London: 
Penguin Group, 2005). 
25. Christopher M. Schnaubelt, ed., Complex Operations: NATO at War and on the margins of 
war (Rome, NATO Defense College, Research Division, NDC Forum Paper 14, July 2010), 5. 
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The inherently complex nature of societies conflated with the plethora of crises that may 
be contributing to state fragility or failure in the first place may lead to what Pam calls a 
“paradox of complexity.”26 This paradox results from the identification and labelling of a 
problem as complex which in turn leads to a conclusion that the solution to the problem 
must also be complex. This may prohibit useful action until a suitably complex solution 
can be devised, and this has propelled Western militaries (and NATO) to seek out a 
means of understanding and responding to these sorts of conditions.  
 
These efforts generated a belief that such complex crises could not be solved by military 
means alone and that interventions into fragile, failing or failed states would require the 
integrated application of all instruments of power (i.e., an integrated civil-military 
response). “To advance reform, prevent state failure, and promote peace and recovery in 
war-torn states, donors need to employ the entire panoply of policy instruments at their 
disposal. In short, stove-piped policy responses are ‘out,’ integrated approaches are 
‘in.’”27 While such thinking “supports a growing consensus that outward-focused, 
integrated, and multidisciplinary approaches to security threats and challenges must be 
the norm”28 individual governments, and the Alliance, have struggled to translate what 
appears to be an easily describable objective into a coherent and functioning practice in 
reality. Stewart and Brown believed that in designing integrated approaches to fragile 
states, the donor community is essentially “flying blind” due to a lack of knowledge 
regarding how to combine development, governance, rule of law and security; how to 
sequence these; and how to resolve the short-, medium- and long-term objectives of the 
various actors involved in such interventions.
29
  
 
Amongst the many challenges inherent in these integrated approaches is the relationship 
between militaries and NGOs which are operating in the same engagement space and 
                                                 
26. Jeremiah S. Pam, “The paradox of complexity: embracing its contribution to situational 
understanding, resisting its temptation in strategy and operational plans,” in Complex Operations: NATO at 
War and on the margins of war, ed. Christopher M. Schnaubelt, (Rome, NATO Defense College, Research 
Division, NDC Forum Paper 14, July 2010), 44. 
27. Patrick Stewart and Kaysie Brown. Greater than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing “Whole of 
Government” Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), viii. 
28. A. Leslie, M. Rostek, and M., P. Gizewski, “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to 
Canadian Forces Operations,” Canadian Military Journal  9 no. 1 (2006): 12. 
29. Stewart and Brown, 131. 
Chapter 1: The Comprehensive Approach: A Literature Review 
 
 
17 
 
which may be undertaking similar humanitarian, re-construction or development 
activities. While NGOs generally operate on a set of principles that include neutrality, 
impartiality and the preservation of humanitarian space, militaries generally differentiate 
between actors that benefit from and support the intervention and “spoilers.” 
 
Given that militaries in crisis situations may play a necessary role in the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to populations in areas where a lack of security does not permit safe 
access for NGOs or other aid delivery mechanisms, this is presumed to be a short-term 
solution, and once the security situation improves, military forces should cease such 
activities and allow NGOs to carry out this work. The situation is significantly more 
complex, however, in terms of reconstruction and development, and “there are many 
questions that the aid community does not seem to have clear answers to.”30  
 
Comprehensive Approach as State-Building Model 
 
All of the foregoing—an evolved security environment, the emergence of manifold 
failing and failed states, an acknowledgement of the complexity (bordering on chaos) 
inherent in these scenarios, and the intensified requirement for military forces and 
civilian agencies to operate in the same engagement space–required a coherent model that 
could effectively address these conditions. From approximately 2003 onwards, emergent 
models centered on principles of civil-military integration (such as the comprehensive 
approach) were increasingly, although not uniformly, adopted by most Western 
governments as a means of responding to these challenges.  
 
As an archetypal model of integrated approaches, the comprehensive approach proposes 
that security actors “promote the external and internal coordination of policy instruments 
and the coherence of objectives between different actors,”31 including military forces and 
all other organizations, agencies or other actors which are engaged in an intervention 
                                                 
30. Lara Olson and Hrach Gregorian, “Interagency and Civil-Military Cooperation: Lessons from 
a Survey of Afghanistan and Liberia,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 10, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 39. 
31. Claudia Major and Christian Moelling, “More than wishful thinking? The EU, UN, NATO and 
the comprehensive approach to military crisis management,” Studia Diplomatica LXII, no. 3 (2009): 21–
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(including the host nation). Further, it aims to “reinvigorate the way crisis responses 
should be planned and carried out in view of enhancing both its efficiency and legitimacy 
by harmonizing the interaction and interdependence of tasks and actors involved.”32 The 
model envisions that interactions between security and civil actors will occur both 
horizontally and vertically. The horizontal dimension requires the effective interaction of 
actors operating at the same level (tactical or field level, operational and strategic), while 
the vertical dimension necessitates effective interaction between these levels.
33
 While no 
one definition of a comprehensive approach model has been universally accepted or 
adopted and there are significant challenges inherent in fostering the effective 
interactions the model presumes, the intrinsic value of the model supports a belief that 
these shortfalls must be eventually addressed and overcome.
34
  
 
The optimism surrounding this model is based on various axioms that generally include a 
positive correlation between the coherent application of national instruments of power 
and a comprehensive approach (thereby making it presumably easier to achieve), and that 
a comprehensive approach provides for flexibility and cost effectiveness while addressing 
complex or hybrid threats.
35
  
 
While challenges to the model frequently cite an inevitable civil-military gulf, Hallett 
stressed that emphasis on the civil-military divide is of extremely limited utility. He 
views the comprehensive approach as “not simply the optimization of civil-military 
interaction, nor is it an internationalization of central planning in an effort to improve the 
efficiency of international community inputs.”36 This is based on a nuanced assessment 
that neither civil nor military actors are monolithic in their structures, processes, cultures 
                                                 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ibid,  23. 
34. Ibid, 28.  
35. See, for example, Stijn van Weezel, “The Use of Civil-Military Cooperation in a 
Comprehensive Approach,” CIMIC Messenger 3, no. 2 (February 2011); and Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, 
“Hybrid threats, cyber warfare and NATO’s comprehensive approach for countering 21st century threats – 
mapping the new frontier of global risk and security management,” Amicus Curiae no. 88 (Winter 2011): 
14–17. 
36. Michael Hallet, “Capabilities, not clothes – Distinctions between military and civil services are 
unnecessary,” Armed Forces Journal (June 2011): 1. 
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or other characteristics and that it is entirely possible that either civil organizations or 
military forces may possess similar capabilities.
37
  
 
This line of reasoning is extended by Angstrom who believes that much of the current 
research on the nature of civil and military entities and their relationships is based on an 
assumption that these categories are “fixed and global.”38 His thesis posits that this 
assumption is unhelpful in understanding the changing nature of civil and military actors 
and that these are better understood as malleable norms. If so, this gives rise to a 
spectrum of possible modes of civil-military interaction beyond the traditional view that 
civil-military relations are primarily concerned with the control of the military by 
governments.  
 
While Angstrom’s approach may account for the rise of certain phenomenon (such as 
private military security companies), the attempt to categorize the nature of civil and 
military actors on the basis of how they act, rather than on the source of their authority to 
act, leads to potential confusion and does not address the very real requirement for 
improved coordination and collaboration between legally authorized and internationally 
recognized civil and military entities engaged in a common space. This leads to a second, 
and equally recurring, challenge to the model that revolves around issues of coordination 
or unity of command. For example, Aaronson opines that: 
it is currently impossible to identify an international institution 
capable of coordinating all the efforts required to meet the 
challenges of a comprehensive approach to hybrid threats. Though 
this is a difficult and sensitive issue, it would nevertheless be useful 
to bring a variety of capabilities from different contributors to a 
single organization. But what would be its mandate and legal 
framework, and how would one ensure that it was recognized by all 
as the overall coordinator?
39
 
 
                                                 
37. Ibid. 
38. Jan Angstrom, “The changing norms of civil and military and civil-military relations theory,” 
Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no. 2, (2013): 226. 
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This gives rise to the question of how to think about the comprehensive approach. For 
example, it has been described as a philosophy, a way of thinking, an emergent 
phenomenon, a principle, a broader political level process, a collaborative process, 
doctrine, the generation and application of national and international instruments of 
power, the management of relationships, a means, a technique, a tool and, of course, a 
strategy. 
 
Wendling states that “the comprehensive approach ‘travels’ a lot, according to Sartori’s 
expression. Its significance is so vast, its origins so diverse and its meanings so varied 
that there is a risk of wanting to compare the use of the concept in its widest sense, 
without paying attention to the specific context in which it is implemented.”40 This wide 
variation in ideational approaches reveals the difficulties associated with concept 
definition and, therefore, situating the concept in a universally putative scheme. As a 
result, many of the organizations implicated by a comprehensive approach do not possess 
consistent or coherent interpretations, and this, in turn, leads to an inability to translate 
the concept into a useful instrument.
41
 I should point out that while this problem could 
lead to a conclusion that the concept is so vague, and its applications so diverse, as to 
render it meaningless, this would not be a valid assumption. As the remainder of this 
thesis will highlight, both individual nations and the Alliance took numerous concrete 
steps to embody it in both doctrine and practice, and while there was no firm agreement 
on where the conceptual edges of the model lay, it is clear that the model was central to 
national and international efforts to address the complex security and development 
challenges underway in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
 
Initially, NATO’s own position on the CA was to explain and emphasize the importance 
of the concept while avoiding definitive stances which could lead to the development of 
practical direction for the Alliance short of general policy pronouncements. For example, 
NATO’s web page on the CA states:  
                                                 
40. Cecile Wendling, The Comprehensive Approach to Civil-Military Crisis Management: A 
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41. Major and Moelling, 22. 
Chapter 1: The Comprehensive Approach: A Literature Review 
 
 
21 
 
the need to promote a Comprehensive Approach applies not only to 
operations but more broadly to many of NATO’s efforts to deal with 
21
st
 century security challenges, such as fighting terrorism, 
improving energy security, preventing proliferation of weapons and 
dangerous materials, protecting against cyber-attacks and 
confronting the threat of piracy.42  
 
As the CA became embedded in NATO policy, it began to appear in various guises, most 
recently within NATO’s revised planning doctrine which posits that “a comprehensive 
approach emerges through the determination of various actors to play their part to resolve 
a crisis” and that a CA can be described as a “means to ensure a coordinated and coherent 
response to crisis by all relevant actors.”43 In December 2010 NATO promulgated Allied 
Joint Publication 01-D, Allied Joint Doctrine that provided a more definitive view of the 
CA for NATO operations: 
NATO experiences in Afghanistan, Kosovo and other operations 
confirm the complexity of contemporary crises. Complex crises do 
not lend themselves to simple definition or analysis. Today’s 
challenges demand a comprehensive approach by the international 
community, including the coordinated action from an appropriate 
range of civil and military actors, enabled by the orchestration, 
coordination and de-confliction of NATO’s military and political 
instruments with the other instruments of power. This needs to be a 
broader cooperation and planning in accordance with the principles 
and decisions of relevant senior NATO bodies.
44
  
 
Meharg and St-Pierre linked the increasingly complex environment to “approaches to 
establishing security and to rebuilding states affected by conflict” and identified 10 
distinct approaches in the literature as follows:
45
  
                                                 
42. See http://www.nato.int/summit2009/topics_en/19-comprehensive_approach.html. 
43. NATO, Allied Command Operations, Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive Interim 
Version 1, 17 December 2010, 2-2. 
44. NATO, AJP-01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine, Issued December 2010, 2-11. 
45. Sarah Jane Meharg and Kristine St-Pierre, “Accommodating Complexity in New Operations,” 
in Mission Critical: Smaller Democracies’ Role in Global Stability Operation, ed. C. Leuprecht, J. Troy 
and D. Last, (Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
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3D 
whole-of-government 
joined up 
interagency 
comprehensive approach 
integrated missions 
hybrid/joint operations 
provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) 
clusters 
one UN  
 
Of these, the first five are identified as strategic-level approaches (which is consistent 
with my classification of the Comprehensive Approach as NATO strategy), while the 
latter five are identified as operational-level approaches. Although the authors discuss 
these variants or models in relation to specific nations or organizations (for example, 
NATO is associated only with the Comprehensive Approach), their methodology is 
somewhat restrictive in nature. For example, PRTs are arguably representative of an 
ISAF-associated effort to operationalize the Comprehensive Approach at the tactical 
level, and while the Comprehensive Approach is identified specifically with NATO, 
nations such as Canada and the United Kingdom explored variants of this model while, 
unlike NATO, falling short of adopting it as a formal strategy.  
 
Integrated approaches to crisis management have been a feature of the international 
security environment from approximately the mid-2000s, and de Conning and Friis 
suggested that the interest demonstrated in such approaches may be linked to a number of 
trends, amongst them the requirement for budgetary efficiency in crisis management; a 
need for greater coherence when different actors occupy the same space (with 
Afghanistan as the prime example); a need for operational efficiency in order to reduce 
the time spent in crisis management thereby reducing the number of casualties in order to 
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maintain public support for the operation; and a requirement for some organizations, such 
as NATO, to improve their legitimacy as they reach out to other actors.
46
 As I will note 
later in this thesis, these rationales, particularly with respect to NATO, fall into one of 
three classifications: institutional or functional rationales; theoretical rationales 
(particularly related to the acceptance of state building theories) and norm-based 
rationales.  
 
Wendling situated the concept in relation to broader theories within the realm of social 
science, in particular that of human and societal security; civil-military relations; 
peacekeeping and peace building; organizational issues in public policy and, most 
significantly, theories of state building. Within each of these areas of inquiry, the 
comprehensive approach is identified as an answer to some theoretical dilemma. This 
inquiry thus situates the comprehensive approach in an ideational context as much as it 
may be considered a type of forcing function to develop additional institutional 
capabilities or to leverage external ones. Of these ideas, several recurrent and persistent 
themes emerged from the literature, including the concept of human security and its 
implication for strategy; the nature and meaning of the comprehensive approach itself, 
not just in terms of labelling or definitions, but as strategy designed to achieve specific 
security objectives; the nature of civil-military cooperation which is arguably the root 
mechanism of the comprehensive approach, including the importance of the civil 
contribution (and the involvement of the host nation or indigenous peoples); and the 
relationship between the comprehensive approach and other concepts such as effects-
based thinking, counter-insurgency and civil-military cooperation. 
 
A persistent characteristic of the current security environment is the prevalence of fragile, 
failing and failed states and the plethora of negative consequences such situations 
manifest for human security. The concept of human security is, therefore, central to 
understanding the comprehensive approach as a strategy for responding to complex crises 
and undertaking state-building measures in order to improve human security in such 
settings. As Borgomano-Loup explains:  
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this evolution in ideas has resulted in the notions of human security 
and sustainable security. It is generally agreed that a state that is 
secure both within and outside its borders is stable, with a balance 
between good governance and sustainable economic development. 
The end of the Cold War made possible international cooperation to 
manage crises with a long term view not only of ending conflict but 
also of dealing with the root causes.
47
  
 
Central to the comprehensive approach is a discussion regarding “pragmatic ways and 
means of developing flexible and adaptive mechanisms, tools and processes for 
comprehensive crisis management that ultimately benefit the people suffering from crises 
and conflict.”48 It is the presence of violence in contested settings which arguably 
necessitates military involvement in a comprehensive approach and which distinguishes it 
from other forms of peacekeeping operations or the rubric of civil-military cooperation 
more generally.
49
 This is highly significant to Thruelsen who explains:  
This means that, whereas the interdependence between the political 
ambitions of the comprehensive approach and the realities on the 
ground are ultimately tested in a non-permissive environment, the 
two realities have to merge, otherwise the mission will fail. In the 
benign environment of the 1990s in, for example, the Balkans, the 
consequences of not merging governance with security were 
relatively minimal. In Afghanistan, however, the comprehensive 
approach has come up against the hard reality of conflict, which is 
thus the crucial challenge when a strong military actor engaged in a 
counter-insurgency campaign led to a large extent by military goals 
is leading the efforts.
50
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Neal and Wells trace the development and attempted implementation of the CA in NATO 
and link it to both “the need for effectiveness in an increasingly complex international 
environment, and efficiency in an era of declining defense resources.”51 While those 
conditions arguably generated the requirement for some form of coherent model to 
address them, the authors recognized that more than one model was possible and 
identified four concepts that could be associated with the CA:  
• an externally-driven comprehensive approach, led by an 
international political entity like the UN or the European 
Community, which NATO supports; 
• an Alliance-wide CA focused on NATO-led military operations 
that are multi-organizational/multi-national and of a complex nature; 
• national-level activities requiring “whole-of-government” (in the 
United States) or “cross government” (in the United Kingdom) 
approaches; and 
• sub-Alliance-wide activities, such as the “application of a CA in a 
3-star operational headquarters” as proposed by Julian Lindley-
French.
52
  
This analysis is representative of literature which was concerned not only with problems 
associated with actualizing the strategy within NATO but also fundamentally 
understanding it. Given that the article was written in 2011 and that NATO had been 
actively pursuing the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan since at least 2006, the 
misidentification of the strategy as either national- or operational-level is indicative of the 
struggle, in my opinion, of fully accepting the fact that the strategy was not, in fact, 
working and that further analysis would somehow finally reveal the elusive recipe for its 
success.  
 
In spite of having no officially agreed upon definition of the CA, efforts to parse the 
concept in NATO led to competing ideas and had “effect on how tools to perform and 
measure it can be developed, as well as for how educating and training on the approach 
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should be conducted.”53 Although the CA with its focus on bringing civilian and military 
actors together to address the contemporary security environment “must be a core 
competency of NATO,”54 analysis emanating from the Alliance posited that the concept 
as originally envisioned was shown to suffer in terms of its practical application and its 
ability to assume “robust collaborative interaction based on an agreed end state, overall 
mission objectives, and the means through which those objectives should be achieved.”55 
According to Hallet:  
this thick agreement is seldom obtainable, and when achieved, 
suffers from three major deficiencies: failure to embrace local actor 
priorities—it reflects the interests and objectives of the 
“International Community” more than those of local actors; 
statement generation on common objectives without resource 
commitments; and failure to provide adequate direction for mission 
agreed objectives. In other words, there is a guidance gap between 
the thick CA political level agreement and the guidance necessary 
for planners to do their work.
56
  
 
This analysis led to a conclusion that while “problems of an extremely complex nature 
and present security environments require activities beyond the organic capability set of 
any one single organization,” 57 the CA as a strategy to achieve this cannot, as will be 
described in later chapters, effectively meet these challenges.  
 
Having now reviewed or been familiarized the Comprehensive Approach as a model 
which was ultimately adopted by NATO as its primary strategy in the Afghan campaign, 
it will be useful to briefly introduce three doctrinal concepts that developed and matured 
to varying degrees within NATO and which I identify as antecedent concepts to the 
Comprehensive Approach; these are: the effects-based approach to operations, civil-
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military cooperation and counter-insurgency. The intent of this section is to address the 
question of whether the comprehensive approach developed as a new idea or did it build 
on earlier doctrinal or conceptual platforms. I argue the latter case. 
 
Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) 
 
For NATO, the effects based approach to operations (EBAO) was considered an 
evolutionary, if not revolutionary, development in terms of how the Alliance could 
operate in the complex security environment and, in particular, how such complex 
missions could be planned on the basis of understanding a systems’ approach.  
 
EBAO is an evolution of the US concept of effects-based operations (EBO). As an 
operational air force-centric doctrine, US EBO was concerned with the need to improve 
targeting such that the kinetic effects of bombing or destroying physical targets could be 
somehow linked to the non-kinetic objectives or end states of the operation; that is, EBO 
sought to link tactical actions to operational-level outcomes. Over time, the emphasis on 
effects expanded the EBO concept from its tactical-operational focus to a more expansive 
view of effects across the entire tactical-operational-strategic continuum.
58
 This, in turn, 
gave rise to the centrality of systems’ theory, and systems’ theory figures prominently in 
EBO, and later EBAO, doctrine. In this context, systems’ theory is assumed to, if not 
eliminate that complexity, at least permit a degree of certainty in the planning and 
execution of military campaigns in complex environments. This is a significant 
development for Mitchel who believed:  
In terms of military science, EBAO represents the meeting place 
between the social sciences and the long domination by the 
natural/physical sciences of time and space within the Operational 
Planning Process. It is not a chance encounter; the development of 
EBAO is an attempt to reduce the complexity produced by the non-
linear strategic interaction in modern conflicts.
59
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This desire to reduce the complex nature of modern warfare led to criticisms of the 
effects-based approach, citing both the enduring nature of warfare as inherently complex 
(i.e., what’s new?) and an unrealistic expectation that such scientific approaches could 
reduce massively complex systems to a point at which second, third or “n” order effects 
could be accurately predicted.
60
 The promise of reducing complex systems into 
manageable military problems via tools such as systems of systems analysis and 
operational net assessment led to the rejection of EBO as US doctrine by the then 
commander of US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), General Mattis, in August 
2008.
61
  
 
While EBO waxed and waned within the US military doctrinal community, NATO 
initiated conceptual development on its own version of EBO as early as 2003, and in 
2007, NATO published the bi-strategic Pre-Doctrinal Handbook on NATO’s Effects-
based Approach to Operations.
62
 This publication defined EBAO as “the coherent and 
comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance combined with the 
practical cooperation with involved non-NATO actors, to create desired effects necessary 
to achieve objectives and ultimately the NATO end state” 63  and was based upon a series 
of principles including the requirement to harmonize the contributions of the various 
instruments of the Alliance and, where appropriate, the actions of sovereign states and 
other actors.  
 
Smith-Windsor identified three broad influences that potentially caused NATO to pursue 
EBAO. First, was the change in the international security environment which saw linear 
and attritionist approaches—which were the hallmark of the Western–Soviet competitive 
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era — give way to out-of-area crisis prevention and humanitarian operations. These types 
of operations caused the Alliance to consider the requirements for operating in complex 
environments and scenarios which, in turn, required the Alliance to work more closely 
with non-NATO and civilian actors, and this was reflected in NATO’s 1999 Strategic 
Concept.
64
  
 
Second was the role, increasing power and availability of technologies that could enhance 
the intellectual capability of military planners, and she cites Hunerwadel who posited that 
the availability of new technologies permit “collaborative information sharing and the 
imposition of very precise effects across vast distances; they also benefit from theory that 
enables better anticipation of some complex system behaviours.”65  
 
Finally, she acknowledged the possibility that EBAO simply represented an evolution of 
earlier military thought extending back over generations. For example, Napoleonic 
thought revealed that “during a campaign whatever is not profoundly considered in all its 
details is without result. Every enterprise should be conducted according to a system; 
chance alone can never bring success.”66 This Napoleonic proposition may well be 
descriptive of modern-day EBAO theory. 
 
A key aspect of EBAO is the desire to generate effects by actions within an engagement 
space in order to accomplish objectives and the end state. The engagement space refers to 
“that part of the strategic environment in which the Alliance decides to engage and where 
the interaction of different actors creates conditions that may be acceptable or 
unacceptable to the Alliance in terms of its end state. For easier understanding, the 
engagement space is divided into military, political, economic and civil (MPEC) 
domains.”67 These four domains are analysed from a systems’ perspective in order to gain 
                                                 
64. Brooke Smith-Windsor, “Hasten Slowly - NATO’s Effects Based and Comprehensive 
Approach to Operations- Making sense of the past and future prospects” (Rome, NATO Defense College, 
Research Division, Research Paper 38, July 2008), 2. 
65. J. P. Hunerwadel, “The effect based approach to operations: questions and answers,” Air and 
Space Power Journal (Spring 2006): 54. 
66. David Chandler, ed., Napoleon's Marshals (London: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), 
145. 
67. NATO, Bi-Strategic Command. Pre-Doctrinal Handbook, “NATO’s Effects Based Approach to 
Operations,” December 2007, 2-2. 
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knowledge of the main actors so that appropriate actions, both kinetic and non-kinetic, 
may be taken; actor behaviour altered; and desired effects achieved. EBAO consists of 
four primary functions which “are carried out in a continuous, interactive, parallel 
process and should not be regarded as sequential steps.” These are knowledge 
development, planning, execution and assessment.
68
  
 
EBAO developed many conceptual elements which were picked up by the CA, 
particularly an emphasis on interaction and harmonization with non-military actors and 
means. That said, EBAO remained pre-doctrinal as a result of some members of the 
Alliance remaining unconvinced of its efficacy and concerns regarding the implication 
that it may require the generation of non-military capacity as well as what obligations and 
burdens this might engender for Alliance members. The manner in which the EBAO pre-
doctrinal material was circulated and promulgated beyond Allied Command 
Transformation also raised apprehensions in Allied Command Operations and 
elsewhere.
69
 
 
While many of the basic concepts found in EBAO, particularly that of the importance of 
effects at the operational and strategic levels, have become enduring features of NATO 
doctrine, the term itself and interest in it as formal canon has all but disappeared and has 
been supplanted by the CA. For example, EBAO does not appear in any recent NATO 
doctrine including AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine (December 2010); the Comprehensive 
Operations Planning Directive (December 2010); and the NATO Operations Assessment 
Handbook (March 2011). The latter publication does, however, retain many EBAO 
concepts and theories. 
                                                 
68. Ibid., 2-7 to 2-8. 
69. Author discussion held with General R. Henault (Retired), former Chair of the NATO Military 
Committee, June 6, 2012. 
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Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 
 
The term civil-military cooperation is frequently conflated with civil-military 
coordination (CMCoord) and the subject of civil-military relations more generally.
70
 
While CMCoord seeks to promote “the essential dialogue and interaction between 
civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and 
promote humanitarian principles”71 within NATO, “CIMIC is the link to the civil 
environment and the military facilitator in a comprehensive approach.”72 It is a set of not 
only military functions that support the commander’s mission by establishing and 
maintaining coordination and cooperation between the military force and civil actors in 
the commander’s area of operations but also military capabilities that may be applied 
across the strategic-operational-tactical continuum.
73
 The core functions of CIMIC 
include civil-military liaison; support to the military force; and support to civil actors, 
with this latter function representing the key link between CIMIC and the CA.
74
 
Discharging these CIMIC functions raises a number of important issues including how 
goals and objectives of civil and military actors may be reconciled, what are the impacts 
of military-driven assistance and reconstruction efforts, and how civil and military actors 
can share information in order to achieve a level of mutual awareness and understanding.  
 
NATO acknowledges that not only is the operating environment complex but that 
complexity is the result of diverse civil actors which will be present and influencing the 
environment and therefore how NATO conducts operations. “The civil environment 
involves a myriad of ethnic, religious, ideological and capability drivers, which require 
                                                 
70. Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom and Stuart Gordon, “Trends and challenges in 
humanitarian civil–military coordination: A review of the literature,” (HPG Working Paper, Humanitarian 
Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, May 2012).  
71. United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Civil-Military Guidelines 
and Reference for Complex Emergencies, 2008. OCHA’s mandate includes the coordination of 
humanitarian response, policy development and humanitarian advocacy. For more information see 
www.unocha.org.  
72. NATO, Allied Joint Publication 9, NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 
2003, ix. 
73. Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR), “CIMIC Capabilities - An overview of 
doctrine, structures and courses in selected NATO member countries,” (Results of the CIMIC-study in 
CIOR 2010).  
74. Ibid. 
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sustainable solutions in societies ravaged by conflicts, disasters or humanitarian 
catastrophes.”75 While earlier CIMIC doctrine, particularly that which was developed in 
the US, focused on ensuring that civilians did not interfere with military operations,
76
 
those operations which occur in the context of counter-insurgencies, humanitarian 
missions, post-conflict stabilization, or disaster recovery are, by definition, occurring in 
the midst of a civilian population which cannot be marginalized. Indeed, the strategic 
centre of gravity in most counter-insurgency theory and doctrine is the contested 
population. 
 
For Anders, the purpose of CIMIC is clear: force protection for the military. Although he 
recalled US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 2001 statement that NGOs are a valuable 
force multiplier for the military and identified this as a seminal moment in the 
development of comprehensive approaches, his main argument was directed not at 
military forces per se but, rather, at private military and security companies (PMSC) who 
engaged in activities normally conducted by NGOs. So while he acknowledged the 
research which pointed out the generally conflictual nature of civil-military relations, he 
viewed the lessons derived from this research as a possible means of explaining and 
indeed improving NGO-PMSC relations.
77
 Given an ongoing quest in both military and 
civil sectors to understand how civil-military relations in operational settings may be 
improved, this line of reasoning is, however, less than persuasive. 
 
While NATO CIMIC doctrine stresses that the implications of military action on the civil 
environment should be considered at all stages of an operation, it also recognizes that “it 
may be impossible to achieve harmony between the civil actors and the requirements of 
the military mission.”78 For example, in the Afghanistan context, tensions between 
military and civilian actors was particularly acute in relation to issues such as the conduct 
of night raids into suspected insurgent houses and civilian casualties caused by military 
                                                 
75. NATO, AJP-9, ix. 
76. Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, “Countering Insurgent-terrorism: Why NATO Chose The Wrong 
Historical Foundation For CIMIC,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 17, no.4 (2006):  417. 
77. Birthe Anders, “Tree-huggers and baby-killers: The relationship between NGOs and PMSCs 
and its impact on coordinating actors in complex operations,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no.2 (2013): 
284. 
78. Ibid. 
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operations,
79
 and such actions may be reflective of NATO’s traditional focus on the 
defense of territory rather than the protection of civilian populations which is normally 
the responsibility of affected states and governments.
80
  
 
Funding projects that are perceived to contribute to mission success (i.e., support 
stabilization and reconstruction efforts) or, in the case of COIN, provide opportunities to 
influence the local population by means of economic or infrastructure incentives are also 
a key CIMIC function. Within NATO: 
there are two main types of funding sources for CIMIC field work—
national funding and grants to NATO operational level command 
entities. National level funding in the mission theatre will be 
coordinated through the respective J9
81
 in order to de-conflict and 
harmonise all field work efforts at the appropriate level. 
Prioritisation of CIMIC field work (e.g., reconstruction and 
development) remains with the commander in the joint operational 
area. Command responsibility in CIMIC is to consult and co-
ordinate the conduct of CIMIC field work at subordinate levels.
82
 
 
The funding of such projects by military forces remains a highly contested practice 
within the international development community for at least two reasons. First, the 
practice is perceived to blur the roles of military and civilian development actors and 
agencies in contravention of the core humanitarian principles of neutrality and 
impartiality
83
 and there is scant evidence that such aid contributes positively to either the 
overall level of economic well-being on the ground or supports the goal of stability.
84
 As 
explained by Harvie on behalf of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and 
Performance (ALNAP): 
Hearts and minds tactics—the exchange of material rewards for 
information, cooperation and political support—have a long history 
in military practice and are deemed to have force protection benefits. 
                                                 
79. See http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4652. 
80. Metcalfe, Haysom and Gordon, 24. 
81. The J9 is the senior CIMIC officer in a headquarters staff. 
82. NATO, AJP-9, 3-13. 
83. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182. 
84. Wilton Park, Wilton Park Conference Report 1022, “Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ in 
Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations,” (UK, March 2010). 
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However, they remain deeply contentious from the perspective of 
the independence and impartiality of humanitarian action. In 
Afghanistan, the military’s delivery of assistance in similarly 
painted vehicles, dressed in civilian clothing, and the conditionality 
placed on military aid in return for intelligence have been 
particularly controversial.
85
  
 
The practice of engaging in non-military activities, such as acting as development agents, 
also weakens the overall capacity of the military force and redirects military resources 
from focusing efforts on establishing security and, thereby, setting the conditions for 
civilian actors and agencies to engage in reconstruction activities.
86
 Reflecting on the role 
of military forces providing humanitarian assistance, Clarke asserted that “a military 
force may hope to be seen as a humanitarian actor, but that is both logically impossible 
and militarily self-defeating.”87  
 
An additional challenge within CIMIC doctrine and practice is that of information 
sharing amongst military and civilian actors in the engagement space. NATO’s proposed 
solution to this issue is viewed primarily, although not exclusively, as a technical 
challenge. To address this, NATO established a Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) 
which maintains a civil-military web portal and “facilitates the sharing of open-source 
unclassified information between civilian and military actors working on complex crises 
in order to enhance their sense of shared awareness.”88 The CFC represents a functional 
concept in the context of a more expansive CIMIC model that incorporates an operating 
concept of Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction (FCCMI) which “aims to 
enhance NATO’s ability to interact at the most appropriate levels with non-NATO Actors 
                                                 
85. Paul Harvey et al, “The State of the Humanitarian System Report,” Active Learning Network 
for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2010), 45. 
86. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, eds., “Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and 
Issues in Humanitarian Relations,” Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group Report 21 
(March 2006). 
87. W. Clarke, “The Humanitarian Dimension in Kosovo: Coordination and Competition,” in 
Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience. Command and Control Research Program, ed. L. Wentz 
(US Department of Defense, 2002), 209 
88. See https://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/v6/welcome.html. 
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in order to improve Alliance contributions to crisis prevention and management.”89 This 
model is shown at Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction 
 
Given the criticality of civil-military cooperation to the CA, Rietjens was concerned with 
the identification of an appropriate process model through which key questions regarding 
the execution of civil-military cooperation could be explored, and his research questions 
were: 
What are the phases in the process of civil-military 
cooperation? 
What factors influence the process of civil-military cooperation 
and can enhance the understanding of the phases in this 
process?  
What constitutes the outcome of civil-military cooperation?90  
In a later analysis, he shifted his emphasis from process identification to an examination 
of fundamental requirements for effective civil-military cooperation including 
information gathering, the need for civil-military cooperation, the nature of military 
institutions, as well as the concerns of the local population and humanitarian 
                                                 
89. NATO tasking for the military implementation of the CPG 2006–2007 (IMSM-0387-2006). 
This document orders ACT to complete MC 0550 Para 24a task by developing the Future Comprehensive 
Civil Military Concept, (October 2006). 
90. Sebastiaan Rietjens, “Civil Military Cooperation to a Complex Emergency: Just Another 
Drill?” (PhD diss. University of Twente, 2006),  xi. 
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organizations.
91
 His conclusion that civil-military alliances are generally ad hoc in nature 
underscored his assertion that improved cooperation must be based on the development 
of structures to take into account the various information requirements such alliances 
demand. Information, and more broadly, knowledge, was also at the centre of de 
Carvalho and Haugevik’s analysis of civil-military cooperation in the context of 
multinational and interagency operations.
92
 The challenge of information sharing between 
civil and military actors in the context of the CA will be analysed in greater detail in 
Chapter 3. 
 
The civilian actors most frequently cited as problematic in the context of civil-military 
cooperation are NGOs that will, and must, operate in the same engagement space as 
military forces during complex crises. Significant intellectual effort was expended on the 
challenges this fact produced and on seeking processes or models that could be utilized to 
ensure effective interaction. Borgomano-Loup, for example, suggested that NATO select 
appropriate degrees or levels of interaction or cooperation with NGOs and asserted that 
consistency, effectiveness, efficiency and subsidiarity were the most important qualities 
for military-NGO relations.
93
 While asserting that enhancement of interaction between 
NGOs and NATO is both desirable and feasible, “priority should be given to the NGOs 
whose field of competence is close to NATO’s activities.”94 Other analysts emphasized 
the key role played by NGOs in such crisis settings and that NGO capabilities should be 
leveraged by crisis management actors.
95
 I acknowledge here that the term NGO  has not 
yet been given precise meaning and that it is being applied rather loosely; this 
imprecision will be addressed later in Chapter 3 when I examine and compare militaries 
                                                 
91. Bas Rietjens, “Understanding the Performance of Civil-Military Cooperation: A Case Study of 
the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team,” in Challenges of Effective Cooperation and Coordination in 
Peace Operations, The Pearson Papers 11, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 66. 
92. Benjamin de Carvalho and Kristin M. Haugevik, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Multinational 
and Interagency Operations, Discussion Paper on Operational Terminologies and Assessment for 
Multinational Experiment 5,” Security in Practice 2 (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2007): 3. 
93. Laure Borgomano-Loup, “Improving NATO-NGO Relations in Crisis Response Operations,” 
(Rome, NATO Defense College, Research Branch, 2007), 53. 
94. Ibid., 60. 
95. K. Rintakoski and M. Autti, eds., “Comprehensive approach, Trends, Challenges and 
Possibilities for Cooperation in Crisis Prevention and Management Based on the Comprehensive Approach 
seminar,” Seminar publication (Helsinki, 17 June 2008). 
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and NGOs in a context of how NATO attempted to implement the CA at strategic, 
operational and tactical levels.  
 
Counter-Insurgency (COIN) 
 
Having chosen to situate EBAO and CIMIC as both conceptually antecedent to the CA 
and as evolved or evolving NATO doctrine, situating theories and practices of counter-
insurgency in relation to the CA presents an arguably more complex challenge. This is 
true for three reasons. First, it has been suggested by some analysts that a 
“comprehensive approach” is merely a desirable characteristic of successful counter-
insurgency operations or that the CA and COIN may be conflated conceptually.
96
 Second, 
if these propositions are deemed to be incorrect (as I will argue), then it remains to show 
what the nature of the relationship between COIN and the CA actually is. Third, recent 
evolutions in COIN theory point to the rise of a “globalized insurgency” which raises the 
potential requirement for developing a “globalized counter-insurgency.” Such thinking 
may, in turn, underscore the challenges associated with the conduct of counter-
insurgency operations in a defined geo-spatial location (i.e. Afghanistan) and help to 
explain further why it was unsuccessful in that context.  
 
The study of COIN affords a significant body of literature developed over successive 
periods of history by multiple theorists and practitioners, many of whom are now 
recognized as prominent contributors to this field.
97
 Of these COIN luminaries such 
names as Mao Tsetung, T.E. Lawrence, Charles Callwell, David Galula, Robert 
Thompson, Frank Kitson, John Nagl, David Kilcullen and, most recently, David Petraeus, 
would be amongst the best known and most cited.
98
  
 
                                                 
96. Andrew Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth – The British experience of irregular 
warfare (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 11. 
97. An extensive collection of COIN references may be found at the UK Joint Services Command 
and Staff College, Library Bibliography, Research Guide Series, Counter-insurgency, 2011. 
98. For a recent and insightful discussion of the contribution various “warrior-scholars” have made 
to counter-insurgency theory and practice see Andrew Mumford and Bruno C. Reis (ed), The Theory and 
Practice of Irregular Warfare – Warrior scholarship in counter-insurgency (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2014). 
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 COIN literature tended to emerge from the experiences and reflections of “warrior-
scholars”99 in relation to specific historical conflicts many of which provided the basis for 
evolutionary COIN thought. These span several decades and geographical settings and 
were arguably linked to ongoing developments or changing conditions in the 
international environment at the time. Thus, many of the most-studied counter-
insurgencies are identified with specific “eras” and for the sake of expediency these may 
be classified as: 
 
 Colonial Era (COIN example: Boer War) 
 Revolutionary Era (COIN example: Mao’s takeover of China) 
 De-colonization Era (COIN example: Malaya, Kenya) 
 Cold War Era (COIN example: Vietnam, Northern Ireland) 
 Modern Era (COIN example: Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka) 
 Post-Modern or Globalized Era (COIN example: ISIS in Syria and Iraq?)   
 
The above “shopping list” of counter-insurgencies operations should not lead to a 
conclusion that COIN remained the dominant form of military doctrine throughout these 
eras. Similarly, while Mao’s insurgency (which culminated in victory in 1949) is an oft-
cited example of insurgent innovation (in that he eschewed the principle of territorial 
dominance in favour of “winning the population”)100 the adoption of Maoist principles by 
most Western nations (particularly the British) during the subsequent eras did not 
necessarily translate into counter-insurgent victories.
101
 The US failure in South Vietnam 
(as the foremost example) ensured that US COIN doctrine remained subservient, if not 
                                                 
99
 A theory of “warrior-scholarship” forms the framework of Mumford and Reis’s study The 
Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare. See Chapter 1 of this volume for a detailed discussion of the 
theory. 
100. John Mackinlay. The Insurgent Archipelago (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 
17. 
101. The British are frequently heralded as the most successful counter-insurgents due to 
“successes” in Kenya, Malaya and Northern Ireland. This “myth” is effectively negated by Andrew 
Mumford in his work The Counter-Insurgency Myth, and is also addressed by John Mackinlay in The 
Insurgent Archipelago wherein he suggests that the colonial “effect” had ensured that the local populations 
had already more or less acquiesced to British control and this made the task of COIN more likely to 
succeed. 
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enslaved, to so-called conventional warfare doctrine which stressed mass, speed and 
technology.
102
       
 
Western interventions into Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 significantly altered the 
trajectory of COIN as the subject gained new prominence in theory, doctrine and practice 
due to the devolution of these campaigns into COIN-dominated operations. According to 
Andrew Mumford, “If the War on Terror is the defining conflict of the early twenty-first 
century, then counter-insurgency is the defining mode of waging war against the enemies 
of Western states.”103  
 
While General Richards was prepared to argue in 2007 that NATO did not possess COIN 
doctrine of its own,
104
 by 2009 ISAF had adopted COIN as its primary operational 
approach. This coincided with the appointment of General Petraeus as Commander of 
ISAF (COMISAF), who had recently shifted from his command appointment in Iraq, and 
common canon asserts that his COIN methods and associated troop surge were 
responsible for the apparently improved security and stability conditions in that 
country.
105
 With approximately 2600 deaths in Iraq in 2011 and increasing levels of 
violence throughout 2012, 2013 and into 2014, the so-called successes created by COIN 
in that setting do not, however, appear to be enduring.
106
 
                                                 
102. Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure Victory – Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in 
the Vietnam War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 40. 
103. Andrew Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth, 5. 
104. John Mackinlay. The Insurgent Archipelago (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 
45. 
105. See http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/2672/counter-insurgency-in-iraq-and-
afghanistan-an-interview-with-john-nagl.“Victory has a thousand fathers, and the success of the surge has a 
thousand causes. Certainly the new counter-insurgency strategy Gen. Petraeus implemented by focusing 
first on providing security to the population, the additional troops he had with which to implement that 
strategy, the tribal outreach we both took advantage of and encouraged, the Sunni awakening, and the ‘Sons 
of Iraq’ flipping from fighting with al-Qaida to fighting against al-Qaida, and the subsequent decision by 
Sadr and the Shia militias to renounce armed violence and take political action to achieve their objectives—
all of those things factor in to the success of the surge. I would say that the mental construct that Gen. 
Petraeus had of how to counter an insurgency was the single most important factor. He understood what he 
was trying to accomplish in a different way than his predecessors did and he took advantage of 
opportunities as they became available to him,” 18 September 2008. 
106. See United States Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Iraq 2012 OSAC 
Crime and Safety Report, 3 March 2012, 
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But what exactly is COIN and how does it differ from the CA? NATO defines COIN as a 
“set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological 
activities required to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances.”107 This 
definition is instructive from two perspectives. First, the definition itself is 
straightforward, if not deceptively simple, given the vast array of activities and spheres of 
endeavor it implicates. Second, some form of linkage to the CA may be assumed given 
reference to those activities which fall within the civilian realm.
108
  
  
NATO’s doctrine is similar to many Western nations which also adopted or revised their 
COIN doctrine in light of their participation in the Afghan and Iraqi operations. Oft cited 
COIN theorist David Galula provided a useful summary of the most prominent COIN 
theories which underlie much of that doctrine, including his four “laws” of counter-
insurgency: 
1.The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population 
rather than control of territory; 
2.Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support 
of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active 
friendly minority; 
3.Support of the population may be lost. The population must be 
efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of 
retribution by the opposite party; and 
4.Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing 
or driving away armed opponents, then gaining support of 
the population, and eventually strengthening positions by 
building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships 
with the population. This must be done area by area, using a 
                                                                                                                                                 
general decline in terrorist-related violence, the security situation in Iraq remains fluid. In December 2011, 
U.S. forces completely withdrew from Iraq. Terrorists and insurgent groups continue to conduct large-
scale, lethal attacks that often target personnel and facilities associated with both American organizations 
and the Government of Iraq. Insurgents also continue to carry out effective small-scale attacks throughout 
Iraq that cause fewer casualties but hinder free movement and influence public opinion regarding safety 
and security.” 
107. NATO, Allied Joint Publication 3.4.4, Counterinsurgency, Study Draft 2, May 2009, 3-19. 
108. Ibid., 1-4 to 1-5. 
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pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a 
neighbouring area.
109
  
The focus of COIN is, thus, closely related to a contested population, and COIN theory 
provides various prescriptions for how a counter-insurgency may “win hearts and minds.” 
David Kilcullen described a three-pillar framework for COIN which, not surprisingly, 
held that security, political and economic pillars are necessary to obtain control of a 
population, and these are based on information including intelligence, information 
operations and media operations. His model is presented at Figure 2.
110
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Kilcullen’s COIN Framework 
 
This multi-faceted approach is echoed in most national COIN doctrine and points to the 
need to eliminate root causes of an insurgency as the only logical means of permanently 
defeating it.
111
 Chapter 3 of this thesis will examine the extent to which the US and ISAF 
resourced the COIN campaign in Afghanistan from the perspective of force ratios, 
including the ratio of counter-insurgents to insurgents and counter-insurgents to the 
population and I will argue that while various COIN theories were understood by the US 
                                                 
109. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, Connecticut: 
Praeger Security International, 1964), 71. 
110. See http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf 
111. United Kingdom, Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, Security and Stabilisation, The Military 
Contribution, November 2009, xi. 
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and its NATO allies, these were not translated into practice, with the result that the COIN 
campaign in Afghanistan subsequently failed. 
 
While there is a relationship between COIN and the CA, they differ in three substantive 
ways. First, the CA is a strategy, while COIN is an operational-level approach. This is 
clearly the view of Emile Simpson who noted that “Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan is 
frequently described as a strategy. It isn’t. Counter-insurgency is an operational 
approach: a method which organises actions in service of a strategy, but not a strategy in 
itself. A strategy connects an operational approach to its ends, the objectives of policy, 
and adjusts both in so doing.”112  
 
In this regard, the relationship between CA and COIN is similar to the CA and other 
operational-level approaches (for example, programs undertaken by international 
organizations to strengthen specific aspects of the “host nation”). These operational-level 
tools are utilized to achieve specific objectives (for example, security, improved 
governance, or improved economic conditions) which are situated at the end of 
conceptual lines of operation embedded in an overarching (i.e. comprehensive) strategic 
campaign framework.    
However, as in conventional war, were operational doctrine to be 
up-scaled to the level of policy, there would be a risk that it would 
crowd out real strategic debate: hard political choices about what 
political end-state is to be sought may well be neglected, as the 
generic policy aims of doctrine, such as ‘avoiding state failure’, 
become the actual policy aims.
113
  
Second, COIN and the CA differ on the basis of focus. Counter-insurgency operations are 
military-led and are, not surprisingly, focussed on the insurgency, and more specifically, 
on the insurgents. The endstate of COIN operations is the successful defeat of the 
insurgency and this can only be achieved if the insurgents are defeated militarily (e.g. 
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka), physically isolated from the host population (e.g. Malaya) or 
integrated into the mainstream political process (e.g. Northern Ireland).  
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Success in counter-insurgency, therefore, is constructed of a 
subjective interpretation of an eradication of insurgent violence; 
however, this is often the result of overt political compromise, 
which questions whether ‘success’ is therefore the right word to 
describe a strategic outcome.
114
 
This contrasts with the CA, which is focussed not only on the short-term internal security 
situation and the threat posed to the “legitimate government” by the insurgency (the 
intent of which is to seize political power) but on broader factors and conditions which 
are necessary to achieve long-term stability and prosperity such that future insurgencies 
are unlikely to emerge again. In the case of Afghanistan, for example, the inability of 
NATO to address the regional and, indeed, international, factors at play in Afghanistan 
(particularly the role of Pakistan) virtually ensured that the COIN operation, which was 
limited in force size, geographical scope and timeframe, could not succeed. 
 
Third, and finally, COIN and the CA differ in their treatment of the host nation as the 
most significant actor in the crisis. Most COIN doctrine models insurgency as a struggle 
between insurgents (who are generally assumed to be indigenous actors who possess 
some form of grievance and seek to resolve that grievance through the acquisition of 
political power); the local population which may be either neutral or supportive of the 
insurgency to some degree or another; and counter-insurgents who are external actors and 
whose role it is to “win hearts and minds” on behalf of the host nation government such 
that the majority of the local population no longer supports the insurgency on the 
assumption that this is the decisive factor to achieve success.
115
    
 
This model is in contrast with the CA which views the host nation government as the 
critical actor. While the importance of good host-nation government is noted in most 
COIN doctrine, actions of the indigenous government are generally not portrayed as the 
critical factor in determining the ultimate outcome of the COIN operation. Rather, the 
government is viewed as a well-meaning recipient of external beneficence which is 
prepared to act rationally and consistently within the framework desired by the external 
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interveners.  Clearly, the evolving situations in Afghanistan and Iraq belie this 
assumption. In these cases, the actions of these governments (to undermine the 
democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan and to pursue sectarian exclusivity and 
dominance in Iraq) have led to retardation, if not outright reversal, of whatever gains 
were made under the periods of external intervention in those states. 
 
In the final section of this discussion of the relationship and relevance of COIN to the 
CA, the theory of insurgency as a globalized phenomenon will be introduced.  I have 
already noted Mao’s innovative contribution to “pre-globalized” insurgent theory, 
namely, that “winning” the local population, and not territory per se, was deemed the 
decisive factor in a successful insurgency. In addition to this general formula, Mackinlay 
summarized other elements of the Maoist approach, as follows:  
 
 Insurgency is the expedient of the weaker side – it would not choose 
to be an insurgent if other options were available 
 
 He identified the importance of the population of the intervening 
side, as well as the population of the local population 
 
 He stressed the importance of ideology – the message 
 
 He made the important connection the environment (urban vs rural 
for example) and the opportunities these provided to the insurgent 
 
 He exploited the human terrain by the identification of “an 
overwhelming sense of grievance”  
 
 He used the reaction of the counter-insurgent force to drive the local 
population towards the insurgent cause (via over-reaction, for 
example)
116
 
 
These tenets of insurgency formed the basis of much counter-insurgency theory 
throughout what could be described as the entire “post-Mao” era, i.e. the sum of all of 
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eras that followed.  In this sense, Mao is the insurgent prototype which “provided the 
central concept for Western thinking.”117  
 
This predominantly Maoist approach to COIN theory shifted in 2009 with the appearance 
of Kilcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla and Mackinlay’s The Insurgent Archipelago, 
both of which posited that the insurgency emanating from within radicalized Islam and 
embodied by al Qa’ida (AQ) was now a “globalized” insurgency and that previously held 
COIN theories needed to be significantly revised to match this new threat to Western 
security. 
 
For Kilcullen, “accidental guerrillas” are created by a deliberate (i.e. non-accidental) 
process whereby AQ “infects” a given state by establishing a presence in ungoverned or 
conflict-affected areas and proceeds to spread violence and radical ideology to other 
regions. This uptick in violence is designed to prompt an intervention by external 
(Western) forces in order to address the threat to state stability and this, in turn, creates 
conditions for AQ to turn the population against the interveners and support or ally with 
AQ which is now viewed as a type of “liberating force.”118  
 
Given characteristics inherent in globalization more generally – the spread of western 
cultures and economies and the effects of these on conservative societies; the ubiquity of 
communications technology (particularly the internet and social media); and easy access 
to global travel – he posits that AQ has both the motivation and means to operate on a 
global basis. In this model, individual AQ cells need not be physically linked or 
coordinated in any formal fashion and global insurgency is thus the aggregate of these 
individual cells all working towards a common endstate (which includes the 
establishment of a caliphate in the Middle East which would be used as a launching pad 
against the West).
119
 This “aggregation model” is critiqued by Mumford who is 
concerned that the “‘global’ nature of Al-Qaeda’s insurgency, as Kilcullen depicts it, 
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does run the risk of being conceptually misleading…There is an uncritical understanding 
in Kilcullen’s work that insurgencies today are global because of their connectivity or the 
expanse of common motives and tactics, not simply by dint of their geographical 
dispersal.”120 
 
While acknowledging the intrinsic Maoist roots of his theory, Mackinlay’s view of 
insurgency is also globalized in nature. He views contemporary insurgency as possessing 
four characteristics. First, unlike the Maoist approach which assumed a shift in insurgent 
focus along a continuum of military-political action, contemporary insurgency is 
fundamentally a political process throughout which utilizes violence (including terrorism) 
for specific political purposes. Second, the specific techniques of a given insurgency are 
correlated to the types of societies in which the insurgency manifests, be this under-
developed, developing or developed.  Third, insurgency is understood to be an act of 
desperation, undertaken only when political ambitions are not matched with the power 
commensurate to translate this ambition into reality. Finally, and in direct 
acknowledgment of Mao’s key principle, contemporary insurgency “has to involve the 
population; its energy, its ability to sustain itself and to continually replace and regenerate 
its losses, arise from popular support.”121 
 
Mackinlay’s model of globalized insurgency links acts of violence which manifest from 
within Western societies (or Western leaning ones) to a global network of insurgents who 
may or may not have been “radicalized” in any specific conflict.   To the extent that 
insurgents may, therefore, be “domestically grown” and linked via communications 
technology to insurgents in other locations, there is no requirement to maintain traditional 
(i.e. Maoist) forms of sanctuary. 
The communities which are the heartlands of the insurgent energy, 
the energy that has attacked our cities and our populations, live and 
act on a different plane. They stretch around the world in an 
archipelago of individuals, cells and communities; they have no 
territory, they exist in isolated but interconnected groups that are 
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horizontally related rather than vertically ordered, and their shared 
sense of outrage is regenerated by the exertions of the media and the 
visibility of the campaign. In these wispy, informal patterns, without 
territory and without formal command structures they are not easily 
touched by the kinetic blows of a formal military campaign.
122
 
Both Kilcullen and Mackinlay posit similar solution sets to address the globalized 
insurgency challenge. Kilcullen describes his approach as “full spectrum strategy” that 
balances all elements of national power (the “DIME”) which  
is used to build reliable local alliances and partnerships with key 
leaders and influencers in the population. These partners, in 
conjunction with the intervening force, then develop a political 
strategy designed to improve governance, security and economic 
conditions and so extend government control over the population 
and the environment while marginalizing the enemy in a physical 
and political sense.
123
  
 
In order to achieve these objectives, the counter-insurgency campaign needs to 
synchronize “civil and military efforts under unified political direction and common 
command-and-control, funding and resource mechanisms”124 and include a 
“comprehensive approach that closely integrates civil and military efforts, based on a 
common diagnosis of the situation and a solid, long-term commitment to the 
campaign.”125  
 
While acknowledging the requirement to include “an array of government departments 
and non-government agencies”126 in the COIN operation, Mackinlay stressed the 
essentially non-military nature of the problem, suggesting that the globalized insurgency 
would be better understood as a form of “political violence”127 and not as a form of 
warfare. This is underscored by the fact that the globalized nature of insurgency makes it 
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difficult to identify a campaign centre of gravity for either the insurgents or the counter-
insurgents.
128
  
 
In spite of the similarities between these two analyses – the labelling of the AQ 
insurgency as “globalized”, as well as the evidently “whole of government” approach to 
dealing with this insurgency – neither author offered particularly useful solutions to the 
problem. Kilcullen admits that, with respect to Afghanistan, nothing prescribed by him 
was “particularly new or controversial in conceptual terms” and that the problem lay in 
the international community’s inability to implement strategic solutions effectively. 
Mackinlay’s appreciation of this same situation appeared to be even more dire:     
The international dimension of a new era of coalition forces was an 
obstacle to operational effectiveness that was never addressed with 
conviction. Expectations were too high; it had taken NATO states 
several decades to agree how to direct and fight a conventional 
engagement in the relatively small operational space along the 
German inner border – why should anyone imagine that the 75 
nations and several hundred civil agencies who poured into these 
new, byzantine scenarios could achieve the same degree of 
operational cooperation in just a few years?
129
  
In this sense, both Kilcullen and Mackinlay merely establish the contradiction inherent in 
their own models, namely, that state-based solutions to a globalized phenomenon are 
likely to be ineffective. Situating local acts of violence as nodes within a broader 
insurgent “campaign” to acquire political power (on a global basis?) may lend credence 
to terrorists, or simply criminal elements, who are willing to identify with a supra-
national “cause” in order to inflate or disguise their true intentions or capabilities. By 
these authors own admission, states in which the vast majority of the indigenous 
population do not support an insurgency are not likely to be at risk. A more worrisome 
trend is the participation of radicalized Western nationals in active insurgencies. To the 
extent that such individuals are further radicalized, and gain “hands-on” training and 
experience in conflict zones, their return to their Western homes does present an 
increased level of risk.    
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While a theory of “globalized counter-insurgency” may help to explain why COIN 
operations in limited geo-spatial settings are rarely successful in the post-modern era, 
other critics of counter-insurgency as a means of achieving state stability frequently point 
not to factors such as under-resourced counter-insurgent force levels or revolutions in 
insurgent techniques as causes of failure, but rather, view the entire premise of COIN as 
one based on ongoing Western imperialism, underscored by liberal theories of how states 
actually advance.  
 
Marshall, as a representative of this school, is particularly concerned with counter-
insurgency myths, such as the British myth that heralded successes in Malaya and 
elsewhere were “moderate, benign, and egalitarian”130 or that the so-called “invisible 
hand” of the market is an effective conflict moderation tool. The concern of Marshall, 
and others, is the fact that phrases such as winning hearts and minds papers over the 
reality that counter-insurgencies have historically involved high levels of violence 
towards indigenous populations who were seen as harbouring insurgents or providing, at 
a minimum, logistical support and succor.
 131
 While this view is an important one and 
worthy of further study, such critiques must not be allowed the intellectual failing of 
permitting comparisons between cases which are situated in periods of history in which 
such imperial actions were commonplace and the modern or post-modern eras in which 
international laws and norms designed to protect local populations are generally accepted 
and adhered to. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that violence is a necessary 
feature of counter-insurgency and that some of the most successful examples, such as the 
destruction of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka in 2009, were also exceptionally violent.
132
 
 
I have now asserted that the CA evolved as NATO strategy in the context of pre-existing 
concepts and extant doctrines in various stages of maturity and acceptance, including 
EBAO, CIMIC and COIN. While each of these concepts arguably claimed lineage to 
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national sources, the iterative nature of Alliance and national doctrinal influence is 
relevant and is present in these cases.
133
 Each of these concepts also demonstrated that a 
CA was either necessary or assumed, and each made specific reference to a CA or offered 
some definition of it.  
 
To summarize, from EBAO two central theories emerged: the notion that action-effects 
linkages may be identified, analysed and utilized to manage military operations, as well 
as a systems’ approach to understanding the operating environment itself.  
 
From CIMIC the importance of civil-military interaction in the complex operating space, 
coupled with  a diversity of actors, generates significant challenges in the conduct of 
military operations, particularly in relation to the utility of military forces as providers of 
aid and as reconstruction agents as well as the sharing of information amongst disparate 
civil and military actors.  
 
Finally, from COIN, we see the development of conceptual models that implicate a broad 
set of actors and actions in multiple spheres in order to address insurgencies and the 
proposition that insurgencies cannot be defeated without attendance to root causes and 
this, in turn, edges towards the requirement for building effective state institutions that 
can address those root causes.  
 
It was noted that theories of insurgency and counter-insurgency evolved through a series 
of identified historical eras, and that the modern era continued to be influenced by Maoist 
approaches. New COIN theories, such as “globalized insurgency”, have evolved in order 
to help explain post-modern models of insurgency which to appear to have adopted 
tactics and techniques derived from the nature of globalization more generally. Whether 
the failure of NATO and its allies to defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan was the result 
of poor application of “classical” COIN theory and doctrine, or if Afghanistan is merely 
but one “stop” on the insurgent archipelago, remains to be seen.   
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Comprehensive Approach as NATO Strategy 
 
I turn now to literature that identified and traced NATO’s adoption of the CA as formal 
strategy in the Afghanistan setting. The adoption of the CA strategy by NATO cannot be 
de-linked from its Afghan enterprise, as it was NATO’s willingness to assume the ISAF 
mission in 2003 and the subsequent expansion of that mission into a full-blown state-
building project that caused the Alliance to seek an effective strategy which could 
address the full range of civil and military imperatives that the mission evidently required 
to succeed. That said, the adoption of the CA had implications for the Alliance which 
went well beyond ISAF and revealed underlying tensions amongst Alliance members and 
other international organizations regarding the role of the Alliance in the international 
security environment.  
 
It is possible to trace the evolution of the CA strategy within NATO via a trajectory of 
official publications and statements by NATO officials as well as via a review of 
literature sources from analysts both in and outside of the Alliance.
134
 Meharg and St-
Pierre earlier correlated the CA and NATO on an exclusive basis and posited that 
“NATO has developed a formalized Comprehensive Approach strategy for its 
operations,”135 and interviews and discussions between myself and various senior NATO 
players confirmed the view that the Alliance did adopt such a strategy in the context of 
the ISAF mission.
136
 Given the testing circumstances under which it was adopted, 
combined with the highly complex and bureaucratic character of the Alliance, the 
adoption process was admittedly uneven and disjointed, and this is also reflected in the 
literature.
137
  
 
With respect to official sources, the CA is clearly linked to early Alliance CIMIC 
doctrine which acknowledged the 1999 Strategic Concept’s recognition of the changed 
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nature of the international security environment and the possibility that the Alliance must 
stand ready “to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis 
management, including crisis response operations.”138 The document stressed that 
interaction between the Alliance and the civil environment was crucial to the success of 
operations, and it provided guidance to Alliance CIMIC operators regarding the types, 
roles and mandates of various organizations and agencies with which the Alliance may 
interact.
139
 While not describing a comprehensive approach per se, CIMIC doctrine 
identified several key features of the concept, including a prescient overview of the 
challenges such an approach generates.
140
  
 
An initiative by Denmark in 2004 formally placed the Comprehensive Approach on the 
Alliance’s agenda under the heading of Concerted Planning and Action (CPA) in order to 
address perceived shortcomings identified in NATO’s operational experiences in Bosnia 
and Kosovo and now echoed in Afghanistan.
141
 As a result, the CA was identified as a 
key element emerging from the Riga Summit in 2006, the Declaration of which stated: 
Experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrates that today’s 
challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international 
community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military 
instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of 
decisions of all actors, and provides precedents for this approach. To 
that end, while recognising that NATO has no requirement to 
develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, we have tasked 
today the Council in Permanent Session to develop pragmatic 
proposals in time for the meeting of Foreign Ministers in April 2007 
and Defence Ministers in June 2007 to improve coherent application 
of NATO’s own crisis management instruments as well as practical 
cooperation at all levels with partners, the UN and other relevant 
international organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and 
local actors in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future 
operations wherever appropriate.
142
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By 2008 the Alliance was committed to the state-building project in Afghanistan and was 
convinced that the Comprehensive Approach was the correct way forward, and the 
Bucharest Declaration of that year asserted that: 
Experiences in Afghanistan and the Balkans demonstrate that the 
international community needs to work more closely together and 
take a comprehensive approach to address successfully the security 
challenges of today and tomorrow. Effective implementation of a 
comprehensive approach requires the cooperation and contribution 
of all major actors, including that of Non-Governmental 
Organisations and relevant local bodies. To this end, it is essential 
for all major international actors to act in a coordinated way, and to 
apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a 
concerted effort that takes into account their respective strengths and 
mandates.
143
  
 
In order to actualize the CA strategy, the Alliance approved a Comprehensive Approach 
Action Plan in order to “improve the coherent application of NATO’s own crisis 
management instruments and enhance practical cooperation at all levels with other actors, 
wherever appropriate, including provisions for support to stabilisation and 
reconstruction.”144 The plan was to enhance capabilities in five major areas of work: 
planning and conduct of operations; lessons learned, training, education and exercises; 
enhancing cooperation with external actors; public messaging; and stabilization and 
reconstruction which will require “better coordination of NATO’s military efforts in this 
field with those of its partners and other international and non-governmental 
organizations.”145 NATO’s commitment to the CA was further evidenced by the 2008 
Strategic Vision which stated: 
There can be no lasting security without development and no 
development without security. Success requires a comprehensive 
approach across security, governance and development efforts and 
between all local and international partners in support of the Afghan 
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Government. We will intensify our contribution to such a 
comprehensive approach.
146
  
 
By 2009 the state-building project in Afghanistan was clearly faltering and ISAF, now 
heavily influenced by the United States, adopted the operational tenets of counter-
insurgency, and NATO COIN doctrine published in 2009 stated that: 
a comprehensive approach, which places emphasis on achieving a 
common understanding of the situation and a unity of purpose and 
effort, is the only way of achieving a successful outcome. It is vital 
that interaction and cooperation between those planning and 
coordinating political, military and economic activities take place at 
every level, to ensure a unified, comprehensive approach to crisis 
and a political settlement that underpins resolution.
147
  
 
In order to support planning in the now defined comprehensive engagement space, the 
NATO operational planning process (OPP) was re-branded as the Comprehensive 
Operational Planning Directive (COPD) in 2010. Whilst this military planning doctrine 
retained many of the earlier concepts which were embedded in OPP and EBAO doctrine, 
the theory of comprehensiveness was pervasive throughout.
148
  
 
The 2010 revision of NATO’s strategic concept continued the trajectory of entrenching 
the CA as fundamental strategy for the Alliance, asserting that “the lessons learned from 
NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear 
that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective 
crisis management.”149 The political guidance on ways to improve NATO’s involvement 
in stabilization and reconstruction operations issued in 2011 solidified the link between 
the CA and stabilization and reconstruction in fragile, conflict and post-conflict affected 
states. It stated: 
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Stabilisation and reconstruction efforts contribute to a 
comprehensive approach to crisis management and to 
complementarity, coherence and coordination of the international 
community’s efforts towards security, development and governance. 
For the purposes of this political guidance, stabilisation and 
reconstruction activities should be understood to include support to 
establishing long-term stability and strengthened governance, local 
capacity building and the promotion of ownership by the relevant 
national authorities, encouragement of the rule of law and 
establishing the basis for economic, human and social 
development.
150
 
 
Many early observers of NATO’s evolutionary adoption of the CA were in general 
agreement with the overall theoretical construct and its importance for the Alliance.
151
 At 
the same time, the significance of the strategy for NATO’s transformation from a 
collective defence organization into a multi-purpose security organization became clear 
and the implication that this would potentially require new capabilities, particularly 
enhanced civilian capacity, generated debates both in and outside of the Alliance.
152
  
 
Many of these discussions focused on the reality that while NATO’s leadership was 
evidently committed to the concept at the strategic level, a lack of institutionalization, 
coupled with multitudinous and disparate opinions regarding the exact nature of the 
concept (even to the point of having no agreed definition), resulted in confusion. Thus 
while some observers posited that “NATO does not own a Comprehensive Approach,”153 
others were more concerned about how NATO should adapt in order to ensure that the 
CA was successfully implemented.
154
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Analysts sought to understand what motivated the Allies to contribute to the ISAF 
mission and what the relationship between that mission and the CA was more generally. 
Hynek and Marton, for example, posited that troops “were deployed to Afghanistan to 
deal with a complex set of tasks. Among them, in order to assist in state building and to 
provide governance assistance at the sub-state level”155 and that the deficiencies in this 
project necessitated a comprehensive approach. That said, in spite of the expenditure of 
significant intellectual effort to grasp the significance of the CA strategy, there was not, 
by 2011, an officially approved definition of it, and it was becoming increasingly obvious 
that the concept was extending into a wide variety of domains. Far from narrowing 
towards a precise set of doctrinal prescripts, “the development of a family of various texts 
(thought pieces, concepts and doctrine) related to the CA,”156 would possibly remain the 
norm. As such, analysts were now more likely to identify the “children” or “cousins” of a 
Comprehensive Approach than attempt to submit a singular and, therefore, potentially 
limiting definition. 
 
While some analyses of the concept rose to the brink of the arcane (such as Hallet’s 
description of the CA as a “design process that that reduces the inter-organizational 
interaction transaction costs and provides a structure that enables self-synchronization 
among diverse organizations”157), others were concerned with grounding the CA as a 
strategy in the realm of action. For Frioriksson, for example, the concept was inextricably 
linked to interventionism, and he interrogated military and humanitarian activities and 
tools in relation to their primacy, consequences, sequencing, balance and prioritization in 
peace-keeping, peace-enforcement or peace-making interventions.158 Rynning was 
equally concerned about how the strategy was to be actualized on the ground, and he 
argued that the Comprehensive Approach possessed “abundant intuitive appeal but no 
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strategy of action” and that it “ties people and organizations together but does not tell 
them what will happen when the grid locks.”159 
 
Other observers of the Alliance downplayed the difficulties NATO was experiencing in 
Afghanistan. Olson, for example, asserted that the “big existential questions about 
NATO—out-of-area operations, enlargement, transformation, partnerships—these 
questions at their core have been answered.”160 This rather cheery perspective was not 
evident, however, in much of the material generated during the period in which the 
Afghan insurgency was growing and the expanding analytical discussion suggested that 
the inability of the Alliance to successfully institutionalize the Comprehensive Approach 
represented a strategic vacuum which rendered the possibility that “the Alliance’s 
military value to its members is likely to be questioned.”161  
 
Critical Views of the Comprehensive Approach 
 
In this final section of the review, I turn to literature that offered opinions (generally 
negative) about the effectiveness of the CA as NATO strategy in relation to its 
interventionist state-building objectives in Afghanistan (and presumably beyond). 
 
As pure model, the comprehensive approach was designed to promote and enhance 
coherence amongst the many actors involved in an intervention. While this mantra of 
coherence is inextricably associated with the comprehensive approach, critics concerned 
about the preservation of humanitarian space rejected coherence between military and 
humanitarian actors on both normative and ideological bases. Meharg, for example, 
asserted that these types of attempts to integrate civil and military actions in the realm of 
aid and reconstruction had created a situation in which “humanitarian space no longer 
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exists.”162 This had serious repercussions for humanitarian organizations which opted to 
participate in these integrated missions as she believed that they had effectively abdicated 
their responsibility.
163
  
 
Cornish was equally concerned about the impact of this integrative trend, and he argued 
that an evolutionary shift towards the development of effective patterns of 
communication, coordination and cooperation between civil and military actors was 
disrupted by 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror resulting in war-fighting missions 
“which for the most part were quickly dressed in human rights and humanitarian 
clothing.”164 While asserting that the intent of integrated approaches was laudable, the 
effect “resulted in humanitarian and development aid programming becoming 
subordinated to political interests in counterproductive ways.”165 This resulted in the 
NGO community rejecting the agenda implied by such integrated missions with the by-
product that “humanitarians are now seen as obstructionist and antiquated by the political 
and military communities.”166 The politicization and militarization of aid resulting from 
the use of comprehensive approaches was a common and recurring theme in the 
literature, and it was asserted that the use of aid to win hearts and minds was not only 
inconsistent with normative humanitarian principles but also ineffective.  
 
For example, Douglas pointed to Iraq and Afghanistan as significant events in the context 
of increasing levels and forms of civil-military interaction but argued that progress was 
haphazard and that it was necessary to broaden thinking about civil-military relations 
more generally. This, he thought, would involve potentially more difficult reforms to 
improve civil-military relations as well as institutional reforms which potentially affect 
“areas of policy that were once purely the internal business of an agency.”167  
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Metcalf sought to explain why the relationship between military and humanitarian actors 
was continually fraught and unconstructive. While acknowledging factors frequently 
cited in the literature such as differences in terminology, cultures and concepts, she 
posited that it was more likely a result of fundamental differences in motivations, goals 
and approaches and that, in keeping with earlier observers, linked these to the “principles 
of humanity, impartiality and neutrality which humanitarian actors, in theory at least, 
strive to adhere to.”168 While some observers of the comprehensive approach viewed the 
inherently different cultures and roles of humanitarian and military actors as the primary 
source of friction, others pointed to inter-institutional competition and conflict as well as 
lack of coherence of policies towards state fragility as serious impediments to actualizing 
the strategy.
169
 I take up this line of thinking in Chapter 4. 
 
In evaluating comprehensive approaches, Stewart and Brown posited that the necessary 
ethos would rarely emerge at once but would, if it did at all, emerge as the result of an 
iterative process. In their view, the range of possible forms of interaction between civil 
and military actors included two extremes: the very difficult to achieve “gold standard” 
wherein objectives, strategies, tools and sequencing are fully aligned at interagency level 
and the exact opposite, wherein objectives are basically incompatible, there is little 
information flow among actors about who is doing what, and little knowledge of or 
interest in adopting an integrated approach.
170
  
 
de Coning echoed the view that while greater coherence in the international peace 
building system was desirable, this was based on an assumption that a sufficient level of 
shared values, principles, goals and objectives existed amongst the various organizations 
and actors in the system, and he challenged this assumption.
171
 
 
In addition to the foregoing critiques of the comprehensive approach as an ineffective 
model, other challenges remained with respect to the attempted actualization of the 
strategy in an alliance context in general and in NATO specifically. These challenges 
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included conceptual, institutional and capability gaps at all levels—tactical, operational 
and strategic—and, again, I will investigate these in detail in Chapter 4. At this point, I 
will identify some material that addressed specific challenges to NATO’s attempt to 
actualize the CA as well as some material that offered potential solutions to the gridlock.  
 
Mariano examined NATO capacity in relation to its abilities to conduct war fighting, 
peacekeeping and humanitarian aid at all levels of conflict—tactical, operational and 
strategic. He posited that to be successful in the new security environment NATO would 
require capacity in each block of the nine-block matrix such an analysis produces and 
offered evidence that NATO did not possess such capacities. At the same time, he argued 
that “NATO has no authority and limited capacity to integrate peacekeeping and 
humanitarian aid into its core competencies of collective defense.”172  
 
The question of whether NATO should (or could) generate civilian capacity from within 
the Alliance itself or whether the CA strategy was intended to leverage civil capacity 
from external organizations and agencies was never fully resolved.
173
 For example, while 
Thruelsen labelled the mission in Afghanistan as “being implemented with a lack of 
civilian resources,”174 it was not clear where such resources were to be found. 
Alternatively, Jakobsen recognized that NATO does not have the civilian capacities that a 
fully-fledged CA requires and proposed that the Alliance first “get its own house in order 
by creating a common understanding of its role in CA, as well as the mindset, doctrine 
and procedures that will enable it to employ its own resources in accordance with CA 
requirements for success.”175 He posited that the adoption of the CA was hampered by, 
amongst other factors, the extent to which NATO should utilize military capabilities to 
fulfill essentially civilian tasks if no civilian assets were available.
176
  
 
                                                 
172. Mariano in Meharg, Helping Hands,156.  
173. Williams,103. 
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Friis and Jarmyr conceptualized the CA on a basis of “developing categories and 
definitions of various kinds of interactions and between various kinds of actors,”177 and 
this discussion was extended by Thruelsen in a later work in which he examined the role 
of international military forces in Afghanistan and their interplay with other actors. He 
concluded that the Afghan mission lacked the glue to bring all of the necessary actors 
together and that this could result in a NATO “retreat to types of operations on which the 
‘NATO family’ can more easily find a broad political consensus, such as peace support, 
peacetime military engagement or anti-piracy.”178 This view was supported by Williams 
who asserted that “the organization’s traditional resources make only a small contribution 
to providing security in post-conflict states”179 and that this necessitated the attempt to 
create new capability merging civilian and military efforts.  
 
The idea that NATO would develop its own capacity in order to address civilian 
shortfalls was roundly rejected by Kashmeri who believed that organizations other than 
NATO, specifically the European Union (EU), had already developed effective civil-
military instruments and that any attempt by NATO to duplicate this would be 
unsuccessful and unnecessarily expensive.180 D’Hollander referenced the NATO concept 
of Smart Defense as recognition of the growing financial pressures that underscored 
Kasmeri’s view.181  
 
It is necessary to point out that not all observers of the NATO strategy, or indeed the 
comprehensive approach as a general model for dealing with complex crises, were 
unsympathetic or critical. Two cases in point highlight, however, the intellectual 
challenges the support of this model required. In the first case, Coletta proposed that the 
application of principal-agent theory may hold promise with respect to finding a way out 
of the coordination dilemma. He explains that: 
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Principal-agent categories abstract from real life situations the 
structure of incentives facing employers and their labor force in 
order to explain why work does or does not get accomplished. A 
solution to the principal agent game typically reflects the perspective 
of the leader, the person or entity that controls production inputs and 
enjoys direct utility from the work completed.
182
 
He identified the United States as the most logical candidate for principal in the context 
of the Afghan mission and developed a model whereby the most active players in the 
mission would submit themselves to a bargaining process led by the US. While 
recognizing the need to take each actor’s perspective into account in order to ensure 
burden sharing, the US would be permitted to “impose participation thresholds restricting 
other actors’ involvement in designated complex emergencies.”183 While this is an 
intriguing theory which may, in fact, describe the mechanism by which a given 
international society could arrive at decisions related to complex crises, I would suggest 
that it is not reflective of the Alliances’ current decision-making process, which is based 
on the principle of unanimity and which, therefore, affords an equal voice to the least 
powerful members. At the same time, the theory presupposes that the international 
community may be equated to (or may assume) some form of structure akin to an 
organization wherein the “labor force” (states, IOs, NGOs, etc.) all possess a common 
perspective or understanding of the problem and are willing to accept and provide 
resources to achieve the goals of the so-called principal–an assumption certainly not 
borne out in practice (see Chapter 3) or in theory (see Chapter 4). 
 
In another example, Egnell’s 2008 article “Between reluctance and necessity: the utility 
of military force in humanitarian and development operations,” offered a skeptical, albeit 
measured, view of the comprehensive approach. While questioning the “theoretically 
weak assumption of increased effectiveness from civil military integration,”184 he 
suggested this problem could be addressed by focusing on outcome-based thinking which 
would identify the precise aim of operations and translate this into specific operational 
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and tactical objectives that would be assigned to civil or military elements as appropriate. 
He explains that: 
It may not simply be a problem of finding the right method. In some 
cases, increased integration into coherent comprehensive approaches 
may be the more effective solution. In other cases, a clear line of 
demarcation between certain actors and their activities may be the 
answer. The important thing is that such calculations are made, and 
that they are holistic in that they involve both short- and long-term 
effects, intended and unintended, at all levels of operations.
185
 
 
By 2013, his somewhat fuzzy stab at a systems’ approach to addressing complex crises 
gave way to a view far more precise in nature. In his article “Civil–military coordination 
for operational effectiveness: Towards a measured approach,” Egnell argues that with 
sufficient strategic guidance in place, the various intervening actors (civil and military) 
would have only limited reasons to cooperate and coordinate in the field. This is based on 
an appreciation that various agencies and organizations working at operational and 
tactical levels possess unique competencies and are fully capable of undertaking tasks 
and fulfilling their respective responsibilities and could do so while remaining within 
their respective stovepipes. “For the sake of effectiveness and efficiency–which in the 
end means saving lives–as well as to avoid confusion about actors and responsibilities in 
the eyes of the local population, each agency should therefore also focus on their core 
competencies and avoid dabbling in other areas.”186 In this sense, Egnell essentially 
refuted the basic premise of the comprehensive approach and falls, I believe, into that 
camp which tends towards the assertion of theories that explain away the need for a 
comprehensive approach while not admitting that the theory itself is simply unattainable 
in practice.  
 
Given that we have systemized the Comprehensive Approach as a strategy in the context 
of NATO’s response to complex crises, in particular the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, 
the question of how well NATO apprehended that strategy and the effect it would have 
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on the Alliance is an important one. Some observers pointed to an absence of 
“unambiguous leadership” and “a clear lack of unity” as contributing to a lack of 
effective strategic direction.
187
 Thruelsen had earlier postulated that the ISAF mission 
suffered from a lack of coherent political strategic understanding as well as “lacking an 
appreciation of the context and importance of mission success,”188 and other observers 
recognized that with the ISAF mission “NATO assumed a serious responsibility”189 and 
that “it permeates both its other operations and largely shapes its institutional 
evolution.”190 This impact of NATO’s failure to achieve its strategic objective in 
Afghanistan will be taken up in some detail in Chapter 5. 
 
A realist line of argument posited that the ability of the Alliance to effectively actualize 
the CA would not, in fact, have resulted in campaign success in Afghanistan due to 
conditions that were present in that setting, including pervasive Afghan government 
corruption, falling public support for the mission in NATO capitals and the ability of 
insurgents to utilize Pakistan for unimpeded re-supply and force generation, and 
Chaudhuri and Farrell identified this problem as an “operational-strategic disconnect.”191 
While Jakobsen suggested that “it has been wrong to hail its CA as a ‘sine qua non’ for 
success in Afghanistan, as the new strategy remains a work in progress.”192 Suhrke 
argued that NATO’s commitment to the Afghan mission: 
appears less the product of a deliberate strategy than the result of a 
“disjointed incrementalism” where sub-rationalities of 
organizational interests, vested interests and rhetoric traps are 
prominent. … These features of the intervention are not surprising 
given that it was a non-routinized response to a conflict unfolding in 
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a complex environment and a first out-of-area engagement. 
Nevertheless, they appear as principal “lessons” and a tale of caution 
for the alliance if it is committing itself to an operation, regardless of 
the formal designation and ideological framework of the 
operation.
193
  
Conclusion 
 
As the comprehensive approach evolved, many Western nations and international 
organizations explored, experimented with and adopted, to one extent or another, 
variations of the model, although none adopted it as a formal strategy with the exception 
of NATO. As the state-building project in Afghanistan appeared to founder and the costs, 
both human and financial, associated with the mission mounted, the core theories on 
which the model was premised came under critical assessment. Thus, the critical line of 
inquiry returned to the matter of strategy in a context of security writ large.  
 
In the context of a single nation, the attainment of security is related to ideas such as 
existentialism, power projection and human security. In the context of an alliance such as 
NATO, the attainment of security, and the adoption of strategies to achieve it, relates to 
both the security of the members which make up the alliance and the alliance itself (to the 
extent that it is seen as a provider of security to its members or, at the very least, a 
significant security contributor). In this sense, adopting a strategy to attain security for an 
alliance speaks to the role of the alliance in relation to its members as well as to other 
organizations, institutions and nations outside of the alliance and with whom the alliance 
must interact or influence in order to achieve its strategic and, therefore, security 
objectives. 
 
Wagnsson argued that NATO members, rooted as they are in Westphalian construct and 
tradition, are under pressure to shift “towards institutionalization of security cooperation 
and a broader definition of referent objects of security” and that “the Alliance is severely 
torn between traditional constructions of ‘the self’ and a need for change.”194 She 
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identified that NATO possessed a variety of roles in the international security 
environment—firefighter, watchdog, good neighbour and seminar leader—and that 
NATO’s ability to evolve successfully in a post-Westphalian world will depend on how 
well NATO develops in each of these roles, and she concluded that “the globalized threat 
environment is likely eventually to force NATO to fully recognize the need for a more 
post-Westphalian approach to security.”195 If so, strategies that NATO selects to attain 
security in a post-Westphalian environment must meet both the security needs of its 
members and be effective in their broader, external manifestation. To the extent that 
NATO selected the CA as a strategy to maintain (or re-attain) security in the post-9/11 
context, it is posited that neither of these important litmus tests was achieved.  
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Chapter 2: NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to State Building in Afghanistan 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis posits that NATO adopted the Comprehensive Approach in response to the 
state-building challenges it faced in Afghanistan from approximately 2006 onwards, 
although the evolution of this strategy is linked to its reaction to the terrorist attacks in 
2001 and its willingness to assume leadership for the mission in 2003. At the same time, 
Afghanistan was considered the first real test of NATO’s out-of-area mission statement 
adopted in the NATO 1999 Strategic Concept. M. J. Williams asserted that “following a 
decade of operations in the Balkans, NATO rewrote its strategic concept to account for 
the new strategic environment—an ‘international discourse coalition’ asserting a new 
transatlantic security agenda in the public space.”1  
 
The aim of this chapter is to trace the broad narrative of NATO’s experience in 
Afghanistan between 2001 and 2011 and explain why it adopted the Comprehensive 
Approach as its strategy. The temporal period under study has as its “left flank” the year 
in which the United States was attacked by a terrorist organization that had direct and 
indirect connections to the state of Afghanistan. NATO’s response was to invoke, for the 
first time, Article 5 of the NATO Charter which declared that an attack on one NATO 
member was an attack on all.
2
 Arguably, NATO elected to engage in Afghanistan as a 
result of a complex mixture of external and internal pressures, including a desire to 
demonstrate solidarity with the US, prove its willingness and capability to operate outside 
its traditional area in response to the evolved security environment, and ameliorate those 
Alliance members which were providing leadership to ISAF and were pressuring NATO 
to accept responsibility for the mission at the institutional level.
3
 
 
The “right flank” of 2011 brings the narrative as close to current as is reasonable. In 
addition, the selected year provides an opportunity to examine the efforts of the US and 
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NATO to address the conditions in Afghanistan for a full decade, and there is sufficiently 
rich data available for this period to illustrate the point that these efforts have not 
succeeded. At the same time, to paraphrase Mr. Churchill, if 2011 was not the end of the 
Western intervention into Afghanistan, it was certainly the beginning of the end. 
 
On 22 June 2011 the President of the United States outlined his intention to begin the 
withdrawal of US military forces from Afghanistan with the aim of transitioning security 
in the country to the Afghan military by the end of 2014.
4
 This decision was consistent 
with an earlier agreement between NATO and the Afghan national government which 
also planned for the transition of security from NATO to Afghan forces in a phased 
approach ending in 2014.
5
 At time of writing, a series of negative incidents involving US 
and NATO forces were prompting a re-evaluation of the transition timetable with a view 
to frontloading the process such that NATO forces would shift to a support role, requiring 
Afghan forces to take responsibility for combat operations throughout the country by 
mid-2013.
6
  
 
While the size of the Afghan national army (ANA) increased to approximately 195,000, 
it continued to struggle with a significant attrition rate, and as of early 2012, only 11 of 
168 Army Kandaks (equivalent to a Western battalion) were rated as independent.
7
 These 
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and other indicators generated multiple analyses which suggest that, far from being 
capable of providing security in 2014 or earlier, there is a strong possibility that these 
forces will, in fact, be engaged in an Afghan civil war once all NATO forces have 
withdrawn.
8
 
 
These analyses have created a heightened sense of concern amongst many sectors of 
Afghan civil society and non-governmental organizations that improvements (minor as 
they have proven) in living standards, education, human rights and gender equality may 
be at risk.
9
 This is underscored by observations of various powerbrokers, including 
President Karzai, who appear to be preparing for a post-NATO, post-US environment 
that would require them to accommodate the demands of fundamentalists in order to 
forestall an attempt by the Taliban to overthrow the central government once again and 
push the country back into civil war. The announcement by President Karzai supporting a 
code of conduct for women issued by the Ulema Council is seen as indicative of this 
trend.
10
 
 
While the US and NATO maintain that the comprehensive plan adopted in Lisbon in 
2010 for stabilizing the country while simultaneously increasing the quantity and quality 
of indigenous Afghan security forces remains extant, several NATO members have 
already significantly reduced their military and civil commitments to the mission, and by 
the end of 2011, it was suggested that the mission had, in all but name, become almost 
fully “Americanized.”  
 
                                                 
8. This is the opinion of Mr. Chris Alexander, MP, former Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan 
(2003–2005) and Deputy Special Representative of United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 
from 2005–2009. Comments made at a conference 10–11 April 2012 in Toronto. See 
http://www.newswire.ca/fr/story/945119/soldiers-policymakers-and-scholars-debate-afghanistan-at-
conference. 
9. See, for example, “Aid Groups Fear Effect of Troop Pullout on Afghanistan,” accessed 5 
September 2013; available from 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2016942796_afghanaid06.html. 
10. President Hamid Karzai, Kabul, 6 March 2012, news conference. The “code of conduct” 
issued by the Ulema Council, as part of a longer statement on national political issues, is cast as a set of 
guidelines that religious women should obey voluntarily, but activists are concerned it will herald a reversal 
of the trend in Afghanistan since 2001 to pass laws aimed at expanding women’s rights. See: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/06/hamid-karzai-afghanistan-womens-rights. 
Chapter 3: Interrogating the Comprehensive Approach 
 
 
70 
The Effect of 9/11 
 
On September 12, 2001, one day after the terrorist attacks in the United States, NATO 
invoked Article 5 of the NATO Charter for the first time in its history and pledged “to 
provide the assistance that may be required as a consequence of these acts of 
barbarism.”11 To the later chagrin of some senior US officials, this offer of assistance was 
rejected by the US, although NATO did undertake a number of unilateral steps, including 
enhancing intelligence monitoring, increasing security at bases and other locations, 
deploying the Standing Naval Force to the eastern Mediterranean and moving airborne 
early warning platforms to the US in order to free up American platforms for the mission 
in Afghanistan. 
 
By October 2001 the US, along with partners Canada, Denmark, Norway and France, 
launched Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in order to topple the Taliban, locate 
or kill Osama bin Laden and destroy the terrorist networks and training facilities from 
which the 9/11 attackers were presumed to have emanated. With an emphasis on teaming 
special forces with indigenous Afghan fighters from the primarily Northern Alliance (and 
aided by US precision-guided munitions), the military operation to remove the Taliban 
from power was decisive and relatively short-lived. While other allies (including 
Germany and the United Kingdom) had also joined the coalition, it was clear that all 
these nations were involved on a purely bi-lateral basis and that NATO per se was not 
committed. 
 
M. J. Williams cited Gerard Toal who believes that the invasion of Afghanistan 
represented a counter-modern tendency. Counter-modern acts are committed when 
national governments territorialize abstract and amorphous global risks into more specific 
threats from rogue states. In counter-point, however, Williams argued that “these 
attempts to territorialize risk are not so much counter-modern, as they are counter-late 
modernity. Policy makers find it difficult to shift from the state-based, threat-oriented 
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system of international security to one that is based on managing risks.”12 Inevitably, the 
territorialization of the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan raised the issue of the 
terrorist threat in its global manifestation and the extent to which such amorphous threats 
may be addressed in a global context.
13
 
ISAF Established 
 
In December 2001, the United Nations sponsored a conference in Bonn, Germany, which 
resulted in the Bonn Agreement—a UN-backed framework to establish a transitional 
authority in Afghanistan and provide a roadmap toward “the establishment of a broad-
based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government.”14 As a 
generalized postwar reconstruction strategy, it affirmed that an interim authority would 
be led by Hamid Karzai, included guidelines for writing a constitution and conducting 
elections and outlined the future Afghan government. Maley argued that the seeds of 
Afghanistan’s future problems lay in the Bonn Agreement itself, in that it did not take 
into account what type of state Afghanistan should be, based on its internal dynamics and 
history; the result of which was a “bloated state structure that breeds internal 
competitiveness.”15  
 
It is significant to note that this initial step towards the stabilization of Afghanistan was 
UN-led; in fact, the UN had been monitoring the situation in Afghanistan for some time 
and a series of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) expressed 
increasing concern at the actions of the Taliban and the threat these posed to the larger 
international community. Between 1996 and 2011 the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) issued 36 Afghan related UNSCRs, including UNSCR 1386 in December 2001 
establishing the International Security Assistance Force as called for in the Bonn 
                                                 
12. Williams, 79–80. 
13. Williams, 133 
14. Preamble to the Bonn Agreement. See http://peacemaker.un.org/afghanistan-
bonnconference2011. 
15. William Maley has been Foundation Director of the Asia–Pacific College of Diplomacy at the 
Australian National University since 2003. Comments made at a conference 10–11 April, 2012 in Toronto. 
See http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/blog/soldiers-policymakers-and-scholars-debate-afghanistan-at-
conference. 
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Agreement and UNSCR 1401 in March 2002, which established the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. 
 
These expressions of international action are consistent with the role of the UN, which is 
to “establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.”16 Williams posits that 
this is consistent with neoliberal thinking about institutions “whereby agreements and 
contracts exist to reduce transaction costs, lower uncertainty and manage collective action 
problems.” 17  
 
While many of the Afghan-related UNSCRs dealt with the formal extension of the two 
UN- authorized missions and other housekeeping matters, the list of issues to be resolved 
outlined in these documents provides insight into the variety, profundity and persistence 
of the challenges facing the country throughout the entire period, including violations of 
human rights, narcotics proliferation, corruption, civilian casualties, the use of 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and many others.
18
 
 
In spite of the establishment of the ISAF mission and the participation of several NATO 
members, ISAF and Afghanistan did not figure prominently at the NATO Prague Summit 
in November 2002, at least officially. The primary focus of the summit was the addition 
of seven new members to the Alliance and the ongoing transformation of its military 
command arrangements. While the summit declaration acknowledged and commended 
the UK, Turkey, Germany and the Netherlands for their willingness to assume command 
of ISAF, it resolutely stated that “the responsibility for providing security and law and 
order throughout Afghanistan resides with the Afghans themselves.”19 This was 
consistent with an earlier statement in the document which pledged NATO to “further 
                                                 
16. Preamble to the UN Charter. 
17. Williams, 93.  
18. The complete set of UNSCRs related to Afghanistan and other related subjects, such as 
international terrorism more generally, may be found at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html. 
19. NATO Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November 2001, Para 14, see 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm. 
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promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area,”20 a clear affirmation of intent to 
remain concentrated on NATO’s traditional area of interest. 
 
Of the approximately 5000 ISAF personnel (civilian and military) on the ground in 
Afghanistan in 2002–2003, 90 percent were drawn from NATO or Partners for Peace 
(PfP) nations, and the leadership of ISAF continued to rotate amongst various NATO 
nations. Between February and August 2003, a joint leadership arrangement saw ISAF 
under German–Dutch administration, and during this period, there was increasing 
pressure on NATO to increase its participation and role in the Afghan mission. These 
pressures were “in large part to end the arduous task of searching for a new ‘lead nation’ 
every six months to run ISAF.”21 At the same time, the readiness of NATO to accept 
leadership for the ISAF mission was also reflective of several Alliance members’ 
willingness to participate in a reconstruction mission, which was both consistent with 
broader humanitarian objectives and also in partial counter-balance to the US global war 
on terror.
22
 While a study of the process and motivations of the various actors involved 
with the decision to have NATO accept command of the ISAF mission is indeed worthy, 
there is not a specific requirement to delve into this in detail; my primary concern is the 
effect this decision had on the subsequent campaign.  
                                                 
              20. Ibid. 
21. Quote from NATO spokesman Mark Laity, Kabul, 10 August 2003. Quoted in The Guardian, 
accessed 5 September 2013; available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/aug/11/afghanistan. 
22. James D. Bindenagel, “Afghanistan: The German Factor,” NDU, Prism no. 1 (December 
2012): 4. 
Chapter 3: Interrogating the Comprehensive Approach 
 
 
74 
 
ISAF: NATO Takes Over 
 
In April 2003, NATO’s foreign ministers authorized Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe (SHAPE) to examine plans for an Alliance-wide mission and on August 
11, 2003, NATO agreed to take on the leadership of ISAF. In October of that year the 
UNSC expanded the ISAF mission mandate beyond Kabul to include the entire country,
23
 
and in December 2003, NATO announced its intention to establish five provincial 
reconstruction teams (PRT) in addition to the nine under US control. The first NATO-run 
PRT would be in Kunduz, in the north under German command; this PRT was previously 
established by the US and would require ongoing US support in order to function, a point 
of early friction concerning the perceived level of support being provided to ISAF by 
NATO members in general. 
 
Although more will be said regarding PRTs later in this thesis, it should be noted that the 
PRT model has been heavily criticized for pursuing a “government-in-a-box”24 approach 
to state building. This criticism, while valid, should be tempered with an appreciation of 
these organizations as manifestations of bi-lateral agreements between Afghanistan and 
PRT lead nations. A more important distinction is to be made between those PRTs 
operated by ISAF and those operated by the United States. For the most part, ISAF PRTs 
focused on the provision of security within relatively defined areas, whereas US PRTs 
engaged in wide-ranging activities, including the direct provision of aid by military 
forces and other state-building endeavours. The ISAF model relied more heavily on 
civilian agencies and NGOs to engage in aid and reconstruction, and this was considered 
a more nuanced and, therefore, successful approach.
25
  
 
Between early 2004 and late 2006, the ISAF mission underwent expansion both in terms 
of force levels (although these continued to be viewed by the US and others as too 
                                                 
23. UNSCR1510. 
24. “We’ve got a government in a box, ready to roll in.” Statement by General Stanley McCrystal 
in relation to an ISAF operation in Marja, Afghanistan, accessed 5 September 2013; available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/13/world/asia/13kabul.html. 
25. Comments made by Humayun Hamidzada at a conference 10–11 April, 2012 in Toronto. Mr. 
Hamidzada is a former Deputy Minister for Policy in the Afghan Ministry of Finance. See 
http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/blog/soldiers-policymakers-and-scholars-debate-afghanistan-at-conference. 
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meagre) and geographically. By April 2004, NATO troop contributions had risen to only 
6500 with most of these from Canada and Germany, and a noted lack of helicopter 
platforms underscored that the mission was not being given priority by NATO members, 
despite public statements to the contrary.
26
 
 
In January 2004, a new Afghan constitution was approved with a strong presidential-style 
government, and in June following the Istanbul Summit, NATO pledged to increase 
support for the ISAF mission and declared that it would support the emergence of a 
secure and stable Afghanistan. Although an agreement was made to raise troop levels to 
10,000, it emerged that 1000 of these would be held in reserve in Europe, and this gave 
rise to further criticism by the US that NATO was continuing to under resource the 
mission. It is revealing that the Istanbul Declaration acknowledged that while collective 
defense remained the core purpose of NATO the threat environment had evolved and that 
NATO itself must adapt: to what extent was not yet entirely clear. 
 
Between July 2004 and February 2005, discussions ensued between the US and NATO 
related to merging the US OEF mission and ISAF under a unified NATO command; 
however, this was rejected as several NATO members, particularly Germany, had 
represented the mission to their domestic audiences as one of peacekeeping, not combat, 
although combat was occurring in many parts of country on a regular basis.
27
  
 
ISAF Expansion 
 
In February 2005, NATO announced that it would expand the ISAF mission beyond 
Kabul and the northern provinces with the intent of having a presence across the entire 
country by 2006. It was not entirely clear which nations would provide the additional 
forces necessary to accomplish this; however, the US announced that as new NATO 
troops deployed to the Western provinces, US troops would be re-deployed to the more 
                                                 
26. Osinga, Frans and James A. Russell in Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James A. Russell, eds., 
Military Adaptation in Afghanistan. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013, 300. 
27. Farrell, Theo and Sten Rynning, “NATO’s Transformation Gaps: Transatlantic Differences 
and the War in Afghanistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 5 (21 October 2010 online): 691. 
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troublesome southern and eastern areas, and an agreement to merge the two missions was 
made in principle, albeit with many details left undecided. By the summer of 2006, ISAF 
had expanded across the entire country, establishing headquarters and PRTs based on a 
geographic regional command configuration with the US deployed primarily in the 
eastern region adjacent to the Afghan–Pakistan border which was identified as the porous 
region through which Taliban fighters and logistical support for the growing insurgency 
were transiting.  
 
The insurgency expanded steadily between 2002 and 2006 with attacks increasing by 
approximately 400 percent over that period. Similar to Iraq, a lack of US post-conflict 
planning has been identified as a primary causal factor for the insurgency, although this 
may be considered as too simplistic.
28
 Beyond a lack of military planning, some analysts 
posit that it is the US “way of war”29which led to this development.  
 
Maley posited that focusing on the purely military aspects of the insurgency is too 
limiting and that broader regional factors must also be examined, in particular the 
approach to Afghan–Pakistan relations which have virtually never ascribed to a 
Westphalian model of secure borders and mutual non-interference.
30
 Indeed, Yasmeen 
argued that the Pakistani view is almost entirely regional, balancing its need for strategic 
depth in relation to India with a desire for regional economic cooperation. These factors 
would suggest that any attempt to impose a military solution will likely fail and that 
political engagement with all actors in the region, including the most conservative, will 
be necessary.
31
  
                                                 
28. Williams, 64. 
29. Ibid, 67. 
30. Comments made by William Maley at a conference 10–11 April, 2012 in Toronto.  
See http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/blog/soldiers-policymakers-and-scholars-debate-afghanistan-at-
conference. 
31. Comments made by Samina Yasmeen at a conference 10–11 April, 2012 in Toronto. Ms. 
Yasmeen is Director of the Centre for Muslim States and Societies at the University of Western Australia. 
See http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/blog/soldiers-policymakers-and-scholars-debate-afghanistan-at-
conference. 
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ISAF Adopts a Comprehensive Approach Strategy to State Building 
 
 
In November 2006, the bi-annual NATO summit was held in Riga, Latvia, and the 
ensuing declaration stated that “contributing to peace and stability in Afghanistan is 
NATO’s key priority,”32 a clear shift from earlier positions. For the first time, a strategy 
of Comprehensive Approach as a means of achieving stability was placed on the summit 
agenda, and the ensuing declaration acknowledged the evolving security environment and 
the “challenges from instability due to failed or failing states” 33 and led to the following 
assertion: 
There can be no security in Afghanistan without development, and 
no development without security. The Afghan people have set out 
their security, governance and development goals in the Afghanistan 
Compact, concluded with the international community at the 
beginning of the year. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are 
increasingly at the leading edge of NATO’s effort, supported by 
military forces capable of providing the security and stability needed 
to foster civilian activity. Guided by the principle of local 
ownership, our nations will support the Afghan Government’s 
National Development Strategy and its efforts to build civilian 
capacity and develop its institutions.
34
 
 
Arguably, with this declaration, NATO had entered the realm of state building
35
, and 
there can be no complete examination of NATO’s evolution towards a strategy of 
                                                 
32. NATO, Riga Summit Declaration, 29 November 2006, Para 5, See 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm. 
33. Ibid, Para 6.  
34. Ibid. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy or ANDS is an Afghan driven framework 
for development containing numerous benchmarks and indicators of development in the areas of security, 
governance, rule of law, justice and human rights, economic and social development and several so-called 
cross-cutting issues. This document will be examined and utilized as a basis of assessing Afghanistan’s 
development progress between 2006 and 2011 in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The Afghanistan Compact 
referred to in this quote was the result of the London Conference held 31 January – 1 February 2006; it 
spells out the goals of the Afghanistan government and the international community and refers to the 
Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals Country Report 2005- Vision 2020.  
35
 Osinga and Russell suggest that NATO’s entry into state-building was signalled by its adoption 
of a new Comprehensive-Strategic-Military Plan in 2008. I believe that the 2006 Riga Summit declaration 
is a clear statement of intent to support state building in Afghanistan. See Frans Osinga and James A. 
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Comprehensive Approach without a brief treatment of this subject. Indeed, the concepts 
and associated practices of state building have come to occupy a major position in the 
literature, and as witness to the relevance of this topic, NATO has generated 
bibliographies that address the nature of the state, post-conflict reconstruction and peace 
building, as well as failing and failed states amongst other interrelated themes.
36
 At the 
same time, academic interest in the subject of state building and its relationship to a 
variety of social science disciplines has increased, and literature reviews have attempted 
to address the full spectrum of state-building-related theories and practices.
37
  
 
A Brief Introduction to State-Building Theory 
 
Within the literature several reoccurring leitmotifs are evident. First is a focus on 
definitional analysis of the various concepts and terms which are associated with state 
building, in particular, defining the nature of the state and attempting to categorize states 
in accordance with some scheme. Thus the appearance of “fragile states,” “weak states,” 
“failing states,” “failed states,” “collapsed states” as well as a number of other 
classifications.
38
  
 
Given a wide variety of definitions—which emphasize particular aspects of state 
formation, functionality and structures—there is no universally accepted lexicon. That 
said, the US Center for Global Development captures the essence of the failing state as 
follows: 
A ‘failing state’ can be defined in various ways. In political science 
it has come to mean a state which is not able to maintain internal 
security. We give the term an economic meaning: a failing state is a 
low-income country in which economic policies, institutions and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Russell in Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James A. Russell, eds., Military Adaptation in Afghanistan. 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013, 312. 
36. NATO, Thematic Bibliographies The State, No.8/2000; Post-Conflict Reconstruction and 
Peace Building, No.1/2008; Failing and Failed States,” no. 3/2010, see 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/63479.htm 
37. See, for example, Usman Hannan and Hany Besada, “Dimensions of State Fragility: A Review 
of the Social Science Literature,” Centre for International Governance Innovation, Working Paper no. 33 
(November 2007); and Stephanie Blair and Ann Fitzgerald, “Stabilisation and Stability Operations – A 
Literature Review,” Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University (June 2009). 
38. See Hannan and Besada’s appendix for an overview of how these types of states are defined by 
numerous international organizations and nations. 
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governance are so poor that growth is highly unlikely. The state is 
failing its citizens because even if there is peace they are stuck in 
poverty. The failure may well, however, be wider. Empirically the 
combination of poverty and stagnation substantially increases 
proneness to civil war. Through various routes the state may become 
a hazard to its neighbours and conceivably to the world.
39
 
 
Second is a focus on causative analysis (i.e., what factors cause a state to be classified in 
accordance with a particular definition of state fragility or failure and what factors cause 
states to shift from one classification to another). According to Hannan and Besada, “the 
forces leading to the emergence of fragile states are seen as numerous and diverse. They 
encompass economic causes, intra-state conflict and international factors, among 
others.”40 The identification and measurement of these diverse factors leads to the 
development of numerous approaches to analysing and classifying the internal conditions 
of such states and conducting inter-state comparisons in order to support putative 
schemes that may, in turn, generate potential policy options for dealing with them. 
 
Third is a focus on the impact of fragile, failing or failed states (however defined) both in 
relation to internal populations which may be subject to political, economic, social or 
physical depravations or violence and external populations (i.e., neighbouring states or 
the international community at large). This is based on the premise that fragile, failing 
and failed states generate, incubate, support or export various threats or de-stabilizing 
conditions such as trans-national terrorism, ethnic-cleansing, large-scale refugee 
movements or violence-prone state-based or non-state-based actors or organizations. 
 
Fourth is a focus on early warning, that is, utilizing the classification schemes previously 
mentioned to assess the potentiality of a given state to shift from one classification to 
another, based on a series of indicative factors, thereby providing an opportunity for 
another state, coalition of the willing, alliance or the broader international community (as 
mandated by the UN) to engage the fragile, failing or failed state in some fashion. 
According to Rotberg: 
                                                 
39. US Center for Global Development, see http://www.cgdev.org/event/development-
effectiveness-fragile-states-spillovers-and-turnarounds. 
40. Hannan and Besada, 7. 
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That said, research on failed states is insufficiently advanced for 
precise tipping points to be provided. It is not yet correct to suggest 
that if GDP [gross domestic product] falls by X amount in a single 
year, rulers dismiss judges, torture reporters, or abuse the human 
rights of their subjects by X, or if soldiers occupy state house, or 
civilian death rates rise more than X per year, that the state in 
question will definitely tip from weak to failing to failed. All we 
know is that the sum of those actions suggests that all is not well in 
the depths of Ruritania, misery is spreading, and the future shape 
and fate of the state is at serious risk.
41
 
 
This, in turn, leads to hypotheses regarding the optimal means of dealing with such states 
and implicates theories of post-conflict reconstruction, aid, development, stabilization, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, security sector reform, counter-insurgency, peace building, 
nation building and state building. While the literature offers a variety of definitions for 
these policy instruments, the focus is frequently on attempting to understand how they 
differ from each other and on their inter-relationships in both theoretical and empirical 
terms.
42
 
 
In this regard, state building is primarily concerned with (re)creating, strengthening and 
maintaining state-society relations and working with executive, judicial and legislative 
branches of a state at all levels of government down to and including the local level.
43
 
State building implies that indigenous capabilities or capacities are inadequate or 
unavailable to meet the tasks required to operate a functioning state and that these 
capabilities and capacities must, therefore, be imported. Naude and McGillivary cited 
Maxwell who identified six state-building policy instruments, the selection of which is 
actor and case dependent. They are: 
engaging in bilateral or multilateral dialogue;  
bypassing government by providing humanitarian aid and NGO 
development directly to affected groups; 
                                                 
41. Robert I. Rotberg, “Weak and Failing States: Critical new Security Issues,” Turkish Policy 
Quarterly 3, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 12. 
42. UK, UK Stabilisation Unit, Guidance Note, 9. 
43. Blair and Fitz-Gerald, 12. 
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incentivizing government by rewarding performance or 
extending conditional support; 
investing in state capacity by providing aid for governance and 
institutional building; 
investing in non-state capacity by strengthening NGOs and the 
business sector directly; and 
engaging in direct military intervention.44 
 
The process of generating or re-generating functioning instruments of state power is 
generally understood to be a long-term process in contrast with peace building which is 
centred on establishing conditions of non-violence such that longer term state-building 
projects may take hold.
45
 Numerous factors play into the probable success or failure of 
the long-term project, not the least of which are decisions regarding the degree to which 
the process should focus initially on strengthening the central instruments of the state, or 
assume a more decentralized posture. In the case of both Iraq and Afghanistan, some 
analysts believe that the “Baghdad-first, Kabul-first” approach, which was adopted by the 
US, fostered a high level of dependence on external resources, and although attention 
ultimately shifted to other population centres (based on the expansion of the PRT 
network in Afghanistan, for example), the culture of dependence supported by patterns of 
aid distribution were too deeply engrained to overcome a sense of abandonment on the 
part of the rural populations.
46
 
 
Fifth, and finally, is a focus on the effect of various policy instruments on the host nation, 
in particular how various approaches are likely to change conditions within the state. This 
leads to a hypothesis that whatever policy instruments are selected to engage with fragile, 
failing and failed states and attempts are made to address or alleviate the causes of such 
failure, they will, themselves, fundamentally alter elemental aspects of the target state, in 
particular, the indigenous population. This is due to unforeseen transformations in 
                                                 
44. Wim Naude and Mark McGillivary in Fragile States – Causes, Costs and Responses, ed. Wim 
Naude et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 20. 
45. OECD DAC, State building in Situations of Fragility, 4. 
46. Robert M. McNab and Mason Edward, “Reconstruction, the Long Tail and Decentralisation: 
An Application to Iraq and Afghanistan,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 18, no.3 (2007): 374. 
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internal power structures, dislocations in economic structures and relationships and 
stresses on social relationships, including inter-group, inter-tribe or inter-ethnicity 
connections or power relations.
47
 Thus the selection of policy instruments, which are 
generally categorized as “soft” or “hard” depending primarily on the presence of 
exogenous military forces, will potentially alter the character of the fragile, failing or 
failed state and propel it along a trajectory that may or may not result in a desirable or 
improved condition.
48
  
 
The importance of conceptualizing and respecting the people affected by an intervention–
the indigenous population–is a theme that appears as a form of sub-text in most 
interventionist literature. Of particular interest to this thesis, Karlborg’s article 
“International quest for local legitimacy in Afghanistan: A tower of Babel?” reported the 
findings of a study which sought to identify and compare how NATO and the UN framed 
their understanding of what she termed “local legitimacy.” In this sense, local legitimacy 
refers to how the indigenous population views the intervention from their perspective and 
the extent to which the intervention is accepted as “legitimate.” The results of her study 
found that both NATO and the UN possessed very similar conceptions of how they 
framed local legitimacy in so far as it was tied not to the quality of the assistance 
provided to the Afghan population (and their perception of that assistance) but rather to 
the Afghan state. Afghan civilians were not generally considered as having a role in 
determining the level of local legitimacy apart from that of being victims of either 
coalition or insurgent attacks and this, she found, “rhymes poorly with the recent shift in 
both UN and NATO policy discourse towards increasing international support of the 
transition to Afghan lead of all security management in the country.”49 While generally 
disappointed with the framing of local legitimacy as primarily confined to the 
institutional or state level, she portrayed NATO’s pursuit of the Comprehensive 
Approach, particularly after 2008, as indicative of a shift towards connecting 
                                                 
47. Jan Angstrom, “Inviting the Leviathan: external forces, war, and state building in 
Afghanistan,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 19, no.3 (2008): 382. 
48. Hannan and Besada, 35. 
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international assistance to the local population, albeit via a trajectory of increasing the 
strength and authority of the Afghan government. 
  
Angstrom explores Lake’s approach to understanding state failure who believes that the 
quest for political order in failed states is key to understanding how the actors view both 
the problem of the failed state and the potential solution (i.e., the parties failed to agree 
on political order or the nature of the state).
50
 Thus, the achievement of order in society 
must precede the development or “awarding” of legitimacy on the central government. In 
this sense, legitimacy will be acquired once the society sees that the central government 
is capable of providing security for its people; if the source of that security is an external 
intervener, and not the central government, “these interventions need not have a positive 
effect on the resurrection of the state from state-collapse.”51 At the same time, the 
achievement of neither political order nor governmental legitimacy presupposes a 
democratic or liberal version of these conditions. 
 
Fukyama posits that the extant Western pattern of state building tends towards three 
distinct, but frequently overlapping, phases. Phase one is post-conflict reconstruction in 
which outside powers provide stability via the provision of military and police forces, 
humanitarian relief and technical assistance to restore various infrastructure systems such 
as electricity, water and banking systems. Phase two may be loosely defined as 
development and involves the creation of self-sustaining state institutions, designed to 
survive the withdrawal of the interveners; this is considered far more difficult to achieve 
than phase one and is generally tied to conditions on the ground rather than a specific 
timetable. Phase three “has to do with the strengthening of weak states, where state 
authority exists in a reasonably stable form but cannot accomplish certain necessary state 
functions like the protection of property rights or the provision of basic primary 
education.”52  
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Given the difficulties associated with development, there is a temptation to suggest that 
external interveners should eschew the development function altogether. In practice, 
however, the ability to differentiate between the delivery of humanitarian aid and 
practices associated with development in states where basic institutions simply do not 
exist is highly problematic. In some historical cases, such as post-war Germany and 
Japan, elements of state functionality continued to survive in spite of overwhelming 
physical destruction, and this provided a platform for development; this was not the case 
in Afghanistan (or Somalia, for example) where it may be argued that the state was not 
only dysfunctional, but never existed in the first place.
53
 
 
By one definition, a state consists of “coercion wielding organizations that are distinct 
from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all 
other organizations within substantial territories.”54 Given that Afghan tribes and militia 
groups were not under control of any centralized state coercive apparatus, the challenge 
of exogenous state building in Afghanistan was clear. If so, Afghanistan may not meet 
the minimum standard imposed by this definition, and this pattern has been ingrained 
over multiple generations. Williams argued that characteristics extant in Afghan society 
call into question the ability to form a state in the Western model including “lack of 
ethnic uniformity; complicated familial and tribal identities; and complexity of 
relationships and power that challenges attempts to centralize control.”55 Most telling, 
when any degree of central control has been achieved, it has only been accomplished 
through extensive external support and when such support no longer exists, neither does 
the centralization.  
 
Response to a Growing Insurgency 
 
Throughout 2007 and 2008, the insurgency grew in intensity and expanded to all areas of 
the country, including the northern and western regions which had previously been 
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relatively peaceful. NATO members assigned to those regions, particularly the Germans 
and French, were now having to engage in combat and were experiencing casualties from 
direct attacks and IEDs, and this was generating significant negative effects within their 
domestic political environments. 
 
The statement following the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008 declared that 
Afghanistan was now NATO’s top priority and that the “Euro-Atlantic and wider 
international security is closely tied to Afghanistan’s future as a peaceful, democratic 
state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism.”56 In order to assist 
Afghanistan to achieve these goals, NATO now recognized that: 
the international community needs to work more closely together 
and take a comprehensive approach to address successfully the 
security challenges of today and tomorrow. Effective 
implementation of a comprehensive approach requires the 
cooperation and contribution of all major actors, including that of 
Non-Governmental Organizations and relevant local bodies. To this 
end, it is essential for all major international actors to act in a 
coordinated way, and to apply a wide spectrum of civil and military 
instruments in a concerted effort that takes into account their 
respective strengths and mandates. We have endorsed an Action 
Plan comprising a set of pragmatic proposals to develop and 
implement NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach.57 
 
While the comprehensive approach may be traced to NATO’s approach to crisis 
management and state building as manifested in the 1999 Strategic Concept, its evolution 
towards formal NATO strategy progressed from the Concerted Planning and Action 
Initiative (CPAI), championed by Denmark in 2004. The significance of the CPAI was 
the recognition that stabilization and reconstruction required efforts at the strategic and 
operational levels and could not be confined to the tactical level alone. At the same time, 
there was a growing understanding that NATO could not achieve its state-building 
objectives without the participation and cooperation of individual member nations and 
other significant international actors, including NGOs. 
 
                                                 
56. NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008, para 6.  
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As indicated previously, the comprehensive approach was formally introduced and 
discussed at the Riga Summit in 2006, and the summit tasked relevant NATO bodies to 
determine how to integrate the concept into their work. Early Alliance adopters included 
some of the Scandinavian countries, Canada, the UK and eventually the US.
58
 In reality, 
NATO did not view the Comprehensive Approach as a new capability per se but rather as 
a strategy to overcome a capacity and coordination deficit at the operational and strategic 
levels. 
 
By 2008, the Taliban had “coalesced into a resilient insurgency” and would “maintain or 
even increase the scope and pace of its terrorist attacks.”59 Following his election in 2008, 
President of the United States, Barack Obama, initiated a review of the situation in 
Afghanistan and announced on 27 March 2009 that the US would launch a 
“comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,”60 including the immediate 
deployment of 17,000 additional US troops. The mission for these troops was to increase 
the ability of the US to secure the eastern and southern regions of the country where the 
insurgency was most prominent, increase security along the Afghan–Pakistan border, 
increase the size of the Afghan security forces through training and mentoring, and 
provide security for the Afghan presidential election scheduled for August 2009. 
Unfortunately, and in spite of the upsurge in US and NATO security forces, the 
international community deemed the 2009 Afghan presidential election to be deeply 
flawed, and following an attempted, but failed, run-off vote to appease critics of the 
electoral process, Hamid Karzai was re-affirmed as president until 2014.  
 
In January 2010, President Karzai joined more than 70 countries and international 
organizations in London in order to plan for a new phase in the Afghanistan conflict. The 
primary goals for the conference included drafting plans for the transition of security to 
the Afghans themselves and enticing the Taliban to participate in a political process of 
reconciliation. The conference was held in the context of a deteriorating security 
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environment, which was the subject of a UN report in which the UN Secretary General 
stated: 
We are now at a critical juncture. The situation cannot continue as is 
if we are to succeed in Afghanistan. Unity of effort and greater 
attention to key priorities are now a sine qua non. There is a need for 
a change of mindset in the international community as well as in the 
Government of Afghanistan. Without that change, the prospects of 
success will diminish further.
61
 
 
The UN report highlighted the fact that in the third quarter of 2009, there was an average 
of 1244 incidents per month, a 65 percent increase over 2008, and 784 conflict-related 
civilian casualties between August and October 2009 representing a 12 percent increase 
over the same period in 2008. In order to attempt to reverse this trend, the US opted to 
employ a surge strategy similar to that previously employed in Iraq. This translated into a 
commitment to deploy an additional 30,000 US troops along with an additional 9000 
troops from the rest of the international community, bringing the total in theatre to 
approximately 135,000.  
 
While plans for the security transition were agreed upon at the London Conference and 
further steps approved across all major lines of operation, Afghan requests for greater 
control of international funding were rebuffed based on a requirement to demonstrate 
concrete improvements in levels of government corruption—an accusation earlier 
labelled by Karzai as “propaganda.”62 With respect to reconciliation, Karzai revealed a 
plan to create a national peace council to oversee the integration of Taliban rank and file, 
most of who were believed to fight within a few miles of their home and principally for 
local reasons.
63
 The UN revealed that it had held talks with Taliban representatives 
concerning guarantees of safety should the Taliban lay down arms; however, these and 
other “secret” negotiations between the Taliban and various parties, including Karzai and 
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http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33400&Cr=afghan&Cr1. 
62. President Karzai 2009 inauguration speech, accessed 5 September 2013; available from 
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unspecified US representatives, resulted in no concrete progress. This was no surprise to 
some observers who believed that the insurgency was, in fact, close to victory.
64
 
 
On 5 December 2011, a second Bonn Conference was held in order to re-affirm the 
international community’s long-term commitment to Afghanistan. Although the Taliban 
and Pakistan were invited to attend this conference, neither was present, and observers 
(and critics) of the outcomes stated that “the conference was full of empty rhetoric and 
underscored the hurdles threatening the future of Afghanistan.”65  
 
Summary 
 
The narrative of NATO’s increasing level of involvement in Afghanistan between 2001 
and 2011 and its adoption of the Comprehensive Approach may be understood in the 
context of an intersection between the external dynamics caused by modulating levels of 
US attention towards Afghanistan and the internal dynamics of the Alliance, in particular, 
the dichotomous views between those members who viewed the mission as an extension 
of a perceived obligation to the US and those who viewed the mission as a genuine 
expression of NATO’s role in an evolved security environment. The latter cohort 
attached to this view a belief in the efficacy of exogenous state building and NATO’s 
capacity and willingness to act in that regard; arguably, it was this belief that supported 
the adoption of the Comprehensive Approach.  
 
These dynamics were played out in a context of asymmetric power relationships between 
the US and NATO, the UN and NATO, and between the US, NATO and the government 
of Afghanistan. Maley argued that at no time did an elite consensus form in any of these 
institutions concerning a credible theory of victory.
66
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A temporal analysis of the evolution of NATO’s involvement suggests that three 
overlapping phases are evident. The first emerged in 2001–2003, during which period 
several Alliance members participated in the OEF mission in support of the US global 
war on terror and provided rotational leadership to ISAF. This period focused on regime 
change and counterterrorism, specifically the removal of the Taliban from power, the 
hunt to find Bin Laden and the destruction of the al-Qaeda networks that were operating 
inside Afghanistan.  
 
The second phase involved the establishment of the transitional government in Kabul and 
the exodus of the Taliban to safe havens outside of Afghanistan which appeared, at least 
to the US, as a signal that the threat posed by the Taliban had been eliminated. Once 
these conditions were present, NATO agreed to command the ISAF mission and a period 
of (attempted) state building was initiated. It was during this phase that the insurgency re-
emerged and NATO adopted the Comprehensive Approach in order to address the 
requirement to stabilize the country and build state institutions which would theoretically 
provide the Afghan government with the means and capacity to exercise control from the 
centre. This phase occurred in the period of approximately 2003 until 2011, although the 
core of the state-building project was focused in the period 2006–2011. 
 
The third phase relates to the adoption of counter-insurgency by the US and NATO. By 
2009, it was evident that a number of serious problems were becoming entrenched, the 
most cited of which include corruption, civilian casualties caused both by insurgents and 
ISAF forces, narcotics production and a general lack of progress in virtually all areas of 
civil society and the economy. The appointment of General Petraeus resulted in the 
adoption of counter-insurgency doctrine resulting in a significant surge of US and ISAF 
force levels. This doctrine was adopted in order to establish conditions in local areas such 
that newly trained Afghan forces could provide security and allow civil society and the 
economy to improve. Training and mentoring of the Afghan security forces was viewed 
as a critical requirement both to increase their size as well as to improve their overall 
operational capabilities, and a significant effort was directed towards this aspect of the 
mission. Indeed, the outcome of this training and mentoring program was directly linked 
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to the announced transition beginning in 2013 and ending, assuming conditions are met, 
in 2014 as previously discussed.
67
 
 
The phases as outlined ought to be considered as overlapping, that is to say, that counter-
terrorism actions were ongoing throughout the entire period, as was the attempt to build 
and strengthen state institutions. That all of these activities were occurring 
simultaneously within the same geographic space while looking forward to a transition of 
international forces out of the country led to criticisms that the mission had devolved into 
one of confusion and a “rush to declare victory and leave”68 on the part of the 
international community. Other observers suggested that the international community had 
no actual strategy for Afghanistan between 2001 and 2009, that is, between the period of 
regime change and the adoption of counter-insurgency as a coherent doctrine.
69
 
Regardless of how one chooses to interpret NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan between 
2001 and 2011, it is clear that the mission evolved and thickened at all levels: tactical, 
operational and strategic.  
 
At the tactical level, NATO members found themselves engaged in active combat against 
a determined, intelligent and versatile set of opponents. These engagements resulted in 
significant and unexpected casualties, and these complicated the ability of many Alliance 
members to justify and maintain their participation in the mission in the face of growing 
domestic scepticism and political pressure.  
 
At the operational level, NATO agreed to expand the mission spatially and to commit 
increasingly large numbers of forces in order to set the conditions for stabilization and 
reconstruction to occur. This approach faltered partly as a result of an imbalance between 
the required time for stabilization to manifest and the pressures wrought by a growing 
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insurgency, and this imbalance ultimately led to a shift in operational focus towards 
counter-insurgency.  
 
At the strategic level, NATO accepted command of the ISAF mission in order to 
ameliorate both external (primarily US) and internal stresses. As US interest in 
Afghanistan waned in relation to the perceived threat emanating from Iraq, NATO found 
that its earlier, but rebuffed, offer of assistance to the US was now more than welcome. 
That several Alliance members were already committed to and engaged in the Afghan 
scenario and pressuring NATO headquarters (HQ) for greater involvement made the 
decision virtually impossible to avoid. However, it was not foreseen that the relatively 
calm state of affairs following the ouster of the Taliban would devolve into a full-scale 
insurgency or that NATO would become the primary agent for state building which 
ultimately required the adoption of the Comprehensive Approach. Based on an 
understanding of strategic theory, it may be surmised that the confluence of interaction at 
all levels combined with the complexity inherent to exogenous state building reduced the 
probability of success for the Comprehensive Approach, and the extent of that failure is 
the focus of the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 3: Interrogating the Comprehensive Approach 
 
Aim 
 
The aim of this chapter is to interrogate the CA strategy from ontological and 
epistemological perspectives and posit a model through which the theories underlying the 
CA may be analysed: this is supported by an investigation into how NATO attempted to 
actualize the CA at strategic, operational and tactical levels in Afghanistan. The 
predominate theory supporting the CA as a model of exogenous state building is the 
ability and willingness of civilian and military systems (broadly defined) to coordinate 
and collaborate at high levels in order to achieve mutually agreeable objectives. This 
chapter will demonstrate that this assumption is largely unattainable in practice and that 
NATO’s failure to achieve its strategic objectives in Afghanistan are linked to conceptual 
and pragmatic weaknesses of the CA as both theoretical model and military strategy. 
 
Integrated Interrogational Framework 
 
In order to achieve the stated aim, an integrated perspective of the CA as actualized in 
Afghanistan is required. This, as Rynning reminds us, is a result of the fact that “the 
Western campaign there reveals flaws that are general and therefore fundamentally 
worrisome.”70 Table 1 provides an integrated interrogational framework for gap analysis 
and the basis of evaluation of the CA as a strategy for state building in Afghanistan. It 
provides for analysis at strategic, operational and tactical levels and identifies how 
NATO attempted to actualize the strategy at each one. It then views the CA from the 
perspective of conceptual, institutional and capability gaps, which are defined as follows. 
Conceptual gaps speak to the adoption and maintenance of untested, unproven or false 
beliefs about the organization or system itself, about the environment it is operating in or 
the nature of the problem(s) it is facing. Institutional gaps speak to the inability of an 
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organization or system to evolve correctly or in time for the successful adoption of a new 
strategy. Such adaptations may include organizational structures, processes or attitudes 
and beliefs. Capability gaps speak to an inability on the part of an organization or system 
to design, develop and adopt new methods required to execute a selected strategy or 
adapt existing ones successfully. 
 
 
LEVEL 
METHODS OF 
ATTEMPTED 
ACTUALIZATION 
CONCEPTUAL  
GAPS 
INSTITUTIONAL 
GAPS 
CAPABILITY  
GAPS 
STRATEGIC 
 
In the NATO 
context, the NAC 
is the political- 
strategic level, HQ 
NATO the 
political-military 
level and SHAPE 
the military-
strategic level. 
 
 
Gain, build and 
strengthen external 
partnerships 
 
Conduct strategic 
communication 
 
 
Lack of coherent 
internal and 
external narratives  
 
Lack of 
understanding of 
the engagement 
space 
Lack of internal 
consensus: role and 
mission 
 
Lack of 
institutionalization 
of CA 
 
Inability to 
overcome civil-
military paradigms 
 
 
Ineffective 
partnerships 
 
 
Persistent 
national 
stovepipes 
OPERATIONAL 
 
In the Afghan 
context, either HQ 
JFCB or HQ ISAF 
may be considered 
the operational-
level HQ. 
 
Conduct COIN 
 
 
Build host-nation 
security capacity 
 
Lack of coherent 
command and 
control model for 
CA 
 
Lack of coherent 
CA doctrine 
 
Insufficient COIN 
force ratios 
 
Restrictive national 
caveats 
 
Absence of 
effective civil-
military 
planning 
capability 
TACTICAL 
 
In the Afghan 
context, either HQ 
ISAF or the 
regional command 
(RC) HQs may be 
considered the 
tactical- level 
HQs. 
 
 
Support PRTs 
 
Practice CIMIC 
 
 
 
Misunderstanding 
roles of military 
vs civilian actors 
 
 
Ineffective PRT 
model 
 
 
 
Lack of cultural 
intelligence and 
associated 
training 
Table 1. Integrated Interrogational Framework 
Gap Analysis: Strategic Level 
 
NATO’s strategic-level efforts to implement a CA in Afghanistan focused on gaining, 
building and strengthening external partnerships as well as conducting internal and 
external strategic communications, and these actions exposed a number of conceptual, 
institutional and capability gaps.  
 
Chapter 3: Interrogating the Comprehensive Approach 
 
 
94 
The requirement to engage external partners has already been linked to the idea that 
“NATO sees its comprehensive approach as a ‘collective endeavour’ which involves 
developing strategic partnerships with external civilian and political organisations, rather 
than the development of internal civilian capacity.”71 Of the many potential partnerships 
NATO sought to build, NATO’s relations with the UN, EU and major NGOs were the 
most important, and the degree to which these partnerships operated effectively in the 
Afghan context will be described in relation to strategic capability gaps.  
 
The conduct of strategic communications describes “the articulation of cross-government 
[or Alliance] guidance on influence and supports the synchronisation of the words and 
deeds of friendly actors to maximise desired effects,”72 and this will be discussed in the 
context of strategic conceptual gaps. 
 
Strategic Conceptual Gaps 
 
The first strategic conceptual gap relates to the importance of narrative in conflict. “In 
war, narrative is much more than just a story. ‘Narrative’ may sound like a fancy literary 
word, but it is actually the foundation of all strategy, upon which all else—policy, 
rhetoric and action—is built. War narratives need to be identified and critically examined 
on their own terms, for they can illuminate the inner nature of the war itself.”73 In 
attempting to actualize the CA at the strategic level NATO struggled to develop and 
maintain effective internal and external narratives which were vital to the shaping of 
opinions of key target audiences. 
 
Internal narratives relate to how an organization, in this case the Alliance, seeks to 
explain to its own members what the organization is, why it exists, why it does what it 
does and provides a coherent and logical intellectual framework for understanding how 
the members can relate to it. Developing and maintaining strong internal narratives 
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provides a basis for organizational cohesion and positive motivation towards stated 
organizational goals. As Schuurman explains:  
Such a narrative would seek to place news events within a storyline 
that presents government actions as being in accordance with the 
values and interests of their citizens. Freedman points out that 
developing such narrative constructs should be an integral part of 
foreign counterinsurgency campaigns as such interventions are often 
discretionary in the sense that they are not about the intervening 
state’s national survival, making the fostering of public support very 
important.
74
 
 
External narratives relate to how an organization seeks to explain itself to relevant 
audiences outside of the organization who are identified as important to helping the 
organization achieve its goals. Such audiences may be labelled as supportive, non-
supportive or neutral, and external narratives must take these positions into account. 
Given that both internal and external narratives speak to an organization’s core values, 
they must be matched with actions that are supportive of the narrative and are consistent 
at all levels. 
 
With respect to the attempt to actualize the CA, this required both internal and external 
narratives in order to, on the one hand, assuage Alliance members that the mission in 
Afghanistan could be achieved without the requirement to generate significant non-
military resources and, on the other, provide a convincing rationale for external actors to 
buy in and support the NATO idea and mission without compromising their own.
75
 
 
Although NATO was partially successful in its furtherance of the CA as an internal 
narrative to achieve unity of purpose amongst Alliance members, the lack of a coherent 
external narrative contributed significantly to NATO’s inability to influence important 
external audiences. These audiences included those who were considered generally 
supportive (such as the UN), generally non-supportive (such as the insurgents) or 
generally neutral (such as a large portion of the Afghan population and the 
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humanitarian/NGO community), and Lindley-French suggests that a key weakness of the 
Alliance effort was the “inability to speak with one voice to actors in the region.”76 For 
example” 
The president had already told the American people that the 2009–
2010 surge of U.S. troops in Afghanistan was critical for our 
nation’s security, while simultaneously telling them that we had to 
begin withdrawing those troops in July 2011. Unfortunately, this not 
only sent a conflicting message to Americans and our allies in the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), but also encouraged 
Afghans and Pakistanis to hedge against a NATO withdrawal by 
double-dealing with the Taliban or other militant groups.
77
  
 
Betz argued that missions fail when militaries do not take into account the information 
dominant nature of the operating environment and view the war of ideas as a secondary, 
rather than primary, aspect of the struggle.
78
 If organizations are unable to match rhetoric 
with action, this will be exploited by the opposition, and there are many examples of this 
occurring in the Afghan campaign, such as slow or potentially misleading reactions to 
civilian deaths caused by Alliance tactical actions.
79
 Alternatively, the Taliban utilized 
information management effectively to expose Alliance rhetoric-action disparities and 
were able to maintain and promulgate their own narrative effectively to the Afghan 
population.
80
 As Hultman explained: 
as long as the military operations by the international forces lead to 
high levels of civilian casualties, the insurgents can exploit the 
situation; because even if people do not support the cause of the 
Taliban, the disappointment caused by indiscriminate attacks by the 
international forces may lead people to consider the Taliban 
option.
81
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A second, and equally significant, strategic-level conceptual gap relates to the Alliance’s 
lack of understanding of the engagement space. In this instance, the engagement space 
included not only Afghanistan as a physical place but also the surrounding region and its 
distinctive historical-cultural-social properties. Knowledge of the engagement space is 
vital to the success of campaigns which seek to transform unstable states to stable ones. 
NATO’s acceptance of the ISAF mission in 2003 occurred in the context of a seemingly 
benign security environment, and the prospect of engaging in counter-insurgency, let 
alone state building, was not, as they say, on the organizational “radar screen.” As a 
result, the Alliance did not possess a deep appreciation of the operating environment in 
which they found themselves. Most telling, the Alliance lacked intelligence in several 
domains including the nature of Afghanistan as a social-political entity, the nature of 
Afghan culture, the nature of the insurgents and the regional dimensions of the conflict.
82
  
 
With respect to cultural dimensions, Dansie believes that a lack of cultural sensitivity on 
the part of the intervening forces was a driving factor in the non-compliant behaviour of 
the insurgents,
83
 and instructively, Brigadier-General David Fraser, former Commander 
of ISAF’s Multi-National Brigade Sector South, admitted, “I underestimated one factor—
culture. I was looking at the wrong map—I needed to look at the tribal map not the 
geographic map. The tribal map is over 2,000 years old. Wherever we go in the world we 
must take into account culture.”84 The nature of Afghan culture remained problematic for 
Alliance forces, particularly in relation to such cultural norms as the status of women in 
society and the unspoken, but highly prevalent, sexual relations between older men and 
young male “dancers.” As Western Alliance forces became increasingly engaged with 
Afghan forces and society in general, tensions were raised in relation to the issue of 
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values transfer, the desire to prevent harm and the strategic implications of these on the 
relationship with the host nation.
85
  
 
These gaps in intelligence and knowledge more broadly led NATO and the international 
community to conceptualize theories as to why and how the state-building enterprise 
should be conducted in Afghanistan. The first of these theories was based on the status of 
Afghanistan as a threat to the international community, given its purported role in 
supporting international terrorist organizations. This model visualized Afghanistan in the 
context of the war on terror and, as previously discussed, fitted with a counter-modern 
tendency to territorialize abstract and amorphous global risks into specific threats from 
rogue states.  
 
The second theory emphasized the humanitarian nature of the mission and aligned the 
kinetic counter-insurgency campaign with humanitarian objectives. Stewart argues that 
this approach “misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimising differences 
between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandising our ambitions, inflating a sense of 
moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals.”86 This is the “failed state” 
paradigm which presupposes that failed states constitute a risk to the international 
community and that external interventions are both necessary and justified to “fix the 
failed state”87 in order to eliminate the risk.  
 
The third theory isolated Afghanistan as a unique case and de-linked it from regional 
considerations. This approach allowed the international community to downplay, for 
example, the role of Afghanistan in exacerbating various grand strategic issues centred in 
the region, including ongoing US–Iranian tensions, the role of Afghanistan in the Indian–
Pakistan rivalry (in particular the desire for Pakistan to achieve strategic depth) as well as 
the role of emerging superpowers China and Russia and their challenge to suppress 
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radical Islam within their own borders
88
 while simultaneously exploiting new economic 
opportunities in Afghanistan and beyond.
89
 These factors, and others, resulted in NATO 
failing to align with other actors in the region, instead of with them.
90
 As Muktar 
explained:  
The strategic solution may be inextricably linked to the problem—
Afghanistan is a mosaic of ethnic, religious, and tribal factions all 
with internal and external sources of support. Together, the mosaic 
‘pieces’ compose an image of what we call Afghanistan. The 
mosaic, however, is only loosely bound by a weak central 
government. It is primarily held together by the fragile balance and 
interrelationships between each ‘piece’ and the association of that 
piece to external regional stakeholders. Any effort to strengthen the 
role and influence of the central government or any one of the 
factions will create a bias threatening the entire mosaic. Significant 
disruption of the mosaic would be resisted by internal forces and 
likely provoke one or more external players to covertly or overtly 
intervene. An effective regional strategy would be one that moves to 
stabilize the internal mosaic, not remake it or disrupt the precarious 
balance between each of the internal pieces and the external 
stakeholders.
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Strategic Institutional Gaps 
 
At the strategic level, NATO exhibited institutional gaps in three areas: a lack of internal 
consensus surrounding the nature of the Afghan mission and the implications of this for 
the role of the Alliance itself, a lack of sufficient institutionalization of the CA, and an 
inability to overcome differences extant in numerous civil-military paradigms. 
 
The fact that the Afghan mission was an out-of-area state-building enterprise generated 
much discussion within the Alliance as to its proper role in the international security 
community. Kitchen viewed the Alliance through a prism of multiple identities, spanning 
the formal institution itself through that of security community and a political community 
in the realm of security.
92
 These identities are reinforced by how the Alliance responds to 
challenges, and this is largely influenced by the choices of its member nations. Following 
the Prague Summit of 2002, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to “further promote peace 
and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area,” and while already unofficially engaged in 
Afghanistan, this did not figure as a primary issue at that time. As the extent of NATO’s 
involvement grew from 2003 onwards, internal debates exposed fissures amongst 
Alliance members with respect to what the Afghan mission heralded for the future of the 
Alliance and its role in the international community, in particular, whether NATO should 
remain a regional, Atlantic-focussed defensive organization or become a manager of 
global security issues in cooperation with other democratically-inclined “international 
societies.”93  
 
The imperatives of the Afghan mission not only exposed differing internal perceptions of 
the Alliance but also revealed an underlying tension between various member states’ 
appreciation of the US role in the Alliance and the extent to which the Alliance was being 
used to further the US war on terror. These concerns were largely expressed by France 
and other northern European members who were actively engaged with furthering a 
Euro-centric security capability in the form of the European Common Security and 
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Defense Policy (CSDP) and which some Alliance members viewed as a means of 
counterbalancing US influence in Europe.
94
 
 
The difference in American vice European world-view was made clear in the Afghan 
mission, which the US regarded as part of the larger war on terror and which the 
Europeans viewed as a “state building mission and for which they thought they were well 
positioned.”95 While the US had arguably engaged in state-building enterprises from the 
1890s onwards,
96
 failures in Vietnam, Haiti and Somalia engendered a position amongst 
US policy makers that the US was not well suited to state building and that the US 
military, in particular, should remain a war-fighting institution.
97
 While these positions 
speak clearly to philosophical or normative considerations, issues of domestic politics 
and varying impacts of constrained resources amongst Alliance members are also 
significant, and “this induces a dynamic of alliance politics that state actors attempt to 
either mitigate, navigate, or exploit—depending on their interests and views.”98 
Yalcinkaya and Acar posit that strategic ambiguity created by diverging focus between 
attempting stabilization through reconstruction and development on the one hand and 
conducting kinetic counter-insurgency on the other signified a de facto “two-tier 
alliance.”99  
 
Given that NATO struggled with the CA at the strategic conceptual level and could not 
internally agree on the meaning of the Afghan mission from a normative perspective, a 
lack of CA institutionalization speaks to how NATO attempted to internalize the concept 
and translate it into viable operational and tactical doctrine. As late as 2010, Jakobsen 
was prepared to argue that the Alliance was “still in the process of laying the foundation 
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for future institutionalization” of the CA and that initiatives such as the indoctrination of 
EBAO into formal NATO doctrine and practice, various Multinational Experiments 
(MNEs) to test aspects of the CA concept and the FCCMI (referred to earlier) were all 
“too late” to be of any use in Afghanistan.100  
 
This is not to suggest that concrete steps were not taken to actualize the concept in 
theatre, including the appointment of a NATO Senior Civilian Representative; the 
appointment of development advisors (DEVADs) at ISAF and regional-command levels; 
the establishment of a Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund (POHRF); and in 2007, 
the creation of a Comprehensive Approach Team.
101
 While these initiatives were 
designed to facilitate interaction between the military and civilian actors in theatre, the 
root problem of coordination and collaboration remained extant. Hull argued that this 
problem is an entrenched characteristic of the CA, given that the idea of voluntary 
coordination (or even cooperation) cannot replace the need for direction within a system 
and that this level of control is only to be found within organizations or states where legal 
or other bureaucratic mechanisms can ensure compliance.
102
 
 
As a result, Hull argued that the CA must necessarily be understood within the context of 
which type of organization or system is attempting to implement it, and four typologies 
are cited: national approaches, intra-agency approaches, inter-agency approaches and 
international-local approaches. Arguably, the degree of control possible is greatest in 
national approaches and is reduced as one moves towards international-local approaches 
(i.e., the CA), wherein widely divergent goals and potentially abrasive cultural barriers 
between military and civilian organizations may exist.103 
 
At the same time, the CA suffered from the manner in which it was introduced into the 
organization, that is, as a broad statement of intent not founded upon rigorous research or 
other means of organizational adoption. Normally, NATO applies a very logical and 
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exacting methodology for the adoption of new strategies and capabilities, referred to as 
the NATO Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) policy, which was not 
utilized as a means of introducing the CA into the organization. CD&E is described as:  
one of the tools that drive NATO’s transformation by enabling the 
structured development of creative and innovative ideas into viable 
solutions for capability development. The CD&E aims at capturing 
the best ideas and enabling potential solutions to be explored 
through Concept Development, tested and validated through 
Experimentation, either within NATO or collaboratively with 
nations.
104
 
 
The structured approach to CD&E, while iterative, may be classified as an essentially 
four phased approach which incorporates concept initiation, project planning, concept 
development as well as concept assessment and validation.
105
 As concepts move through 
these phases, it may be possible to identify a level of concept maturity ranging from the 
formulation of a principle idea through to full implementation in all key aspects of the 
system and organization.
106
  
  
That the CA was not subjected to a formal CD&E process prior to its adoption at the 
strategic level helps to explain why it was unevenly accepted and poorly implemented. 
For example, my assessment following a NATO CD&E conference in December 2010:  
identified that many HQs, Branches and Agencies within NATO (let 
alone in the nations) were involved in some aspect of concept 
development, experimentation and/or the operationalization of CA 
and that these efforts were uneven and uncoordinated. There was a 
recurring demand for NATO to achieve a level of internal coherence 
in this field prior to formally linking with other IOs, NGOs or the 
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nations. It was not clear at the end of the conference which NATO 
agency had the mandate to move the CA concept forward.
107
  
 
By now, it is clear that the CA implicated NATO not only as a formal institution but 
implicated as well a larger system in which the institution must function in order to 
achieve a desired level of civil-military coherence. In fact, if such a system exists, it will 
do so in the context of a “system of systems” wherein other institutions or actors 
operating in the same engagement space (physically or virtually) will interact. This leads 
to an examination of the final strategic-level institutional gap, that is NATO’s inability to 
overcome various civil-military paradigms wherein these paradigms represent aspects of 
the civil and military systems broadly defined. What is also clear is that the CA does 
require civil and military systems to interact in some manner in order to achieve mutually 
agreed upon goals or an end state. The spectrum of potential civil-military interaction, 
which may be described as dynamic and mutative, is illustrated at Figure 3.
108
 
 
 
Figure 3. Levels of Civil-Military Interaction 
 
 
While these labels are very general in nature, the manner in which the civil-military 
systems may interact depends on the underlying characteristics of the systems which 
must be somehow identified and classified. Fritz-Millett believes that institutions may be 
                                                 
107. D. D. Eustace, “Attendance Report – NATO Concept Development and Experimentation 
2010 Conference – Civil-Military Interaction Contributing to a Comprehensive Approach from an 
Experimentation Workshop,” (Norfolk, VA, Dec 2010), 3. 
108. Stephen Fritz-Millett, “A Trainer’s Perspective on Research & Development in Support of 
the Comprehensive Approach,” paper submitted to the NATO Workshop HFM 204-RWS (Toronto, 
October 2010),  9. 
Chapter 3: Interrogating the Comprehensive Approach 
 
 
105 
 
investigated in the context of McKinsey’s 7S Framework and that this model may also be 
useful as a means of classifying system characteristics. Originally designed as a business 
organizational change tool, the model is based on the assumption that while an 
organization or system may have a formal structure, the organization or system comprises 
a series of seven inter-related elements as illustrated in Figure 4.
109
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. McKinsey's 7S Framework 
 
These seven elements are defined as follows: 
 
Strategy. Actions an institution plans and then enacts in 
response to or anticipation of changes in its external 
environment; 
 
Structure. Basis for specialization and co-ordination 
influenced primarily by strategy and by organization size and 
diversity; 
 
Systems. Formal and informal procedures that support the 
strategy and structure; 
 
Shared Values. The dominant values, beliefs and norms which 
develop over time and become relatively enduring features 
of institutional life; 
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Style. This is more a matter of what actors in the institution or 
system do than what they say; i.e., what are they focusing 
attention on?; 
 
Staff.  The people / human resource management processes 
used to select and develop personnel in the institution or 
system, socialization processes, ways of shaping basic 
values, ways of inculcating novices, and career management 
practices; and 
 
Skills. The distinctive competences—what the institution or 
system does best, ways of expanding or shifting 
competencies. 
 
Given that the content of these elements in the assessment of civil versus military systems 
is highly distinctive, the results of this distinctiveness will potentially generate 
impediments to civil-military interaction at the “cooperate” and “collaborate” levels and 
the remainder of this section will examine these elements in greater detail. 
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Strategy 
 
In the context of this discussion, the primary issue is not about the adoption by NATO of 
the CA as a strategy (which has already been described) but rather the more general 
problem of how military and civilian organizations and systems, viewed homogeneously, 
think about and adopt strategies and how these different approaches inhibit the ability of 
these organizations and systems to mesh their selected strategies in order to achieve a 
common purpose. It also raises the question of competitive strategy, that is, is it possible 
that military and civilian organizations will compete to advance their respective strategy 
over the other in order to achieve unique objectives that cannot be satisfied by 
cooperating or collaborating? If so, this generalized tendency would suggest that the CA 
would be continually at risk as military and civilian organizations and systems vie for 
control of the overall process. 
 
This problem implicates organizational theory and organizational culture, and a detailed 
discussion of these is not possible here. That said, Kimminau’s study of civil-military 
relations and strategy is instructive from the perspective that organizational theory 
“proposes that the military or the services, as organizational units themselves, will 
advance their own tools and solutions to problems. While this behaviour is much like 
Kaplan’s law of the instrument—the boy who has a hammer will find that everything 
needs pounding—it also is supposed to reinforce group autonomy, legitimacy, and 
position in larger organizations or governments.”110 If this is true for military 
organizations and systems, it may be true for civilian organizations and systems as well. 
If so, the question is whether or not this leads to competition based on a tendency to 
advance unique or exclusive tools and solutions, and this potential problem is linked to 
issues of organizational culture. Kimminau identified three models for how 
organizational culture may impact specifically on strategy: 
Shaping a “toolkit” of habits, skills and styles from which 
people construct “strategies of action.” 
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Setting the boundaries of strategic debate by language, logic 
and conceptual categories. 
Guiding and circumscribing thought, influencing the way 
strategic issues are formalized, and setting the vocabulary 
and conceptual parameters of strategic debate.
111
 
 
Military and civilian cultures that inculcate and maintain separate and exclusive tools and 
solutions (including habits, language, concepts and working methods) generate divergent 
approaches to strategy and, therefore, to the potential selection of a specific strategy in a 
specific setting. Given that the CA strategy was generated by a military organization in 
order to resolve an essentially military problem (but one that required cooperation and 
collaboration of civilian organizations and systems to succeed), it is possible that the CA 
strategy was not consistent with civilian tools and solutions and, therefore, not capable of 
achieving the necessary level of acceptance within the civilian realm.  
 
Structure  
 
In the Western model, military organizations and systems are highly structured in order to 
ensure civilian control of the application of deadly force on behalf of a state, and that 
such application occurs with maximum efficiency when required.
112
 The continental, or 
general, staff system which evolved from Napoleonic practice (if not earlier) is now the 
standard model for all Western militaries. In this system, each staff position in a 
headquarters or unit is assigned a letter-prefix corresponding to the formation’s element 
and one or more numbers specifying a role. This list reflects the basic structure: 
1. personnel and administration; 
2. intelligence and security; 
3. operations; 
4. logistics; 
5. plans; 
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6. signals (i.e., communications or information technology); 
7. training; 
8. finance and contracts; and 
9. CIMIC. 
 
The described staff system is normally replicated at tactical formations down to brigade 
level and up through all operational-level formations, although the size and 
responsibilities of the staffs will vary based on the nature of the mission and specific 
force composition. At the strategic level, the organizational structure is dependent on the 
specific organization in question, and Figure 5 illustrates the current NATO command 
structure for NATO’s Allied Command Operations (ACO). 
 
 
Figure 5. NATO Allied Command Operations Command Structure 
 
 
 
Of particular relevance to this discussion is the ubiquitous presence of embedded 
planning staffs at virtually all levels in a military organization. These planning staffs 
allow a military HQ to assemble and analyse large quantities of data and information 
relatively quickly and provide military commanders with detailed plans for highly 
complex problem sets, whether such problems relate to short-term tactical plans or 
longer-term operational campaign planning. The outcome of the planning process will 
normally generate a series of documents, such as campaign plans, operations orders, 
force generation requirements and specific directives to subordinate commands (land, 
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aerospace and maritime components; special forces; and logistic commands, for 
example). These details establish the premise that a common characteristic of military 
organizations is a high degree of structure, generally hierarchical in nature and 
emphasizing clear lines of authority and responsibility for decision making at all 
levels.
113
 This is in contrast with NGOs and humanitarian organizations that will be 
operating in the same engagement space with military organizations and with which the 
CA necessitates interaction.  
 
NGOs employ significant numbers of field workers in both aid and development 
activities, and given the need to respond to crises both globally and domestically, the 
structure of a given organization in the field may vary from mission to mission and 
location to location based on assessed needs. Given the number and diversity of these 
types of organizations and the requirement to adapt structures according to mission 
requirements, this generates a highly complex humanitarian system, which does not 
easily complement the highly structured military system with which it will interact.
114
 
 
The nature of the humanitarian system requires a degree of coordination in a given 
mission in order to improve efficiencies, and the United Nations developed a “cluster 
system” which aims to strengthen overall response capacity as well as the effectiveness 
of the response.
115
 That said, it is extremely difficult to achieve a high degree of 
coordination in a mission given the large number of humanitarian actors with widely 
divergent mandates, objectives, budgets and resources, and this was particularly evident 
in Afghanistan.
116
 Weiss and Hoffman suggest that these deficiencies may also be 
explained by the requirement for humanitarian agencies to act in ways conducive to 
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gaining public awareness and support in order to attract funding and that this tendency 
may lead to competition, rather than cooperation, within the sector.
117
 
 
This manifest contrast between military and civilian approaches to organizational 
structure is reflective of their primary missions. For the military, this is the requirement to 
use force to compel an adversary in accordance with legal direction from political 
masters, whereas humanitarians seek to provide assistance to populations in extremis in a 
neutral and unbiased fashion, and these two missions cannot be easily reconciled. 
Systems 
 
In McKinsey’s 7S model, systems are defined as formal and informal procedures that 
support the structure and the strategy. In a military context, such procedures equate to 
doctrine which is defined as fundamental principles by which military forces guide their 
actions in support of objectives. Militaries view doctrine as important and invest a great 
deal of time, effort and intellectual capacity to develop it, including the incorporation of 
formal processes for capturing lessons learned from ongoing or previous operations in 
order to integrate these into future iterations of doctrine.
118
  
 
While NGOs also develop and maintain systems necessary to function as formal 
organizations (for example, to hire and train staff, raise funds, deliver programs and 
evaluate outcomes) these systems have traditionally been more informal, although this is 
arguably evolving. Three aspects of NGO systems are of particular interest to the 
military: understanding the size, scope and capabilities of NGOs operating in a military 
engagement space; the ability and willingness of NGOs to operate in complex 
environments where the military may be expected to provide security; and the ability of 
NGOs to monitor and evaluate projects in order to be able to inform and coordinate with 
military organizations operating in a common engagement space. Each of these entreaties 
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poses challenges given the number of humanitarian organizations, the multiplicity of their 
approaches as well as the dynamic and complex nature of the operating environment.  
 
The mirror aspects of these issues represent key concerns for the humanitarian 
community, namely: the potential threat to humanitarian space posed by military 
organizations and systems engaged in the business of providing aid and undertaking 
development projects in the context of COIN or other military imperatives; the ability of 
militaries to provide “just the right amount” of security when and where it is needed in 
order to permit humanitarian action without compromising humanitarian principles; and 
the desire for information sharing and coordination, which may be misunderstood as a 
desire for control.
119
 
 
With respect to the size, scope and capabilities of NGOs, it has been identified that 
“despite many years of evaluation and analysis in the humanitarian field, some very basic 
information about the humanitarian system as a whole—its size, reach, scope of action 
and capability—remains unknown. In other words, we lack a shared understanding of 
what the humanitarian system actually is, as well as a means of gauging its success.”120 
 
This fact leads to claims that military organizations and systems have shifted their 
mandates into realms previously exclusive to humanitarians and that this is problematic 
for both. In scenarios where NGOs cannot operate due to a lack of security, the military 
must determine to what extent it wishes, or can, address immediate humanitarian 
requirements. Similarly, humanitarian organizations which must operate in secure 
environments often, although not exclusively, rely on the military to provide this security, 
and there is a resultant tension based on roles and the process of handing off aid 
functions, as the security situation improves or degenerates.  
 
With respect to evaluation of humanitarian programs and their effectiveness, the 
challenges associated with collecting, analysing and reporting data to support targeted aid 
or development actions was evident in the earlier examination of the ANDS. While the 
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humanitarian community requires accurate measurement of results in order to satisfy 
donors and ensure legitimacy in the larger international community, the military requires 
accurate evaluation and reporting of progress of humanitarian programs to the extent that 
these are relevant to the military campaign, be it one of stabilization or COIN. According 
to the International Council of Voluntary Agencies: 
There has been some progress among the clusters in establishing 
joint information collection systems, but humanitarian agencies need 
to increase technical expertise to develop common assessment tools 
and establish clear thresholds to mandate a rapid response from 
clusters and donors. Aid agencies regularly conduct assessments and 
baseline surveys in communities, yet there are no common tools 
with which to systematically collect data on a scale to identify gaps 
and vulnerabilities.
121
 
 
Similar to the potentiality for military and civilian organizations to compete on the basis 
of strategies, this may extend to the realm of underlying systems that support those 
strategies. Ackoff, for example, suggested that it would be rare if a representative of one 
of the many disciplines in some way related to a problem did not feel that his particular 
approach to that problem would be very fruitful, if not the most fruitful,
122
 and Ozbekhan 
extended this view to the institutional level.
123
 
 
Shared Values 
 
McKinsey’s model defines shared values as the dominant values, beliefs and norms 
which develop over time and become relatively enduring features of institutional life. In 
the context of this discussion, the questions to be investigated are twofold: first, do 
military and civilian organizations and systems possess unique value sets, and second, to 
what extent are these compatible or conflictual?  
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To the extent shared values within a given organization or system conflict with those of 
another organization or system, it may be advanced that the possibility of cooperation or 
collaboration between them is diminished. In order to investigate this from a theoretical 
perspective, it will be necessary to identify a means of describing homogeneous military 
and civilian organizations and systems in relation to the possibility that these possess 
unique shared values.  
 
One approach is to examine such organizations and systems from the perspective of 
professions, that is, do the organizations and systems, viewed homogeneously, constitute 
a profession and does the profession promote shared values that distinguish it from other 
professions? Part of this investigation must also determine if the organizations and 
systems under study identify themselves with a profession (i.e., do they consider 
themselves a profession) and do other relevant entities (society, government and other 
professions) recognize them as such. Canadian military doctrine defines a profession as 
follows: 
A profession is an exclusive group of people who possess and apply 
a systematically acquired body of knowledge derived from extensive 
research, education, training and experience. Members of a 
profession have a special responsibility to fulfill their function 
competently and objectively for the benefit of society. Professionals 
are governed by a code of ethics that establishes standards of 
conduct while defining and regulating their work. This code of 
ethics is enforced by the members themselves and contains values 
that are widely accepted as legitimate by society at large.
124
  
 
While NATO member states express a unique community of values,
125
 the commonality 
and sharing of those values does not confer on the organization itself the status of 
profession, although it clearly maintains institutional practices and beliefs that support the 
idea of the military as a profession as understood and practiced by its members including 
responsibility to society, expertise, identity, unique standing within society, and 
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vocational ethics which make explicit the particular values and obligations that form the 
foundation of the profession.
126
 
 
The particular values that arise from the Canadian version of the military ethos include 
duty, loyalty, integrity and courage, and these are supported by fundamental beliefs and 
expectations, including accepting unlimited liability, fighting spirit, discipline, teamwork 
and physical fitness. Unlike associational professions in which individual members 
function independently and provide some sort of service for a client (i.e., doctors and 
lawyers), the military profession is considered a collective profession in that it is the 
collective organization as a whole that must act. As such, collective professions require a 
high degree of specialization and organization (for example, maintaining functional 
structures and a hierarchical rank system). Given that individual-level expertise is spread 
throughout the entire organization, a high degree of control and coordination is required 
in order to ensure that the organization’s mission can be achieved, and thus, the adoption 
of a core ethos and set of values is critical. Value sets identified in the context of the 
military profession are designed to ensure individual member adherence to the 
organization and to generate organizational coherence; these characteristics are necessary 
given the purpose of the organization (i.e., to fight wars) and the requirement for 
individual members of the profession to accept unlimited liability as a cost of entering 
it.
127
 Alternatively, humanitarian organizations and systems ascribe to an internationally 
accepted set of principles that are enshrined in UN resolutions and other international 
legal agreements; these are frequently identified in the context of a humanitarian 
imperative.
128
 
 
The core principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence are adhered to by 
virtually all humanitarian organizations and systems, and the values on which they are 
based are consistent with the organizational and systemic objectives of the humanitarian 
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sector. While the humanitarian sector generally ascribes to a common set of values, the 
sector does not meet the basic definition of a profession and does not, in fact, consider 
itself to be one, although efforts to professionalize it have been underway for some 
time.
129
 
 
Given a lack of standards within the humanitarian sector, it is not possible to identify 
members who operate within it as members of a “humanitarian profession,” although 
they may well be members of another recognized profession, such as doctors or 
engineers.
130
 Okros and Keizer suggest that the characteristics of a profession give rise to 
five attributes: jurisdiction, expertise, responsibility, identity and vocational ethic and 
they amplify as follows: 
Professions are seen as operating in (and normally seeking to 
regulate and/or control) a specific jurisdiction as a domain, field of 
action or social function over which society and regulatory bodies 
acknowledge the primacy of the profession,
131
 and changes in roles, 
functions or services provided by a profession or in functions 
provided by another profession can result in “contested 
jurisdictions.”132 
 
This analysis would suggest that opportunities for conflict between military and 
humanitarian organizations and systems may be the result of the pursuit of objectives 
based on mutually engrained, but mutually exclusive, value sets. For example, while 
militaries rarely undertake missions based on a premise of impartiality to all parties 
involved in a conflict,
133
 humanitarian organizations seek to deliver aid to any and all 
parties, regardless of their role. While this value may be noble in intent, the outcome may 
be a prolonging of the conflict leading to further violence.
134
 Humanitarian organizations 
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may, in fact, function unintentionally as a logistical support system for parties in the 
conflict, thus exacerbating it. As Leriche pointed out:  
The cunning co-option of the massively valuable resources of the 
humanitarian aid system is how many militaries and paramilitaries 
have continued to support their soldiers and campaigns despite the 
loss of military assistance. The determination of aid organizations to 
remain neutral, however noble, enables local commanders to 
continue to pillage aid resources intended for those who suffer. 
Those with guns never go hungry.
135
  
 
Style 
 
The 7S model proposes that organizations exhibit a cultural style and that this is revealed 
by behaviours of actors in the organization, particularly key managers. Schein defines 
organizational culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a 
group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members 
as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”136 
Behaviours, as opposed to declarations, expose what is important to the organization (and 
therefore the actors), and at the same time, symbols, including symbolic language, 
support an organizational identity that is commonly understood by the actors. To the 
extent military and humanitarian sectors increasingly operate in common spaces and find 
themselves working on common problem sets, there is a possibility that organizational 
identities (of which organizational culture could be considered the external “personality”) 
are under pressure. 
 
Given what has been revealed in the realms of strategy, structure, systems and shared 
values, a possibility exists that differences in organizational style between military and 
humanitarian organizations and systems may also inhibit high levels of coordination and 
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collaboration. In order to examine this possibility, the focus will be on one specific aspect 
of organizational style, namely organizational decision-making processes.  
 
Heyse classifies NGOs into role categories of implementers, catalysts or partners and 
suggests that in each of these roles both operational and strategic decisions will be made. 
In this context, operational refers to decisions concerning who the NGO will select to 
provide services for (or not) and strategic refers to decisions around issues such as 
funding, policies, lobbying and marketing amongst others.
137
 The concern is the 
processes by which NGOs make operational and strategic decisions in contrast to how 
military organizations and systems make operational and strategic decisions. This is 
necessary in order to ascertain if different approaches to decision making may inhibit 
cross-sector coordination and collaboration. Heyse’s review of NGO literature disclosed 
that “the internal affairs of NGOs have generally long been ignored” and that “only a few 
studies pay explicit attention to the internal decision-making processes of NGOs, either 
empirically or theoretically.”138 In order to analyse NGO decision-making processes, it is 
first necessary to further classify the levels at which decisions may be taken, and these 
are described as micro (individual level), meso (intra-organizational level) and macro (or 
close to what we have described as systemic).  
 
Of these levels meso is of primary concern in relation to the issue of humanitarian-
military interaction, given that the most frequent and consequential interactions will 
occur at the organizational level. It is possible that decisions taken at the micro level 
could have significant impact on meso-level decisions, depending on the role and degree 
of influence that an individual decision-taker holds within the organization; however, it 
would be difficult to determine how micro-level decisions affect organizational-level 
decisions without investigating the internal processes of a specific organization and the 
behaviour patterns of individuals within it. At the other end of the scale, studies of 
macro-level decision making could reveal patterns across organization types, and while 
useful, this information may not assist with understanding how a specific organization 
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will make decisions in a specific setting. March’s typology of decision-making models, 
rooted in organizational decision-making theory, is offered by Heyse as a means of 
analysing NGO decision-making patterns. The March models are labelled consequential, 
appropriate and garbage-can decision making, and Table 3 illustrates these in relation to a 
series of characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
Key questions 
Consequential Appropriate Garbage Can 
What alternatives of 
action are available? 
 
What consequences (in 
terms of costs and 
benefits) will each 
alternative have? 
 
How likely is it that these 
consequences become 
real? 
 
How are these potential 
consequences valued and 
prioritized by the 
decision makers? 
In what kind of 
situation am I? 
 
What kind of person am 
I and what kind of 
organization is this? 
 
What should a person 
such as me, in an 
organization such as 
this, do in a situation 
such as this? 
Is there an 
alternative/solution that 
“needs” a problem? 
 
Which organization 
members can create a link 
between a solution and a 
problem, and are these 
organization members in a 
position to decide? 
 
If so, is there a choice 
opportunity in which a 
decision can be taken? 
Mode of reasoning Sequential 
 
Organizationally 
prospective 
Instant 
 
Retrospective 
Simultaneous 
 
Individual 
prospective 
 
Type of behaviour Maximizing 
 
Anticipatory 
Obligatory 
 
Rule based 
Entrepreneurial 
 
Persuasive 
The inference pattern Information decision 
making 
Decision making by 
analogy 
Decision making by 
linking 
 
Outcome of decision 
making 
Optimal decisions 
(ideally) 
Congruent decisions Coincidental decisions 
Table 2. Characteristics of March's Three Decision-Making Models   
 
Consequential decision making refers to “a rational process of consideration in which 
employees of an organization try to pursue the organizational goals to the best of their 
ability. This is referred to as goal maximization.”139 The process of generating or 
identifying alternatives; evaluating them in terms of costs, benefits and risks; and 
selecting the optimal solution to achieve the organization’s goals is described as 
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sequential due to the structured and ordered nature of the process, and this model relates 
most closely to the decision-making processes sustained by military organizations and 
systems at operational and strategic levels. 
 
Appropriate decision making is a “process of consideration in which employees of an 
organization behave in a manner expected of them in a particular situation.”140 This leads 
to the selection of actions which are normative as opposed to calculative, and these are 
based on an understanding that rules of behaviour are already available for a given 
situation; employees are expected to understand these, and this leads to instant decision 
making. In a military context, this sort of reflexive approach is often valued at the tactical 
level where timelines to make decisions are short and repetitive training is designed to 
inculcate quick and unhesitant decisions; at operational and strategic levels, however, 
where the consequences of decisions may be far-reaching, such an approach could lead to 
bounded decisions or what is sometimes referred to as “situating the estimate.” 
 
With respect to garbage-can decision making, “problems, alternatives for action, decision 
makers and choice opportunities are assumed to exist simultaneously in a so-called 
‘garbage can.’ Decisions are made when employees with the authority to decide have a 
choice opportunity to couple a particular problem with an already existing alternative for 
action.”141 This could occur, for example, when an NGO has excess financial, human or 
other capacity but no crisis is occurring requiring a response; the sudden appearance of 
such a crisis may be considered a choice opportunity. It is more problematic to identify a 
military example of this type of decision- making process, unless one chooses to include 
so-called “wars of choice” in this typology.142  
 
At the micro-level, NGO decision-making processes are concerned with the motivations 
of individuals to make decisions, and various theories have been advanced to explain this, 
including a desire for organizational survival in order to maintain job security and 
personal preferences of employees to work within specific areas of interest regardless of 
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the empirical need for such services. The challenge at this level is to ensure that 
individual interests are aligned with organizational goals.  
 
At the macro-level, the external environment is posited to be the dominant factor 
influencing decision-making processes. Resource dependence theory assumes that 
organizations require access to resources in order to survive and that this will cause an 
organization to reduce dependence on external actors who possess the most relevant 
resources while negotiating with those who have the most power as a means of achieving 
organizational goals. Alternatively, institutional theory posits that “organizations will be 
responsive to regulative, normative and cognitive pressures, resulting from the dominant 
norms and rules in their environment. Adjusting to these pressures is a way to gain more 
legitimacy for the organization.”143 Because NGOs may not be able to meet the 
expectations of all external stakeholders simultaneously, organizations develop rational 
myths through which they adopt certain practices in theory, but not in practice.  
 
Heyse offers an explanation for NGO decision making at the meso-level based on ideal-
typical organizational settings, described as administrative, institutionalized and 
ambiguous. In administrative organizations “principles of instrumental rationality, 
maximizing behaviour and consequentiality will determine the decision making 
process,”144 and this is most likely to engender the consequential decision-making model. 
Such organizations value formal structures and authority, maintain sanctions and 
incentives, and have a high degree of specialization: military organizations are best 
represented by this ideal typology. 
 
Institutionalized organizations have a “value of its own, beyond its formal tasks, to both 
insiders and outsiders”145 and decisions are made “appropriately” due to a common value 
system and shared organizational ideology. Recruitment, training and socialization 
practices ensure that employees adopt the value system of the organization and can make 
appropriate decisions in the presence of informal rule systems. While military 
organizations possess some characteristics of institutionalized organizations, especially a 
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high degree of socialization and training, the absence of a formal structure in such 
organizations (or at least a very weak one) is not consistent with the military typology.  
 
In addition to lacking a formal structure, ambiguous organizations do not possess 
compliance or coordination mechanisms and decision making processes are typified by 
persuasion and compromise; Heyse posits that garbage-can decision-making processes 
would be expected to be prominent in these types of organizations.
146
 Characteristics of 
ambiguous organizations include: constantly dealing with new issues, a high workload, 
unstructured work processes, inconsistent and ill-defined preferences, as well as fluid 
participation (meaning “participants vary in the amount of time and effort they devote to 
different domains”147). 
 
Although it is not empirically possible to directly correlate organization types or 
decision-making preferences to structural characteristics of an organization, such as size, 
there is some evidence to suggest that as NGOs move from less professional to more 
professional practices, or intra-organizational solutions, there will be a tendency to adopt 
an administrative model of organization and practice consequential decision making.
148
 If 
this is true, it may be posited that “less professional” NGOs will sustain institutionalized 
or ambiguous organizations and practice appropriate or garbage-can styles of decision 
making. 
 
The earlier discussion of strategy, structure and systems in military organizations 
highlighted the role and importance of operational and strategic planning, and in this 
context, planning may be considered a formal structured method of arriving at a decision. 
In order to manage the decision-making process, military organizations devise systems of 
planning which may be described as a type of consequentialist decision making and 
which fit administrative organizations, of which the military may be considered 
archetypal in nature.  
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Both military and humanitarian organizations and systems confront complex problems 
and operate in complex environments, and therefore, the ability to arrive at a decision that 
accounts for that complexity and yet achieves the objective is extremely difficult. The 
military sector has a long association with decision sciences and operational research 
(OR) and commonly utilizes theories, techniques and decision-support tools including 
modeling and simulation (M&S) to complement the planning process at higher (e.g., 
operational and strategic) levels.
149
  
 
While the complexity of a problem may derive from various factors, military operations 
and the decisions required to initiate them are most affected by human or social aspects 
and operational research techniques and tools have evolved from hard methodologies 
(which feature primarily mathematical or statistical approaches) to soft methods (which 
incorporate behavioural and social science theories). Examples of the former include 
stochastic programming and system dynamics; examples of the latter include cognitive 
mapping and group facilitation.
150
  
 
In the context of a CA to state building, the emphasis, as we have already witnessed, 
involves taking actions at the tactical level in order to generate effects at the operational 
level through the design of a campaign plan that represents a roadmap of change, leading 
towards a future set of conditions in the environment.
151
 Daellenbach advances three 
streams of decision-support systems based on the perspective of the decision makers in 
relation to the problem and their view of the system in which the problem exists. He 
classifies problems on the basis of two types of complexities: “Technical complexity 
associated with the physical, mathematical, or computational nature of the problem and 
human/social complexity associated with the interrelationships between the 
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stakeholders.”152 The streams of decision support are defined as functionalist systems 
approaches, interpretive systems approaches and emancipatory systems approaches.
153
  
 
These approaches to decision making reveal characteristics that may be mapped to 
military and humanitarian organizations and systems as well as to the complex problem 
inherent in a CA. For example, military organizations generally maintain an emphasis on 
functionalist approaches, given their focus on advancing new weapons systems and the 
requirement for both mass and technical superiority to defeat an enemy. As such, the 
military operational planning process stresses the importance of defining the problem 
clearly, limiting the number of variables and structuring well-defined objectives and end 
states and assumes that the decision maker has the ability to implement the selected 
option. Having stated that, however, military planners are highly cognizant of the human 
aspects of military problems and are well aware that such problems cannot be segregated 
from the larger system in which they are manifested. 
 
Humanitarian organizations would be arguably comfortable with the concepts and 
orientation embedded within emancipatory approaches, given their foci on assisting 
populations in extremis and advocating for social change to promote individual and 
collective well-being. While understood as a “philosophy” of decision making, there 
remains, however, a deficit of practical methods of putting this philosophy into practice. 
 
Arguably, the CA encompasses elements resonant of interpretive approaches in that 
“different stakeholders with different world views have different, possibly conflicting, 
perceptions about the problem situation and its major issues.”154 As observers to a 
complex problem, military and civilian organizations and systems, particularly 
humanitarian organizations, bring to the CA diverging world views, and while 
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recognizing the need for compromise, there is no common understanding of “which 
changes are systemically desirable and culturally feasible”155 to achieve a CA.  
 
In the context of a CA to state building, I have observed that military and humanitarian 
sectors are most likely to interact at the meso-level, and as a consequence, the 
requirement to understand the process of decision making at that level is paramount. 
Given that military organizations possess most frequently the characteristics of 
administrative organizations and practice consequentialist decision making, this 
invariably leads to the development of highly structured planning processes that seek to 
reduce risk, a not surprising revelation given the nature and purpose of military 
operations. While many aspects of functionalist systems’ approaches to decision making 
remain extant in military organizations (as a result of the need to acquire and employ 
highly technical weapons and other systems), the shift from large-scale, kinetic, force-on- 
force threats to complex crises and engagement in state-building enterprises require new 
approaches to decision making, such as those exemplified by interpretative approaches. 
This shift also gives rise to an increase in the human/social complexity scale, requiring 
new theories, techniques and decision-support tools. 
 
Humanitarian organizations possess most frequently the characteristics of 
institutionalized or ambiguous organizations and practice appropriate or garbage-can 
decision making, although it may be argued that to the extent these organizations 
professionalize they may adopt administrative organization characteristics and practice 
consequentialist decision making. While emancipatory systems’ approaches are 
philosophically congruent with humanitarian values, there is a lack of workable means of 
translating this into practice, and as result, interpretive approaches would likely be more 
common. 
 
While a potential shift of both military and humanitarian organizations towards 
interpretive systems’ approaches bodes theoretically well for the possibility of engaging 
in common decision-making practices that would support a CA, fundamental issues 
remain. First, it may be argued that neither organization type would choose interpretive 
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approaches if other options were available as default (i.e., functionalist for the military 
and emancipative for humanitarians). Second, a commonality of approach does not 
necessarily resolve underlying issues that arise from the interaction of different 
organization types and decision-making processes. Third, the subjectivist bias inherent in 
the interpretive systems’ approach ensures that organizations which possess different 
world views may hold “conflicting perceptions about the problem situation and its major 
issues,”156 and the answers to many important questions, such as “which changes are 
systemically desirable and culturally feasible”157 may remain contested. 
 
Staff 
 
While we have opted to investigate the elements of the McKinsey 7S model discreetly, it 
is necessary to recognize the integrative nature of the model, the interplay amongst 
various elements and how these may affect each other. This is particularly germane to the 
staff element, which is described as the “people/human resource management processes 
used to select and develop personnel in the institution or system, socialization processes, 
ways of shaping basic values, ways of inculcating novices, and career management 
practices.”158 It is clear that aspects of the staff element will be fundamentally shaped by 
other elements of structure, systems, shared values and style, and given the interplay 
amongst these, it is possible that staff (i.e., humans in the organization or system) will be 
of a distinct type based on differences (already identified) in the other elements and that 
these will be markedly different across military and humanitarian sectors. 
 
In the military context, human resources represent a capability that is inextricably linked 
to operational mission accomplishment, and modern Western militaries maintain 
sophisticated (and arguably complex) human-resource management systems which are 
designed to manage the “full lifecycle” of a military member. From this description, it is 
clear that a number of organizational and systemic aspects must be implicated in order to 
ensure that a fully trained personnel capability is available at the right place and right 
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time in order to respond to crises, and this helps to explain why militaries engage in 
extensive human-resource management planning. For example, Figure 6 illustrates the 
Canadian Forces Military Personnel Management Conceptual Model. 
 
 
Figure 6. Canadian Forces Military Personnel Management Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
Given that the military is an instrument of state power subjugated to civil authority, the 
management of military personnel must rest on strong societal, regulatory and legislative 
powers that circumscribe the roles, responsibilities and authorities of those within the 
system. These frameworks manifest in specific legislative acts, regulations, orders and 
instructions that address a multitude of individual and organizational-level matters, 
including the nature and conditions of service (including universality of service and 
deployability), discipline and the requirement to obey lawful commands.
159
 These, in 
turn, generate a series of defined programs that address all aspects of military 
socialization, training, occupational standards, career management as well as 
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compensation and benefits. While similar types of programs are found in other public 
sector organizations and the private sector, the underlying philosophy remains distinct to 
the military.
160
 
 
This highly structured approach to personnel management within the military sector 
contrasts with the humanitarian sector which has not embraced such practices for both 
philosophical and resource-related reasons. For example, a recent study of the 
humanitarian sector revealed that “evaluations continue to identify problems with high 
staff turnover and a need to invest more in human resource management systems. There 
continues to be widespread acknowledgement of the need to invest more in national staff 
development.”161 
 
While militaries are subject to cyclical budgetary pressures, the percentage of national 
resources assigned to the military is relatively consistent over time, except in 
extraordinary situations (such as war) or the build-up to such. This measure of 
consistency, thus, allows the military to allocate internal resources in such a manner so as 
to maximize overall capability, balancing available resources against expected or 
potential future missions.
162
 This again contrasts with humanitarian organizations that are 
subject to the willingness of donors to provide funds, and this process of constant fund-
raising affects the availability and capability of human resources.
163
 
 
Jakobsen asserted that a lack of resources for NGO training, particularly joint civil-
military training, is a key inhibitor to effective cross-sector cooperation. He noted, for 
example, that while NGOs are routinely invited to attend CIMIC and peace-support- 
related training by NATO and many member nations, “it is a problem for NGOs to find 
the time, money and personnel required to respond positively to NATO requests and 
invitations for cooperation, especially ones that involve courses lasting a week or 
longer.”164 Conversely, it is extremely rare for military personnel to attend training, 
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exercises or conferences sponsored by NGOs or humanitarian organizations, and as a 
result, this “contributes to the perception in the NGO community that NATO–NGO 
cooperation is driven and dictated by military concerns.”165 
 
In addition to disparities in levels of professionalism due to lack of training in 
humanitarian organizations, differences in approach to occupational standards and 
employment practices also generate the potential for friction between military and 
humanitarian sectors. In the military context, personnel are “required to perform general 
military duties and common defence and security duties, not just the duties of their 
military occupations or occupational specification,”166 and this results in an 
organizational population which has undergone common socialization and training 
experiences, leading to a strong identity. While the presence of a strong identity within 
military organizations is necessary to ensure the high degree of organizational cohesion 
required to function effectively in dangerous or violent missions, it may also lead to 
individual and organizational conservatism. Tamas asserts that “one of the main factors 
contributing to resistance to fundamental change in organizations is their employees’ 
natural desire to maintain the integrity of their personal structure of meaning, the cultural 
and psychological framework that defines their place in the social universe.”167 Meharg 
explains that: 
Identity, derived from identitas, and from idem, meaning same, is 
the quality or condition of being a specified person or thing. It refers 
to the state of being, or relating to, the same substance, nature and 
qualities that can determine one’s role in relation to society. Insofar 
as identity refers to the characteristics shared by organisations, it 
refers both to the material conditions that constitute place, and the 
behaviours, actions and rituals that relate to such material 
conditions. That is, identity refers to the specific places created by 
people sharing a way of life, as well as to the particular experiences 
in such places. Identity, therefore, is specific and sets people apart 
through various elements that are distinct and particularistic, 
including the places they claim as their own.
168
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Given a trend towards marketization
169
 of humanitarian organizations in order to generate 
funding, humanitarian field staffs remain in an almost permanent state of deployment to 
crisis zones, and while this practice may enhance an individual’s sense of purpose and 
contribution, the effect on a psychological level can be potentially damaging. This fact is 
well appreciated by military organizations, which adopt strict policies regarding 
operational tour lengths and frequency of deployments into operational zones, practices 
that humanitarian organizations cannot easily adopt due to limited resources and the need 
to be present when and wherever crises emerge.
170
 
 
This brief comparison of only limited aspects of the human-resource element in 
McKinsey’s 7S model would suggest that significant differences between military and 
humanitarian approaches to human-resource management, training standards, 
occupational standards and employment practices will generate and sustain employees 
with vastly different capabilities, perspectives and approaches to crisis scenarios. 
Underlying these differences may be perceptions based on ideas of military and 
humanitarian identities, and to the extent the essence of the CA generates a requirement 
for coordination and collaboration across these sectors, a possibility exists that the 
fundamental essence of their respective identities may be threatened. 
 
Skills 
 
The McKinsey model describes the final “S” of skills as “the distinctive competences—
what the institution or system does best, ways of expanding or shifting competencies.”171 
The CA anticipates that military and civilian, especially humanitarian, organizations and 
systems will occupy a common space in order to engage in a range of aid, developmental 
and state-building activities supported by a secure environment. As previously described, 
the nature of shifting roles and responsibilities in that common space—in particular a 
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tendency for militaries to undertake activities normally considered the purview of 
humanitarians—suggests that the assumed necessary levels of coordination and 
collaboration across these sectors are potentially elusive. With respect to competencies, 
these may be viewed through both individual and organizational lenses, and it is not 
necessarily assumed that organizational competency is the mere sum of competencies 
held by individuals within the organization, although it is contended that these will likely 
be related in some positive manner.  
 
Given the highly sophisticated approach to military human-resource management, it will 
not be surprising to discover an equally sophisticated approach to military competency 
development. Once again, the focus of competency development is related directly to 
operational-mission accomplishment; in other words, military members must possess the 
necessary competencies to function in a full range of operational conditions, up to and 
including combat. Smith asserted that militaries may be employed to accomplish four 
major functions: ameliorate, contain, deter or coerce, and destroy. Each of these functions 
must be supported by scores of individuals from private to general, each carrying out 
individual actions in the context of a highly complex and frequently violent operational 
environment.
172
 The Canadian Forces (CF) classifies primary military functions from a 
universalist perspective, contending that functions of Command, Sense, Act, Shield and 
Sustain are required in all mission types,
173
 but similar to Smith’s view, these too are 
descriptive summaries of a vast number of individual actions based on a level of 
individual competency nested in the context of a larger organizational one, and the 
investigational issue here is to determine how those competencies are acquired. 
 
In the context of the CF, competency development is achieved through the CF 
professional development system (CFPDS). The purpose of the CFPDS is “the ethical, 
social and intellectual development of CF personnel and the accumulation of a sufficient 
Professional Body of Knowledge (PBK) to deal with the broad range of leadership and 
staff responsibilities throughout the full spectrum of military activities that can be 
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anticipated during an individual’s career.”174 Professional development is understood to 
occur throughout the career of a member and incorporates education, training, self-
development and experience; furthermore, the organization maintains structures and 
incentives conducive to maintaining a continuous-learning environment. 
 
Guiding the CFPDS is the “Canadian military professional ideology consisting of two 
components: the theory-based body of knowledge defining the profession’s specialized 
expertise; and the profession’s value system. The former is referred to as the General 
System of War and Conflict (GSWC), and the latter is the Canadian Military Ethos.” 175 
The GSWC is the theoretical construct of conflict and war into the now-familiar levels of 
tactical, operational, strategic and political. Building on this theory, military professionals 
are expected to possess a very wide base of knowledge, and this is classified into three 
knowledge categories: core, supporting and specialized. 
 
As this knowledge is acquired over the duration of a total career, military professionals 
ostensibly improve their ability to comprehend increasingly complex problems, and this 
process is generally linked to levels of responsibility in the organization which, in turn, is 
reflective of the hierarchical rank structure. In order to acquire the knowledge necessary 
to advance in responsibility, the military career lifecycle is envisioned as a series of 
developmental periods, which are defined as “a timeframe in a career during which an 
individual is trained, employed and given the opportunity to develop specific 
occupational or professional skills and knowledge. Development periods are 
distinguished by progressive increase in the levels of accountability, responsibility, 
authority, competency, military leadership ability and the knowledge of operations and 
war.”176 These periods are characterized by a combination of education, training and 
experience which is career managed in a deliberate fashion in order to generate a depth of 
highly competent military professionals in the officer and non-commissioned cadres.  
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Given similar issues identified in other elements of the 7S model, it will not be surprising 
to determine that humanitarian organizations do not possess the ability to maintain 
competency development systems equal to that of the military. For example, with respect 
to the identification of a humanitarian professional body of knowledge, the following 
knowledge priorities, shown in Figure 7, were identified in a scoping study conducted for 
Enhanced Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance (ELRHA).
177
 
 
 
Figure 7. Humanitarian Knowledge Priorities as per the ELRHA Scoping Study 
 
 
Of interest, each of the four leading knowledge categories has approximate currency in 
the military sector, and it may suggested that security and safety may be mapped to 
“force protection,” monitoring and evaluation to “assessment,” needs assessment to 
“planning” and international humanitarian law to the “law of armed conflict.” That said, 
significant differences between military and humanitarian approaches to skill sets are 
revealed in the survey result as shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Humanitarian Skill Priorities as per the ELRHA Scoping Study
178
 
 
 
 
While undoubtedly important, the acquisition of these individual-level soft skills may not 
translate into organizational-level competencies that are arguably required in complex 
crises, chief among them the requirement to foster effective organizational leadership. 
“Leadership in the NGO sector was considered weak by some interviewees. As one 
noted, there is not a forceful enough group of senior people running emergency responses 
in the big NGOs. And it’s become too managerial—not enough capacity to speak out 
well on the big issues.”179  
 
A vital aspect of the military professional development system is the generation of 
leadership at senior levels with a variety of important transformative competencies; 
however, there is no equivalent process in the humanitarian sector. It is not uncommon, 
therefore, for senior military officers attempting to coordinate or collaborate with 
humanitarian organization leadership in a crisis scenario to hold vastly different 
competencies, resulting from longer years of service, greater levels of senior field 
experience as well as higher professional and academic education levels.
180
 While the 
military promotes the importance of formal academic education for all officers (and many 
non-commissioned members), the humanitarian sector has no structured approach to 
granting professional or academic qualifications. 
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In summary, the military sector promotes and maintains systems of competency 
development that are designed to train, educate and professionally develop effective 
leadership at all levels, as leadership is understood to be a, if not the, critical factor in 
achieving operational mission success. Conversely, humanitarian organizations have 
traditionally focused on the attraction of employees and field workers who empathize 
with the organization’s philosophical orientation but who may not bring with them the 
necessary skill sets to succeed and which may not be acquirable in light of ongoing 
pressures to fund-raise and deploy on a constant basis. As a result, a significant 
competency disparity may exist between military and humanitarian sectors at both 
individual and organizational levels, further exacerbating the dilemma of achieving an 
effective degree of coordination or collaboration in the context of a CA. 
 
Strategic Capability Gaps 
 
Capability gaps speak to an inability on the part of an organization or system to design, 
develop and adopt new methods required to execute a selected strategy or successfully 
adapt existing ones. With respect to the adoption of a CA strategy, NATO experienced 
strategic-level capability gaps along two lines: an inability to foster effective partnerships 
with the UN, EU and major NGOs as well as the persistence of nationally based 
stovepipes. 
 
The importance of partnerships to the success of a CA has already been articulated, and 
NATO explicitly recognized this point in the 2011 statement Political Guidance on ways 
to improve NATO’s Involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction in which it was 
highlighted that “it will be important in this context for the Alliance to seek, in 
accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, unity of effort with the other 
members of the international community, in particular its strategic partners the UN and 
the EU.”181 Such an approach is seen as both necessary, in that these organizations 
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possess civilian capacity which could be potentially marshalled to achieve state-building 
goals, as well as desirable, in the context of transforming NATO from a “static, collective 
defense organization into a flexible security alliance with a potential for global reach.”182 
 
Thakur argued that the failure to achieve a balanced civil-military approach to state 
building in Afghanistan was the result of the United Nations early decision to maintain a 
light footprint which effectively resulted in the outsourcing of key military and political 
decisions to NATO, and this, in turn, reinforced the military nature of the mission.
183
 
However, the UN’s reluctance to effectively engage with NATO in Afghanistan is 
arguably due to the broad- based membership of the organization which must 
accommodate the grand strategic views of Security Council members Russia and China 
which view NATO as “a military instrument of Western ‘neo-imperialism.’”184 
 
With respect to the NATO–EU relationship, this too is constrained by structural and 
organizational factors inherent in the Alliance which requires unanimity on the one hand, 
while struggling with ongoing political disagreements between Alliance members on the 
other, in particular, relations between Turkey and Greece. This led Hull to describe the 
EU–NATO relationship as a “frozen conflict,” and Hull links internal NATO friction as a 
key impediment to the advancement of a CA, given that “applying the new standards 
requires the consensus of all Member States.”185 
 
Jakobsen described the NATO-NGO relationship as the least developed, even in 
comparison to the UN or EU, and he argued that it is “unrealistic to expect NATO to be 
able to create the culture of cooperation and the joint planning, execution and evaluation 
of operational activities with NGOs that effective CA cooperation calls for,”186 and this 
point was underscored in the previous analysis of strategic institutional gaps, specifically 
                                                 
182. Carlo Masala and Katariina Saariluoma, “Renewing NATO’s Partnerships: Towards a 
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See http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/blog/soldiers-policymakers-and-scholars-debate-afghanistan-at-
conference. 
184. Jakobsen, “Right Strategy, Wrong Place,” 87. 
185. Hull, 6. 
186. Jakobsen, 87. 
Chapter 3: Interrogating the Comprehensive Approach 
 
 
137 
 
the attributes of military and civilian organizations and systems, as framed by the 
McKinsey 7S model. 
 
Given the difficulties surrounding the achievement of effective strategic-level 
partnerships in the international community necessary for CA to facilitate state building, 
it has been suggested that “the Comprehensive Approach will only ever ‘work’ if one 
member (the United States) leads which, while attractive in the short term, will tend to 
undermine the legitimacy and multinational ethos that is vital for mission success. This 
would reinforce the tendency of member nations and partner institutions to retreat into 
stovepipes and thus undermine unity of purpose and effort.”187 The persistence of 
national stovepipes is directly linked to the political nature of the Alliance as a group of 
individual nations each seeking to achieve national objectives while attempting to satisfy, 
perhaps minimally, the designs of the Alliance. To the extent that individual nations 
pursue objectives to mollify domestic political audiences or attempt to balance domestic 
and international obligations simultaneously, this may lead to a lack of coordination 
amongst nations, and it will be shown later that this tendency—represented by the PRT 
movement—undermined the effectiveness of operational-level efforts in Afghanistan. 
 
Gap Analysis: Operational Level 
 
Operational Conceptual Gaps 
 
At this point, the integrated investigational framework shifts from the strategic to the 
operational level, and the pattern of investigating gaps along conceptual, institutional and 
capability contours continues. At the operational level, NATO attempted to actualize the 
CA by subsuming extant COIN and CIMIC doctrine and, latterly, by focusing on 
building Afghan security-force capacity. Having already identified the weaknesses 
associated with these initiatives, the purpose of this analysis is not to re-describe them but  
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rather to explain why these were not successful due to persistent operational-level 
conceptual, institutional and capability gaps. 
 
At the operational level, NATO’s attempt to actualize the CA strategy was encumbered 
by the absence of a coherent command and control (C2) model and operational-level CA 
doctrine. In my previous analysis of strategic institutional gaps, the concept of command 
was arguably implicated in all elements of McKinsey’s 7S model, although elements of 
staff, style and skills are intimately affected by it. NATO defines command and control as 
two distinct, but interconnected concepts, as follows: 
Command. The authority vested in an individual of the armed 
forces for the direction, co-ordination, and control of military 
forces.
188
  
Control. That authority exercised by a commander over part of the 
activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not 
normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility 
for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority 
may be transferred or delegated.
189
 
 
These definitions suggest that the nucleus of command is the legal authority invested in 
an individual to issue orders and make decisions, while control relates to the associated 
management functions or processes by which such orders and decisions may be carried 
out. Pigeau and McCann extend these definitions by explaining that command is “the 
creative expression of human will necessary to accomplish the mission,” while control 
represents those “structures and processes devised by command to enable it and to 
manage risk.”190 The essence of this analysis focuses on NATO’s extant concepts of 
command and control in the context of complex operating environments such as 
Afghanistan and in relation to NATO’s attempt to actualize a CA strategy which 
implicates both military and civilian organizations and systems. NATO’s current 
                                                 
188. NATO. AAP-6. It also defines command as: An order given by a commander; that is, the will 
of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action; a unit, group of units, 
organisation or area under the authority of a single individual; to dominate an area or situation; and; to 
exercise a command. 
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understanding of C2 remains embedded in traditional military doctrinal approaches, even 
while attempting to acknowledge the requirement to somehow include non-military 
actors in a C2 construct. For example, NATO’s Comprehensive Operational Planning 
Directive (COPD) requires that a strategic operational planning group (SOPG) “will have 
to ensure that the C2 is adequate for the multinational nature of the forces from all 
contributing nations and articulates arrangements for coordination with non-NATO 
entities” and that “coordination with cooperating non-military and non-NATO entities 
should include agreement regarding the arrangements and mechanisms to be established 
for coordination and the exchange of information to synchronise actions in theatre.”191 
Given my previous examination of the difficulties associated with various military-
civilian paradigms, such objectives may appear far-reaching, and it may be reasonable to 
suggest that a more achievable level of ambition in such complex environments would, at 
a minimum, be the establishment of a coherent military C2 structure.  
 
In this context, the notion of coherent relates to the military concept of unity of command 
which “provides the necessary cohesion for planning and execution of operations. This 
can only be done by vesting the authority to direct and coordinate the action of all forces 
and military assets in a single commander.”192 Although retained as a general principle of 
joint and multinational command,
193
 NATO doctrine acknowledged the inherent 
difficulty of applying this principle in practice and suggested that “unity of command is 
rarely possible when dealing with non-military agencies, so unity of purpose and effort is 
more appropriate; because goodwill, a common purpose, clear and agreed division of 
responsibilities, and an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of others become 
                                                 
191. NATO. COPD, 3-88. 
192. NATO. AJP 01 (D), 1-7. 
193. Ibid. “At the military strategic, operational and tactical levels of command, a fundamental 
tenet of C2 is unity of command, which provides the necessary cohesion for the planning and execution of 
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a designated Joint Operations Area (JOA). As a minimum, a commander would normally have Operational 
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essential elements in maximizing collective effort.”194 In spite of such lofty theoretical 
objectives, the reality of military disunity in the Afghan setting did not support the 
broader intent, and Hope deconstructed the problem of unity of command in that 
campaign. He argued that “from a strategic perspective, no one was in charge” and traced 
this to the initial US reliance on extant US headquarters to command US forces in theatre 
even as ISAF, as a multinational and ultimately NATO entity, was formed.
195
 
 
While SHAPE tasked JFCB to act as the operational-level headquarters for the Afghan 
mission (thereby relegating ISAF to tactical status), JFCB had, in fact, no authority over 
the US headquarters in theatre and was arguably “too far removed from the realities of 
Afghanistan to provide the necessary planning or operational guidance.”196 This 
unofficial disunity became official in 2006 when the US headquarters Combined Forces 
Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) transferred responsibility for the ground campaign to 
ISAF and “operations became split between Commander U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM), Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and Commander U.S. 
Special Operations Command (SOCOM).”197 Hope’s study of the lack of unity of 
command in Afghanistan concluded grimly that “failure to address the current problems 
of unity of command will result in the failure of the alliance—and the coalition—in 
Afghanistan.”198 Figure 9 illustrates the overall (and arguably confusing) command 
structure in Afghanistan in 2008. 
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Figure 9. Command in Afghanistan 2008 
 
 
Reference to the CA in NATO doctrine affirms that “the success of a comprehensive 
approach is dependent on a common sense of purpose and resolve, mutual understanding 
and collaboration, and appropriate resourcing” 199 and that, in the absence of unity of 
command, mutually agreed objectives must be underpinned by unity of purpose. 
Achieving unity of purpose amongst disparate military and civilian organizations and 
systems assumes a common understanding and agreement with respect to what 
constitutes mission success, and given a diversity of objectives, attempts to identify and 
agree on a universal definition is highly unlikely.  
 
Albert and Hayes suggest that associating mission success with effective C2 structures 
and processes is problematic because “the very definition of the mission is a function of 
command.”200 In this sense, an inability to adequately define mission success or identify 
attainable objectives represents a failure of command, and thus, “while C2 may be 
necessary, it is not sufficient to guarantee mission success,”201 which is impacted by other 
important factors, such as the availability of resources and the actions of multitudinous 
players in the engagement space.  
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While Pigeau and McCann unpack the command concept along dimensions of 
competency, authority and responsibility, “control structure and process is instantiated in 
a variety of mechanisms, including doctrinal guidelines, rules of engagement, 
organizational structure, software technologies and equipment,”202 and suggest that 
control’s sole purpose “is to support command by allowing it to take action in the 
operational context.”203 Conversely, Albert and Hayes view command and control as a set 
of integrated functions, including establishing intent; determining roles, responsibilities 
and relationships; establishing rules and constraints; and monitoring and assessing the 
situation and progress.
204
 In their model, C2 is seen as a process by which these functions 
are pursued and achieved effectively, and they argue that C2 as practised by NATO is 
“equivalent to current doctrine” 205 and that newer approaches, which may be more 
efficacious in complex operational environments, should be represented via a spectrum of 
C2 models.  
 
In order to explain the relationships amongst command, control and the environment in 
which these functions take place, Albert and Hayes offer a C2 conceptual model and in 
this approach, command and control functions are not assumed to be static but are 
affected by their respective qualities which, in turn, impact behaviours and generate 
effects in the environment. Each of the major model sub-components—command, 
control, behaviours and effects– are subject to the availability of appropriate information 
(and the quality thereof), and all of this taken together determines the variable outcome of 
mission effectiveness. It is clear in this model that availability of quality information 
represents a critical dependency to achieve mission effectiveness, and if so, it is 
important to determine how such information is attained and how it potentially impacts 
the selection and execution of actions in the operational environment. Albert and Hayes 
deconstruct this problem through a domain-dominant lens, which incorporates a concept 
of “sense making,” which posits that the information domain impacts the physical 
domain via a combination of processes which occur in cognitive (i.e., individual) and 
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social (i.e., collective) domains and that these in turn impact the collaborative ability of 
individuals and organizations in a system. Given my previous analysis of the levels of 
civil-military interaction and the criticality of coordination and collaboration to the 
achievement of a CA, the following explanation by Albert and Hayes is highly 
significant: 
For the purpose of exploring and understanding C2, we are 
interested in a set of these behaviours that involve a common or 
shared purpose or objective. Collaboration is defined as “working 
together for a common purpose.” There is a spectrum of 
collaboration. Words like sharing, coordination, consultation, 
synchronization, and integration could be used to describe differing 
degrees of collaboration. But comparing what one may mean by 
coordination versus consultation is difficult if not impossible unless 
we explicitly define the dimensionality of collaboration. Once we 
define the dimensionality of collaboration, we can fix the point on 
each dimension that corresponds to a given descriptor (e.g., 
coordination). In fact, it is typical to think about coordination in 
varying degrees (e.g., close coordination). When looking at a 
spectrum, it is often helpful to define the endpoints, in this case 
maximum collaboration. 
 
With respect to the discussion of “maximum collaboration,” the following endpoints are 
germane: 
 
• Extent: Inclusive – all participants involved (collaboration cuts across 
organizational, functional, spatial, and temporal boundaries including echelons of 
command); 
 
• Access: Full and equal access – all participants have equal access to all other 
participants; 
 
• Communications: Unconstrained – sufficient bandwidth; 
 
• Level of participation: Participatory – all participants fully engaged; 
 
• Frequency: Continuous – participants engaged without interruption; 
 
• Synchronicity: Synchronous; 
 
• Richness: Rich – multimedia, face-to-face; and 
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• Scope: Complete – involves data, information, knowledge, understanding, 
decisions, and actions.
206
 
 
From Figure 3, collaboration represented the optimum space in a conceptual spectrum of 
civil-military interaction, and the maximums delineated above may, therefore, be 
considered as qualitative descriptors of that collaborative space. The challenge to 
collaboration across civil-military sectors is, therefore, related to the quality, quantity and 
types of information that can or must transpose between the sectors at each point along 
the interaction spectrum. As one moves from less demanding forms of interaction (such 
as coordination) towards the maximalist collaborative space, these information demands 
become potentially overwhelming or even de-stabilizing to the organizations or systems 
implicated, and Albert and Hayes posit that “the endpoint on the spectrum of patterns of 
interaction—everyone with everyone else, all the time, and using the full range of 
media—is simply impractical as an approach for a large-scale military organization or an 
international effort.”207 
 
The challenges to a CA strategy identified in this brief analysis of approaches to C2 are 
arguably related to an absence of CA doctrine at the operational level, which, by this 
stage, is fully implicated as the level at which such strategies must be actualized. NATO 
doctrine writers, supported by various theorists, have sought to incorporate CA language, 
concepts and practices into revised and emerging NATO doctrine, and several references 
have already been made to some of this material. 
.  
The December 2010 NATO publication of the COPD is arguably the most recent effort to 
integrate CA concepts into extant NATO planning theory and processes at strategic and 
operational levels, and indeed, there are multiple references to the CA throughout this 
document.
208
 While the COPD integrates elements of conceptual precursors to the CA 
(such as EBAO, effects assessment and civil-military cooperation), there is no reference 
to discrete CA doctrine per se. 
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Mitchel argued the case that the “the central thrust of CA is to create more synergy 
between the military and non-military resources to maximize the desired effect at all 
levels of policy and plans, the tactical, the operational, the strategic, and the political 
normative. In this regard CA represents a desire for a more effective doctrine when 
dealing with complex conflicts.”209 While the COPD and other NATO publications 
reference this desire for more effective doctrine, there is no single source of information 
on the subject, and intriguingly, the NATO On-line Library associates the CA to NATO’s 
relations with the EU and references at least one publication that is highly critical of the 
CA concept writ large.
210
  
 
Given that the literature review has already covered much of the necessary ground, it 
only remains to restate that a lack of coherent CA doctrine has been linked to conceptual 
difficulties surrounding the core concept. Mitchel frames this problem as “the very nature 
of the CA requirement for multiple political actor cooperation at the strategic level within 
a conflict situation (which) inhibits CA’s development of C2 capacities to support a 
‘standalone’ doctrinal framework that reaches the tactical level. The wide range of 
suggestions and disagreements as to what CA encompasses at the political/normative 
level, from different actors, both state and non-state, is representative of the inherent 
dilemma.”211 He further argued that: 
Quite simply, as conflict situations change one would expect that the 
interests of participating actors to change, threatening the unity of 
command and—more importantly as far as the CA philosophy is 
concerned—the unity of effort. Without CA C2 capacities lead by a 
single political master, CA will find it difficult to develop as a 
complete doctrine—and therefore the desired synergetic effect will 
be very difficult to achieve.
212
 
 
Mitchel’s conclusion was consistent with that of NATO’s own investigation into CA 
capability gaps which recognized the importance of developing a coherent CA structure 
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in order to ensure adaptability from mission to mission. Although various models were 
investigated, analysed and described, the overall conclusion acknowledged that “the 
existence of any knowledge bases on various approaches and the results of their 
implementation is not known,”213 and that further research would be necessary to resolve 
this dilemma. 
 
Operational Institutional Gaps 
 
While the majority of the discussion and arguments have focused on aspects of the CA in 
the realm of ideas and models, action taken by NATO at the operational level implicates 
the role of military forces to actualize the strategy in practice. Given that COIN was a 
primary vehicle by which NATO intended to advance the security component of the 
operational-level security-development nexus, it is reasonable to investigate if the 
institution acted in a manner consistent with its stated objectives. This would suggest that 
the institution would have needed to generate the capacity and capability to meet the 
requirements identified and adopted as guidelines for success. 
 
By the time NATO and ISAF adopted COIN doctrine as a means of achieving the desired 
level of security in Afghanistan, COIN theory, concepts and practices had advanced to a 
sufficiently high level of maturity such that these were well understood throughout the 
Western militaries engaged in the campaign and were generally accepted by political 
leadership both in NATO and key allies. According to ISAF in 2010, “the strategy is 
focused on COIN operations designed to protect population centres, support improved 
governance, and create a sustainable security environment for the Government of 
Afghanistan.”214 However, the Afghan campaign was not, in fact, resourced to a level 
consistent with accepted COIN doctrine, and the risk of failure as a result was well 
understood. This problem was further exacerbated by the imposition of troop- 
contributing-nation caveats, which restricted how and where ISAF could utilize the forces 
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assigned to it. This not only created friction between ISAF and troop contributing nations 
(and between contributing nations themselves) but further handcuffed the relatively small 
number of troops engaged in COIN. 
 
 
The issue of force levels and force ratios in counter-insurgency has been the focus of 
numerous studies, and several were neatly summarized in a 2012 US Army internal 
memorandum. It stated: 
Paragraph 1-67 of FM 3-24 discusses ratios of counter-insurgents to 
insurgents. The FM cites the numbers for previous conflicts as 10 or 
15 friendly troops to 1 insurgent. It then proclaims that a better 
requirement is 20 to 25 counter-insurgents for every 1,000 residents 
in an area of operations for effective counter-insurgent operations.
215
  
 
The interest in force ratios in COIN is rooted in historical practices and has been the 
subject of several analytical studies which have sought to identify ideal or winning ratios 
of counter-insurgents to insurgents and counter-insurgents to population. For example, 
Galula argued in his 1964 seminal text Counter-insurgency Warfare that the French lost 
in Indochina due to their inability to force generate 10–20 counter-insurgents per 
insurgent, and in 1986, Cable’s work Conflict of Myths, The Development of American 
Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War suggested that any such examination 
of force ratios would need to account for the large number of supporting personnel 
engaged in the campaign and that a more accurate approach would be to consider only 
trained manoeuvre counter-insurgency forces.
216
 These and similar analyses began to 
inform official policy, for example:  
The Reagan Administration elected to increase financial pressure on 
the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, by facilitating the insurgent’s 
battle of exhaustion, based on the ten to one ratio. The strategy 
worked and United States assistance allowed the Mujahedeen to 
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erode the Soviet will to invest the resources and manpower 
necessary to succeed in Afghanistan.
217
 
In his article entitled “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Quinlivan focused on 
counter-insurgent force levels not in relation to the number of insurgents, but in relation 
to the size of the population in which the operation was occurring.
218
 Based on a series of 
six case studies, he observed that COIN operations had ranged from 6.6 to 20 counter-
insurgents per 1000 population, but did not offer conclusive prescriptions for success. 
Alternatively, McGrath’s study “Boots on the Ground: Troop Densities in Contingency 
Operations” analysed seven operations and suggested that a winning ratio would be on 
the order of 13.6 counter-insurgents per 1000 population.
219
 Kozelka’s monograph 
reinforces the 20 per 1000 population ratio, but states that while: 
each situation is unique and a fixed ratio will not guarantee success, 
there is a strong correlative relationship between force levels and 
success. This is because in COIN, numbers do matter. The COIN 
force must have adequate strength to establish and maintain 
widespread security to protect the population against insurgent 
violence and intimidation. The case studies show that the closer 
force levels approach the ratio of 20 security forces per 1000 
population, the greater the possibility the COIN force will reach the 
tipping point to success. When the nature of the war being fought is 
COIN, the strategy and force size must be nested with providing 
security for the people.
220
 
 
More recent analyses amplify these baseline studies and three may be noted in particular. 
Goode’s 2009 article “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counter-insurgency” 
reinforced the counter-insurgent to population ratio argument as the key force-generation 
metric.
221
 He noted Quinlivan’s and McGrath’s contributions to understanding the 
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importance of this and cited McGrath’s inclusion of a police to population ratio, which he 
suggested should be on the order of 4 police per 1000 population. 
 
While focused on the counter-insurgent to population ratio as a key determinant for 
success in COIN, Goode posits that this cannot be a pre-set factor but must adapt in 
relation to levels of violence, which he opts to measure as “the number of counter-
insurgents (i.e., security forces) killed in action each year per million residents. This 
number includes both local and intervening forces. There were two reasons for choosing 
this metric. First, it measures the amount of violent resistance to the security forces’ 
attempts to control the nation or region. Second, it is more reliably recorded than other 
possible metrics.”222 Goode’s analysis revealed “that the minimum counter-insurgent 
force is 2.8 soldiers per 1,000 residents, with more forces required as the violence level 
increases. Additionally, the larger the proportion of security forces drawn from the local 
population, the fewer personnel will be needed to deal with the violence.”223 From this, 
he deduces three significant possibilities: 
If the threshold equation is correct, three things should be observed. 
First, in conflicts where the counter-insurgent effort achieved and 
maintained a force equal to or greater than the threshold, the 
violence level should drop to and stay at a relatively low level. 
Second, if the counter-insurgent side never achieves the force 
threshold, the violence should increase until the insurgents win a 
military victory. Third, if the counter-insurgent forces are entirely 
comprised of persons from outside the host nation—mathematically, 
if L is zero—the counter-insurgents should fail.224 
 
Theil’s paper “COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges” 
contributes to the discussion by re-focusing on the counter-insurgent to insurgent ratio 
issue
225—this is not surprising given the US decision to surge troops to Afghanistan in a 
fashion similar to that undertaken earlier in Iraq, and views of the success of this 
approach, both pro and con, have already been offered. 
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While positing that the officially accepted ratio of 10:1 was likely too great, he argued 
that a necessary ratio did indeed exist and offered that a 4:1 ratio “can serve as a basic 
planning figure for counter-insurgent planners.”
226
 However, his study also concluded that a 
lower ratio (i.e., one approaching a level of only 3:1) favoured the insurgency thereby 
generating “a significantly higher chance of exhausting the incumbent government and 
achieving victory.”
227
 
 
In “Manpower and Counter-insurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine” 
Friedman provided a detailed and mathematically supported analysis which, in 
summation, could neither confirm nor definitively refute the relevance of force ratios or 
density to the probability of success in a given counter-insurgency and argued that 
“unless its proponents can muster systematic support, the rule of thumb for deploying 20 
troops per 1000 inhabitants in the area of operations should be scrapped.”228 
 
While the utility of applying this research to the Afghan counter-insurgency may, 
therefore, be open to question, it will be recalled that ISAF, under General Petraeus, 
instituted COIN as the predominant operational approach from approximately 2009 
onwards, and this underscored the argument for a troop surge which ended in 2011. 
Given my earlier examination of the state of Afghanistan in 2011 and the importance of 
the COIN campaign in relation to the CA, it would appear pertinent to undertake such an 
analysis, the aim of which is to determine if NATO and its key members generated 
sufficient forces to achieve mission success in light of the adoption of widely 
promulgated COIN theory and doctrine. This is important because: 
It is also clear that in Afghanistan this doctrinal security force-to-
population ratio is understood and used as a planning metric by 
ISAF operational commanders. During Operation Moshtarak, 
planners in British-led Task Force Helmand identified the necessary 
COIN ratio to be twenty-five counter-insurgents per 1,000 
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population, and this produced an imperative to generate more 
friendly forces.
229
 
 
The challenge to undertaking such an analysis relates to the ability to define and agree on 
key variables under study which, as we have seen in the analysis of changing conditions 
in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2011, is no simple feat, given the complexity of the 
operational engagement space. In order to proceed with such an analysis at least five 
variables would need to be defined: 
What timeframe will be selected? Given that the insurgency 
shifted in intensity between 2006 and 2011, the specific 
timeframe selected will likely produce variable outcomes. 
What engagement space will be selected? Engagement space in 
this analysis will be relevant along two vectors: geographic 
space and population, although population density in a given 
location would be relevant for “micro-level” studies. 
What is the size of the insurgency? Can the number of 
insurgents be identified? Again, size will also be important 
in relation to both time and space factors (i.e., when and 
where they are operating). 
What is the size of the counter-insurgency? Can the number of 
counter-insurgents be identified in relation to both time and 
space factors, and which forces should be included? This last 
question is particularly relevant to the inclusion of Afghan 
security forces. 
Which force ratio analyses should be selected? Counter-
insurgent to insurgent ratios or counter-insurgent to 
population ratios?  
 
The choices made in relation to these variables could result in an entire series of micro-
studies, and this may well be a valuable contribution to a future understanding of how the 
Afghan counter-insurgency campaign evolved: for our purposes, however, a macro 
overview will suffice. Annex A to Chapter 3 provides the results of an analysis of force 
ratios – both counter-insurgent to insurgent and counter-insurgent to population ratios at 
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the height of the COIN campaign which I have identified as March 2011.  While this 
analysis of counter-insurgency force levels is by no means definitive, there is sufficient 
evidence to suggest that the mission was under resourced even at the peak of the counter-
insurgency effort, and given widely accepted theories of COIN and force generation 
ratios, NATO and its troop-contributing nations were aware of the risks their actions 
would pose.  
 
National Caveats 
 
National caveats are defined as “restrictions that individual troop-contributing countries 
impose on their own forces’ activities.”230 In practice, national caveats restricted the 
ability of ISAF leadership to employ troops when, where or how they were needed, in 
spite of being under ISAF command. In general terms, those nations that were willing to 
deploy troops to the more violent areas of Afghanistan tended to impose fewer caveats 
than those operating in less dangerous territory. Although as the insurgency expanded 
from 2006 onwards, virtually all ISAF contributors were engaged in active combat 
operations to one degree or another, and there was ongoing pressure from ISAF HQ and 
Brussels for nations to remove caveats.  
 
Saideman and Auerswald are concerned with the sources of decision making within 
Alliance members and how these processes cause different members to impose caveats. 
Traditional views related to balancing against threats, tailoring actions to public support 
and the role of national culture were considered but were found to be wanting as 
explanations. The source of these differences appears, in fact, to be related to the types of 
governance practiced by the member state and the relationship between governance types 
and individual-level decision making that is possible in the context of multi-lateral 
operations. To clarify: 
Some institutional forms, such as coalition cabinets, tend to impose 
caveats on their deployed troops and then resist dramatic alterations 
to those caveats. … In other cases, such as presidential and 
majoritarian parliamentary governments, domestic institutions 
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empower individuals as the key actors, necessitating that we 
understand their historical experiences and their inclinations. These 
countries are capable of rapid and dramatic changes in policy.
231
 
 
Regardless of the reasons propelling member nations to impose caveats, by 2008, the 
issue was identified as a major problem within ISAF, and the NATO Joint Allied Lessons 
Learn Centre ascertained that “all nations have some form of caveats and associated 
command veto. Some nations have stated that if they are pushed too hard to remove 
written caveats, these caveats will simply become unwritten until the nation is tasked to 
do something not within its intentions. These nations would then implement their national 
command veto and simply refuse to be a part of the planned operation.”232  
 
The import of this analysis is the linkage between caveats and force-generation 
requirements, and given that most contributing nations were reluctant (or unable) to 
generate additional forces, the fight to remove caveats remained an ongoing challenge for 
NATO and ISAF leadership.
233
 In spite of these pressures, as of April 2010 only 22 of 43 
troop-contributing nations were caveat-free.
234
 This situation created tensions amongst 
the various contributors, particularly as casualty levels continued to rise unevenly, and 
this tension was further exacerbated by widely different levels of domestic support for the 
mission and for NATO itself.
235
  
 
Operational Capability Gaps 
 
The analysis of civil and military organizational decision-making processes undertaken 
previously revealed that military organizations possess most frequently the characteristics 
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of administrative organizations and practice consequentialist decision making; this leads 
to the development of highly structured planning processes in contrast to humanitarian 
organizations which are less likely to adopt such methods. This strategic-level 
institutional gap translates at the operational level into a capability gap which may be 
described as the inability on the part of implicated military and civilian organizations to 
design, develop or adopt planning methods that allow for common understanding and 
coherent integrated action which is critical to the success of the CA.
236
 
 
Reference has already been made to the COPD, which is NATO’s most recent planning 
doctrine, and this document states that “planning in a multi-dimensional environment 
generates particular challenges for both civilian and military actors. Experience shows 
that not only may there be no formally appointed lead agency to provide overall 
coordination, but that those organisations capable of reacting quickly are very often 
military in nature.”237 While the COPD is replete with references to the CA and 
establishes an identifiable philosophical orientation towards the concept, detailed 
processes for strategic- and operational-level planning exhibit tendencies to view non-
military actors simply as inputs to the military planning process.
238
 
 
That said, the COPD directs that “cooperating non-NATO entities” must be designated or 
authorized at the political, or NAC, level and that actions taken in relation to these types 
of entities at the military strategic or operational levels will focus primarily on 
coordination and liaison functions.
239
 With respect to the issue of joint civil-military 
planning, operational-level direction requires that “given NAC authorisation for direct 
liaison and coordination with relevant national and international actors, the JFC will 
arrange for their participation in the operational planning as required,” although there is 
no specific method or process attached to this direction.
240
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A more specific planning-related imperative is concerned with “effects development,” 
and the COPD recognizes that the analysis of systems and system elements (which 
comprise the engagement space) may not be influenced by military means alone. This 
then generates a requirement to ascertain non-military means during the planning process 
and identify which actors can generate the desired effects; this logically necessitates 
interaction with those actors, and the COPD identifies four types of potential interaction: 
(1) complementary non-military activity in support of military 
action; 
(2) complementary military actions in support of non-military 
activity; 
(3) mutual support; and 
(4) de-confliction of critical activities.
241
 
 
Tamas asserts that “vocabulary used indicates there is a substantive control orientation in 
perception of ownership of the intervention by the military” 242 and that the presumption 
that NATO does planning in order to achieve effects overlooks the critical role of the host 
nation which should own the process. This is an important observation as much of the 
doctrinal and analytical discussion relating to the obstacles to achieving coherent civil-
military interaction focuses on exogenous military and civil organizations, and there is a 
paucity of analysis in the literature concerning how the intervention target can and should 
be engaged prior to the intervention occurring (i.e., during the planning stage).
243
 He 
explains that: 
Another area where a change in mindset is required is linked to the 
notion of “agency”—the question of who is doing the acting and 
who is being acted on. Most military discourse reinforces the notion 
that ‘we’ act on ‘them.’ The military draws on intelligence, it 
decides what needs to be done, and then others in the field receive 
their ordinance(s). This structure is not surprising considering the 
historical uses of military planning, but it is not well suited for 
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Fourth Generation Warfare, especially the 75 per cent that is non-
kinetic.
244
 
 
Borgomano-Loup advanced explanations as to why the military would like to have a 
more systematic and institutionalized approach to dealing with civilian organizations, 
especially NGOs, which she labels as “predictability” and “effectiveness,” and she 
suggests the motivation for incorporating NGOs into the military planning process is to 
gain access to their capabilities. She also suggests that this has a legal component, in that 
the military force commander may build a legal framework in theatre to outline 
responsibilities towards civilians working in the area of responsibility. While this 
argument underscores the “military as control agent” theory, Borgomano-Loup is 
supportive of enhancing relationships between the military and NGOs, including the 
provision of advice, but concludes that any specific scheme must preclude “any 
integration of NGOs in the planning of operations as decisive operational actors.”245  
 
In addition to multinational or alliance level, obstacles to effective civil-military or 
interagency planning exist at national levels and in settings other than Afghanistan. The 
United States (which is arguably the most advanced Western nation in terms of 
codification and legislation related to establishing formal interagency mechanisms at the 
federal level) has, in spite of such efforts, continued to experience significant 
deficiencies. For example, a study conducted in 2009 noted that the US Department of 
Defense adaptive planning construct “complicated the accommodation of inputs from the 
interagency partners, given the lack of civilian capacity to participate in and contribute to 
such planning.”246 Both Nilsson and Hull also highlight the asymmetry of planning 
resources as a key inhibitor to interagency planning.
247
 
 
Given these descriptions of seemingly intractable obstacles to coherent civil-military 
planning regimes at the operational level, particularly in relation to the intended 
capability as stated in extant NATO doctrine, questions regarding the causes of these 
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obstacles may lead to conclusions regarding the assay of civil-military planning on a 
more generalized basis. Of particular interest would be the potential identification of 
metaphysical factors or elements which fundamentally preclude the desired coherence for 
civil-military planning in the context of a CA strategy to state building. The earlier 
analysis of civil-military paradigms undertaken in the context of McKinsey’s 7S model 
has already addressed some of the underlying dynamics which may logically impede the 
ability of civil and military organizations from collaborating in joint operational-level 
planning particularly, although not necessarily, as direct causation, inimical decision-
making styles.  
 
Smith and Shrimpton suggested that the intervention into Afghanistan (and Iraq) was 
qualitatively different from earlier efforts to rebuild states affected by conflict following 
major wars along two axes: time and strategy. The effort to rebuild Western Europe 
following the Second World War was, for example, a decades-long project that was 
clearly tied to a Cold War (grand) strategy. Alternatively:  
these [Afghan and Iraq] interventions commenced while lacking 
coordinated and coherent civil-military planning, and they have 
morphed repeatedly, without clear long-term visions and without 
promises of long-term commitments. Nation-building has neither 
been promised nor applied in earnest, yet the 3D Approach has the 
trappings of nation-building.
248
 
 
Ryan offered three explanations for this evident deficiency of coordinated and coherent 
civil-military planning which may be encapsulated as lack of trust, loyalty and common 
instrumentality for planning. With respect to the issue of trust, military organizations are 
ingrained with a propensity towards secretiveness as a result of the types of operational 
information they possess, and the potential impact that inadvertent release of this 
information could have. This tendency to stress operational security (OPSEC) generates a 
high level of compartmentalization within military organizations themselves, and most 
information is shared on a need to know basis only, particularly in relation to operational 
matters, including planning. Militaries classify virtually all types of information with 
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levels of classification permitting release or sharing of information to specifically 
designated parties only. In the case of operational information, this would virtually 
always be classified as secret or higher, given the potential for such information to 
compromise operational factors such as the location of forces or timing of impending 
operations. This mindset frequently results in information over-classification, which 
further restricts information flow but which protects information disseminators, allowing 
them to err on the side of caution. 
 
As a result, the inclusion of individuals or organizations in operational planning who do 
not possess approved security clearances is highly problematic, and this obviously points 
to civilian organizations or actors, in or out of government. Most civilian organizations 
outside of government, including humanitarian organizations or other types of NGOs, 
would rarely employ personnel with government security clearances, and thus, sharing of 
classified information is virtually impossible from the military organization’s perspective. 
The issue of trust is, thus, related to the willingness of organizations, both military and 
civilian, to accept risks that are generated as a result of engaging in collaborative 
planning and sharing information necessary to achieve the desired products. According to 
a senior NATO official in 2011, however, there is still “some way to go in order to achieve 
levels of trust needed to achieve comprehensive approach.”249 This is further explained by 
LaRose-Edwards: 
Civilian agencies active in post-conflict or humanitarian situations 
have learned the importance of trust and voluntarily sharing amongst 
themselves, especially as overall command and control is not an 
option. The evolution of civilian agency interaction using 
mechanisms such as the cluster lead concept has not been smooth 
and remains contentious. In truth it will remain a constant challenge 
as agencies and relationships vary to reflect changing contexts. Be it 
civil-military, civil-civil, or military-military, degrees of successful 
interaction will depend on observing basic principles of trust and 
partnership to be found in any joint human endeavour. Human 
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nature remains constant, and if they don’t trust each other, 
coordination will remain ephemeral.
250
 
 
In order to operationalize the CA strategy, some form of cross-organizational, cross-
departmental or interagency entity must be formed in order to engage in operational 
planning. Given the transitory and ad hoc nature of task forces, working groups or 
equivalent entities, Ryan posits that the members of such entities will continue to exhibit 
primary loyalty to their home organization, rather than the temporary organization to 
which they have been assigned. Further, he suggests that the mere existence of such 
temporary entities reveals the limitations of the individual organizations to solve the 
problem.
251
 
 
With respect to planning instrumentality, Ryan provides a succinct overview of various 
US planning methodologies and tools designed for interagency planning but argues that 
each has significant shortcomings in relation to planning for current operations. As a 
result, the tendency is to rely on proven methods, such as the joint operational planning 
process which is, as a military-driven model, reliant on rationale decision making which, 
in turn, is based on a series of assumptions: 
Participants agree on the rules of decision making. 
Participants share a common language. 
Organizational and cultural contexts do not significantly 
influence decision making. 
The problem or goal can be clearly identified and agreed on by 
all participants. 
The problem can be solved by an instrumental rationality of 
allocating means to ends. 
The basic required means are known and will be available. 
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Information required to make a decision is available or can be 
acquired. 
Consistent choice criteria are agreed on by participants. 
The environment is relatively stable during the decision-making 
process. 
Sufficient time is available to generate, consider, and evaluate 
alternatives. 
When planning occurs at multiple levels, decision making is 
nested and proceeds from the top down.
252
 
 
Given my inquiries into the nature of civil-military paradigms discovered via the 
McKinsey 7S model, it is clear that these assumptions and a reliance on rational decision-
making processes may explain, if only partially, the limitations to effective interagency 
planning. 
 
Perez raises the possibility that the fundamental challenge to effective interagency 
planning (or doing interagency planning at all) lies in the realm of complexity in the 
operational environment and that attempts by organizations to solve problems in such an 
environment (frequently described as “ambiguous, complex, uncertain, and ill-
structured”253) may simply not be possible.  
 
The fundamental aim of planning, particularly military planning for complex operations, 
is “designed to optimize logical, analytical steps of decision making in conditions of 
uncertainty and ambiguity,” 254 which hopefully will advance a common understanding or 
appreciation of a future set of conditions that will result from the actions planned and 
executed. Perez argued, however, that: 
the challenge of prediction in human affairs has always plagued 
philosophers, political scientists, and statesman. Their predictions 
have been notoriously unreliable. Socio-political phenomenon, 
which include wars, are not susceptible to simple cause-effect 
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analysis. Causes and effects in human affairs are tangled, multi-
causal, multi-directional, and contingent.
255
 
 
From this perspective, it is possible to imagine that two forms of complexity intersect in 
the current operating environment: the quotidian complexity of conducting operations in 
such an environment and the complexity of the problems to be solved. With respect to the 
former, Pam labels this emergent policy by which “bureaucratic incentives, 
organizational routines, interagency interactions and simple but profound differences in 
perception of reality regularly produce results that are not intended or anticipated by any 
central policymaking intelligence.”256 The concept of emergence in complexity theory 
“concerns the emergence of complex large-scale behaviours from the aggregate 
interactions of less complex agents.”257 Rinaldi explains that:  
According to this model, the global emergent properties (the 
strategic decisions) of the government come about not because of 
the personal, organizational, and national goals of the agents 
(players), but rather because of the interactions (political 
maneuvering) between the agents within the governmental 
hierarchy. And a prior knowledge of the agents does not suffice in 
comprehending the emergent decisions of a government.
258
 
 
With respect to the complex problems to be addressed, the primary challenge is to define, 
at root, what the problem actually is, and this, itself, requires an accepted framework 
from which to investigate it. Rational decision-making models, such as the military 
operational planning process, have been criticized as incapable of determining the nature 
of the problem, and other approaches, such as “design” have evolved in order to address 
this concern.
259
 
 
With or without advanced approaches to planning, the challenges embedded in a CA to 
state building remain that of conceiving a future condition or end state, determining what 
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the end state looks like and deciding whether an end state is, in fact, achievable. Pam 
concluded, and this author agrees, that: 
the interaction between our Complex Operations and their complex 
problems, and the multiplication of unintended consequences, 
suggests that complex strategies and plans may simply be 
impossible to effectively coordinate. By contrast, we have a much 
greater chance of getting many diverse actors all moving in the same 
direction if we’re pursuing a small number of objectives that can be 
clearly explained to all (and supervised).
260
 
 
Gap Analysis: Tactical Level 
 
Tactical Conceptual Gaps 
 
The tactical level of conflict is that at which forces are employed and take actions in 
order to achieve operational-level effects. Ruffa and others believe that the tactical level 
has increased in importance in terms of its ability to influence civil-military relations at 
higher levels.
261
 This implicates two aspects: the phenomenon of the “strategic corporal” 
who, by his or her actions, can have a magnified effect on a campaign courtesy of social 
media streams and the involvement of tactical forces in what Ruffa calls “ancillary 
tasks,” i.e. the delivery of aid.262  
 
In the context of my integrated interrogational framework, the primary tactical-level 
efforts in NATO’s Afghan campaign revolved around two major activity clusters: the 
practice of CIMIC as well as the establishment and support of PRTs. In reality, these two 
activities were intermeshed, and it is generally adduced that PRTs represented the 
physical and organizational manifestation of CIMIC doctrine or theory; I have opted to 
identify these as separate on the basis that general-purpose and special military forces 
frequently engaged in CIMIC or CIMIC-like activities outside of the PRT construct.  
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At the tactical level, the conceptual gap to be addressed relates to a fundamental 
misunderstanding, or lack of appreciation, of the distinct roles to be played by military 
and civilian actors and the consequences of this on overall mission effectiveness. The 
issue of the militarization of aid was introduced earlier in this paper, and various 
analyses, such as those undertaken by ALNAP, highlighted the concern within the 
humanitarian sphere over this trend. The conceptual gap to be investigated extends 
beyond this particular challenge in that actions undertaken by both military and civilian 
organizations on the ground blurred their respective roles to such a degree that the 
Afghan population was frequently unable to distinguish between them, and this, in turn, 
led to a conflation of scepticism, apathy and rejection on the part of the population. 
 
Three factors contributed to this development. First, the lack of civilian capacity, relative 
to the military capacity, ensured that the level of reconstruction and development 
ambition advertised to the Afghan population could not be achieved, and the gap between 
promises made and projects completed generated disappointment and frustration leading, 
in some cases, to a turning away from the exogenous military and civilians entities to 
domestic actors, including insurgents, who appeared to be more capable and effective in 
addressing immediate needs. In order to attempt to overcome this lack of civilian 
capacity, IOs and NGOs opted to engage commercial entities which could offer both 
short-term reconstruction and development capabilities as well as provide their own 
security, thereby ostensibly remaining at arms-length from the military. This trend added 
further to the confusing mix of actors engaged in reconstruction and development 
activities, as these commercial firms often utilized the services of former military 
members who acted, and often looked like, active military forces.
263
  
 
Second, military organizations which were engaged in reconstruction and development 
activities, primarily, although not exclusively, in the PRT construct utilized these 
opportunities to interact with the local population in order to achieve military objectives, 
such as intelligence gathering or conducting influence activities, including psychological 
operations. In this sense, military organizations did not choose to distinguish between the 
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function of acting as reconstruction and development agents (and adhering to the 
principle of impartiality as proclaimed by the humanitarian sphere) and the conduct of 
various military functions which are implied, if not mandated, by the imperatives of 
COIN.
264
  
 
Third, and as related previously, military organizations opted to engage in reconstruction 
and development both in order to be seen as helping the population (thereby benefiting 
from positive relations in terms of force protection) and in order to assist with the “build” 
phase of the “clear, hold and build” model on which the entire premise of the COIN 
campaign was constructed. The deficiencies inherent in this model have already been 
identified, including a lack of ANSF capability, the resilience of the insurgency, the 
under-resourcing of ISAF troop levels as well as the issue of national caveats. While 
there was a military troop surge in the later stages of the counter-insurgency under 
President Obama, the lack of a “civilian surge” ensured that the build phase could not 
succeed, and Jakobsen opined that: 
The result has been a vicious circle from a CA point of view. The 
limited involvement of the civilian organizations has forced deeper 
NATO involvement in humanitarian and reconstruction activities 
than ever before. This has triggered protests from the humanitarian 
NGOs, as well as greater reluctance towards deeper involvement in 
both the EU and the UN. This will force even greater US military 
and NATO involvement which will then trigger more protests and 
greater CA reluctance from the civilian actors.
265
 
 
Tactical Institutional Gaps 
 
While the PRT model was originally transplanted by US forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, 
responsibility for the Afghan PRTs began to shift to ISAF in 2003, and the number of 
PRTs expanded to 26 by 2008. Of these, the US remained the lead nation in 12 PRTs; the 
other 14 were led by 13 different nations (Germany led in both Kunduz and Feyzabad). In 
addition to the lead nations, an additional 13 nations contributed to PRTs, and of these, 
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the majority were non-NATO members.
266
 Terms of reference for PRTs were established 
in 2005 by a PRT executive steering committee chaired by the Afghan Minister of 
Interior, and the following mission statement was incorporated into the ISAF operational 
plan: 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will assist The Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate 
the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified 
area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and 
reconstruction efforts.
267
 
 
NATO defines a PRT as “a joint, integrated military-civilian organisation, staffed and 
supported by ISAF member countries, operating at the provincial level within 
Afghanistan. A PRT is operated by a single nation or a coalition of two or more nations. 
A PRT is generally responsible for covering one province, but some have responsibility 
for two or more.”268 PRTs are the product of direct bi-lateral agreements between the 
establishing/lead nation and the Afghan national government, and as such, there were no 
country-wide or consistent agreements as to PRT size or composition or, indeed, what 
priorities would be pursued or activities individual PRTs would engage in; these 
decisions were determined by leadership in establishing nations and were influenced 
primarily by the proposed location of the PRT in relation to the perceived level of 
security in the province or region. For example, while the US led in 11 PRTs that were 
located in Regional Command East or South (regions most affected by violence), only the 
United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Turkey operated in those 
RCs, with the remainder of the lead nations concentrated in the relatively safer RCs 
North and West.  
 
The gap to be investigated relates to an assessment of the effectiveness of the PRT model 
as a means of achieving operational-level objectives and, ultimately, contributing to the 
success of the CA strategy. NATO and ISAF stated that the PRT model has been 
successful and that, in their view, “PRTs are an effective, flexible, low-cost instrument 
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that can easily be adapted to other conflicts.”269 Not surprisingly, this view was shared 
with member nations which either led or contributed to PRTs, including the main 
contributor, the US.
270
 
 
Contrary positions identified three fundamental flaws in the PRT model that have 
contributed to a widely held assessment that PRTs have failed to meet their original 
promise. First, is the inherent resistance from the humanitarian community based upon 
the already well-understood concern with mixing military and civilian actors and 
processes into the same engagement space. Many humanitarian agencies objected to 
PRTs on grounds of ideology and principle and, thus, opted not to share information or 
cooperate with PRT-led initiatives. While this issue does not speak directly to the 
efficacy of the model itself, it does represent a significant driver.
271
 
 
Second is the difficulty associated with the independent nature of the PRTs based on 
strong levels of national control which largely determined how PRTs operated and set 
priorities. McNerney provides an example of the results of these different approaches: 
while the US-led Mazar PRT made it a priority to support civilian-led missions (such as 
police training, disarmament and judicial reform efforts), the US-led PRT in Gardez 
resisted State Department requests for police training assistance.
272
 Piiparinen suggests 
that PRTs could be described as no more than a “loosely coupled system” and that “the 
relationship between PRTs and ISAF HQ, as well as that between PRTs and RACs, could 
be described more as information-sharing than a coherent command structure.”273 This 
sentiment was echoed by a senior Canadian Forces officer who stated that PRTs tended to 
operate on their own due to a lack of trust and communications between PRT and RC 
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leadership, and when civilian workers from the Kandahar PRT visited RC South 
headquarters out of necessity, they worked in a location separated by a “physical wall.”274 
 
Third, and perhaps most vital, is the determination if the PRT model actually worked. 
This issue implicates two aspects of assessment or evaluation: the ability to measure 
outcomes of PRT activities and programs in relation to their stated goals as well as the 
ability to assess to what extent civil-military cooperation actually contributes to mission 
success (i.e., does the fact of civil-military cooperation enhance or improve the 
probability of achieving success more so than if there is no cooperation). 
 
Zyck cited reports issued by Save the Children (2004), USAID (2008) and the US 
National Defense University (2009), all of which essentially concluded that PRTs did not 
have in place metrics or measures of effectiveness to determine if objectives were being 
met, and “ no single evaluation or study of PRTs located by the author provided 
quantitative or structured qualitative evidence on how PRTs had improved access to 
education or medical care, impacted household incomes, reduced child mortality, 
improved security or had any other direct impact.”275 While assessments of PRT 
performance by individual lead or contributing nations may well have been conducted, 
these are not readily available or shared, and this may speak either to the imperatives of 
national control or the fact that the outcomes may not be palatable to those who were 
funding the PRT effort.  
 
The second aspect of assessment or evaluation speaks to a determination if civil-military 
cooperation as practiced in the context of the PRT model actually contributed to the 
achievement of PRT objectives, and here again, there has been very little study of this 
issue. Rietjens asserts that “there still is no widely used framework to interpret the 
success or failure of civil military cooperation, nor is there a solid set of performance 
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measurements with which to frame an understanding of the raw data.”276 Ultimately, 
however, and in keeping with the planned transition to an Afghan lead in 2014, it is 
probable that all PRTs will be dismantled and the legacy of this model will be analysed in 
greater detail.
277
 This transition is evidently welcomed by Afghan leadership who believe 
that Afghan capacity will have increased to such a level that structures such as PRTs will 
no longer be necessary.
278
 Rynning views this transition more critically and posits that the 
PRT experience revealed that “the Western allies lacked a concept of intervention” and of 
particular relevance to this thesis that “the consistent lack of integrated thinking must be 
attributed to a wide and wavering strategic framework.”
279
  
 
Tactical Capability Gaps 
 
NATO CIMIC doctrine addresses the issue of cultural competence in the context of 
principles governing the civil-military relationship and asserts that:  
a sustained competence towards civil and military culture, local 
customs and ways of life is of fundamental importance to all 
missions. Moreover, a common understanding of the role and 
position of man, women and children (gender) is essential for 
success. In a politically sensitive environment a thoughtless 
violation of a local law or custom can create highly unfavourable 
news and seriously undermine the mission’s chances of success.280  
 
Similarly, the COPD is concerned with the influence of culture in a context of assessing 
characteristics of actors in the engagement space in order to “begin to assess the 
receptivity, susceptibility and vulnerability of actors to different types of military 
influences, as well as their ability to adapt to changes in the strategic environment.”281 
UK doctrine speaks to the significance of culture to the military and asserts that 
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“enhancing cultural capability contributes to the success of operations through risk 
reduction and the exploitation of opportunities, including the potential to influence 
behaviours and perceptions.”282 The military’s interest in culture is also linked to the 
imperatives of COIN, in particular, as a means of “shaping” the population, and US 
COIN doctrine asserts that “successful conduct of COIN operations depends on 
thoroughly understanding the society and culture within which they are being 
conducted.”283  
 
Davis argues that the renewed focus on culture (at least for the Canadian Forces) is 
directly linked to experience in Afghanistan and views “cultural intelligence” (CQ) as “an 
essential contributor to the ability to determine adversarial intent; to work effectively 
across joint, interagency, multinational and public domains (JIMP), to access and 
exercise whole of government (WoG) approaches, and to negotiate the demands of 
interrelated defence, diplomacy, and development (3D) objectives.”284 CQ is defined as 
“as the ability to recognize the shared beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of a group 
of people and, most importantly, to effectively apply this knowledge toward a specific 
goal or range of activities” and notes that “although CQ does not represent a 
mathematical relationship of capabilities in the same way as an intelligence quotient (IQ), 
it is considered to be a unique facet of intelligence; the usage of CQ parallels the use of 
Emotional Quotient (EQ) to refer to emotional intelligence.”285 Importantly, she also 
discriminates between cultural intelligence and mere cultural knowledge.
286
 
 
Given the nominal attention paid to the importance of culture due, principally, to recent 
experiences in Afghanistan (and Iraq), troop-contributing nations developed pre-
deployment training programs in order to provide forces with a measure of cultural 
knowledge and awareness, based upon analyses of political, economic and social 
information. In addition to delivering basic facts regarding the particular culture in 
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question, additional skills and competencies (related to subjects such as cultural 
sensitivity, relationship building, cross-cultural communication, language ability as well 
as listening and observation skills) are occasionally offered, although these are generally 
reserved for specialists such as CIMIC operators or special operations forces. Davis 
asserts that while CQ does not consist of any one of these skills or competencies “in 
isolation,” it does encompass most of them.287 
 
Given that pre-deployment training is, by definition, the responsibility of troop-
contributing nations, the character and quality of that training is subject to national 
faculty, availability of resources and the training priorities established for a given 
mission, or phase of a mission. While most ISAF troop-contributing nations provided 
some modicum of culturally related pre-deployment training, it has been generally 
assessed that this was uneven across nations and rarely, if ever, attained the level of 
proficiency implicated by CQ.
288
 
 
Anecdotal evidence from deploying troops from across ISAF nations have indicated “that 
present cultural awareness training provided prior to deploying to Afghanistan is not 
sufficient,”289 and the author, as a recipient of the Canadian version of this training, can 
personally attest to the assertion that “the cross-cultural training is dated, ineffective, too 
academic, repetitious, too general, and often inaccurate.”290 This fact is particularly 
worrisome in the context of the proposed transition of security from ISAF to ANSF, 
which is based on an ability to effectively train Afghan forces.
291
 
 
Selmeski underscores this requirement for cross-cultural skills in the context of a CA and 
argues that “leaders must be able to work with a diverse group of people and 
organizations ranging from 24-year-old congressional staffers, to Northern Alliance 
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warlords, to representatives from nongovernmental organizations.”292 He describes cross-
cultural skills as a “meta-competency” and opines that military attempts to inculcate 
culturally attuned forces “tends to be a knee-jerk reaction to the deployment-of-the-day 
and focused on content delivery rather than fostering general competence across the 
profession.”293  
 
These observations do not apply solely to Canadian or US forces. For example, while the 
UK has been frequently touted as the very best of the Western nations to succeed at 
COIN (due to their long experience in Malaya and Northern Ireland and their ability to 
work successfully with other cultures), senior British observers have concluded that much 
greater emphasis must be placed on the cultural, as opposed to technical, aspects of 
modern conflict.
294
 
Integrated Interrogational Framework: Outcomes 
 
The aim of the integrated interrogational framework was to provide a means of analysing 
the efficacy of the Comprehensive Approach to state-building strategy, as practised by 
NATO in the Afghanistan setting. The framework identified a series of initiatives 
undertaken by NATO at strategic, operational and tactical levels that were designed to be 
complimentary and mutually reinforcing. 
 
At the strategic level, the focus was on gaining, building and strengthening external 
partnerships in order to leverage the capabilities of those organizations while 
simultaneously conducting strategic communications, both internally and externally, in 
order to influence both alliance and non-NATO actors that the mission was achievable if 
sufficient military and civilian capacity could be generated.  
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At the operational level, NATO, and ISAF specifically, adopted counter-insurgency as a 
set of theories and practices to clear, hold and build specific provinces and regions of the 
country in order to suppress the growing insurgency and permit reconstruction and 
development activities to take effect. This was coupled with a significant effort to build 
host-nation security capacity in order to allow for a transition from a NATO lead to an 
Afghan lead not later than 2014, which was announced as the planned mission 
termination target date.  
 
At the tactical level, ISAF and troop-contributing nations practised civil-military 
cooperation tactics, techniques and procedures with a view to maintaining force 
protection and undertaking quick impact projects that would have concrete, short-term 
positive impact on local populations and shift loyalties from local power brokers (and the 
insurgents) in favour of the central Afghan government, from whom this largesse was 
presumed to have emanated. The pinnacle of CIMIC organizational and structural 
manifestation was the PRT, which was introduced by the US following its incubation in 
the Iraq setting but quickly adopted by ISAF as a means of integrating available civilian 
capacity with built-in security in order to generate integrated reconstruction and 
development effects at the provincial level throughout the entire country. 
 
In keeping with the structural approach to analysis, each of the three levels—strategic, 
operational and tactical—were interrogated from a perspective of concept, institution and 
capability given that these attributes are fundamental to the successful adoption and 
actualization a given strategy. In other words, the “right” concepts must be understood 
and communicated to an effective institution willing to adopt the concepts and generate 
the necessary capability to turn concept into action. To the extent that some aspect of this 
formula goes wanting, we may identify the problem as a type of gap that must, in order to 
be successful, be overcome. Each of these lines of inquiry were pursued with respect to 
the adoption and attempted actualization of the CA to state building in the Afghan 
setting, and a brief summary of the conceptual, institutional and capability gaps at each 
level now follows. 
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Conceptual Gaps 
 
Conceptual gaps were evident at all levels of analysis. At the strategic level, NATO’s 
desire to elicit support from non-NATO entities gave rise to a belief that effective 
partnerships could be created through focused dialogue supported by a dual-track 
narrative designed to provide a convincing rationale for external actors to support the 
NATO mission while simultaneously attempting to maintain Alliance cohesion in the 
face of an evolving mission objective and a surprisingly violent and robust insurgency.  
 
Hampered by an “inability to speak with one voice to actors in the region,”295 NATO was 
additionally handicapped by a lack of understanding of the engagement space in which it 
was operating. This led to a series of serious issues, the most problematic of which was 
arguably a lack of appreciation of the regional dimensions of the conflict and resulted in a 
narrow focus on Afghanistan and a lost opportunity to engage other regional actors, 
particularly Pakistan, which were intimately involved in supporting the insurgency as a 
means of projecting strategic depth. 
 
At the operational level, the conceptual gap related to a lack of coherent doctrine to 
support the CA. While the CA was increasingly introduced into a variety of NATO 
publications (and was the subject of numerous conferences, experiments and exercises), 
the lack of an organized and consistent doctrinal point of reference allowed for wide 
interpretation of the strategy amongst Alliance members, and this generated a “wide 
range of suggestions and disagreements as to what CA encompasses.”296 The lack of 
agreed doctrine led naturally to widely varying interpretations as to how the strategy 
ought to be actualized at the operational level.  
 
Given the conceptual fluidity at the strategic and operational levels, it was not surprising 
to ascertain that the strategy could not be effectively understood at the tactical level. As 
this level relates to actions taken by military and civil players in the same engagement 
space, the CA as (loosely) interpreted allowed for a blurring of roles leading to inter-
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organizational friction and a lessening of integrated mission effectiveness. This problem 
was driven by a variety of other factors (including a lack of overall civilian capacity; the 
utilization of the PRT construct to achieve military objectives, such as intelligence 
gathering; and the entry of military actors into the “build” phase of the COIN campaign 
to the frustration of the humanitarian and developmental sectors). 
 
Institutional Gaps 
 
As an institution, NATO opted to declare the CA as extant strategy in order to achieve 
success in the complex operating environment of Afghanistan, specifically, as well as a 
guiding principle for all future crisis response operations that NATO might choose to 
engage in. That said, as late as 2010, the Alliance was “still in the process of laying the 
foundation for future institutionalization” 297 of the CA and it was arguably “too late” to 
be of any use in Afghanistan. The adoption of new NATO capabilities, of which the CA 
would certainly qualify, is generally subject to a rigorous process under the rubric of the 
NATO CD & E policy; however, in the case of the CA, this policy was not followed with 
the result that the full panoply of institutional resources and processes could not 
effectively absorb or support it.  
 
While NATO struggled to institutionalize the CA strategy internally, the imperatives of 
the increasingly dire situation in Afghanistan did not allow for lengthy analyses, and 
ISAF began to engage relevant non-NATO actors in order to leverage their capacities and 
generate the desired integrated effects. As these two systems, civil and military, engaged 
at the operational level in order to find mechanisms for effective cooperation and 
collaboration, the distinctive and enduring nature of these systems and organizations 
emerged as impediments. Analysis of various systemic and organizational elements 
revealed inimical and persistent characteristics across the realms of strategy, structures, 
systems, shared values, style, staff and skills, and it was concluded that that this 
exacerbated the dilemma of achieving an effective degree of coordination or 
collaboration in the context of a CA. 
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Led by the United States, the Afghan COIN campaign was championed by General 
Petraeus from approximately 2009 onwards, resulting in a “military surge” that ended in 
2011. The intent of this surge was to bring the level of deployed forces to one that would 
result in a suppression of the insurgency similar to what had (evidently) occurred in Iraq. 
Following a macro-level analysis of force ratios at the height of this surge, it was 
concluded that the mission was under resourced and that NATO and its troop-
contributing nations were aware of the risks this lack of force generation and capacity 
would pose to the success of the COIN campaign and the mission in general.  
 
Adding to the lack of military-force capacity, troop-contributing nations continued, in 
spite of pressure at all levels, to maintain national caveats that restricted how, when and 
where ISAF leadership could employ the forces theoretically under ISAF command. This 
fact created tensions within the Alliance, and as casualties mounted, the problem of 
national caveats eroded domestic support for the mission. 
 
Of all the institutional efforts to actualize the CA strategy, the PRT model was the most 
visible manifestation. While touted by NATO and various Alliance members as a highly 
effective approach to contributing to reconstruction and development at the provincial 
level, there was widespread opposition to PRTs from humanitarian and development 
agencies, in part due to the widely varying nature of the PRTs themselves, given their bi-
lateral and national foundations. While there were numerous ideological and practical 
criticisms of the PRT model, the most vital question was the determination of PRT 
effectiveness, and it was advanced by at least one analyst that no single evaluation or 
study of PRTs could reveal evidence that PRTs had improved any material aspect of the 
Afghan economy or society or “had any other direct impact.”298 
Capability Gaps 
 
At the strategic level, NATO’s inability to overcome disagreements with important 
partners in the state-building enterprise, particularly the UN and EU, undermined the 
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“multinational ethos that is vital for mission success,”299 and it was argued that absent 
these global partnerships, a CA strategy could succeed only on the basis of having a 
strong lead nation, a concept that would ironically cause Alliance members and other 
partners to retreat into stovepipes—the exact antithesis of a CA. 
 
Shifting to the operational level, virtually all NATO publications that referenced the CA 
deemed that a vital aspect of working with external partners was an ability to conduct 
joint military-civil planning and assessment. The vexing problem of how to achieve 
effective joint planning was the focus of much reflection and experimentation in NATO 
and member nations, and while several methods and processes were developed, 
especially at national level, it was identified that none of these had been effectively 
operationalized or institutionalized “in a way that has broken down the separate civilian 
and military stovepipes.”300 
 
The nature of the complex problems to be solved in the context of exogenous state 
building, combined with the inherent complexity of intra- and inter-organizational 
behaviours, requires an ability to solve these complex problems at a higher level of 
understanding than is currently possible with the processes and tools available to both 
military and civilian organizations. While new approaches, such as design, have evolved 
in order to attempt to address this capability shortfall, there remains the more 
fundamental challenge of conceiving a future condition or end state that can be agreed by 
all parties to state-building enterprise, especially the host nation itself. 
 
The issue of the host nation rises clearly at the tactical level in the form of culture and the 
ability of intervening military forces (and civilian actors) to acquire and apply cultural 
intelligence, which is distinguished from and is viewed as a higher level of capability 
than cultural knowledge. The capability gap identified relates to the uneven delivery (or 
absence altogether) of appropriate pre-deployment training and awareness that might lead 
to the acquisition of cultural intelligence (as well as the resultant impact this has on cross-
cultural relationships) and, of great significance in the Afghan context, the ability to 
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transfer knowledge and skills from one cultural perspective to another. Given the desire 
to transfer security from NATO to the ANSF, this cross-cultural training capability is 
vital to the NATO end state for transition by 2014. 
 
In summary, it is clear that conceptual, institutional and capability gaps were identified at 
strategic, operational and tactical levels and that, far from transitory, these gaps reveal 
that the CA to state building in the Afghanistan setting was virtually bound for failure. 
Whether this strategy would succeed in another less complex engagement space (if such a 
space exists) is an open question. That said, important lessons may be derived from that 
experience including what does the failure of the CA in Afghanistan imply for NATO as 
an institution and for future NATO interventions into failing or failed states? Those 
questions will be the focus of Chapter 5. 
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Annex A to Chapter 3: Macro-level Analysis of COIN Force Ratios as at March 
2011 
 
The aim of this analysis is to provide a macro-level overview of COIN force ratios in 
Afghanistan at the height of the COIN campaign which I have identified as March 2011. 
Five key variables – timeframe, engagement space, insurgency size, counter-insurgency 
size and force ratio analysis – are described in Table 3 and the resulting calculations 
based on these variables are shown in Table 4.  
 
VARIABLE SELECTIONS RATIONALE 
Timeframe March 2011. 
 
This was the “height” of the troop 
surge. It would be assumed that 
the surge level would be selected 
to maximize probability of 
mission success. 
Engagement Space Entire country. 
 
 
It has already been demonstrated 
that the insurgency was active 
throughout the country during the 
selected timeframe and that ISAF 
was to provide security on a 
country-wide basis. 
Insurgency Size Low estimate. 
High estimate. 
 
By using these estimates as a 
range, the analysis may provide 
insight into ISAF’s decisions and 
actions. 
Counter-Insurgency Size ISAF forces only. 
ANSF forces only. 
ISAF plus ANSF forces. 
 
By using these force sizes, the 
analysis may provide insight into 
the utility of ANSF forces to 
achieve mission success 
with/without ISAF assistance. 
Force Ratio Analyses Counter-insurgent to insurgent. 
Counter-insurgent to population. 
 
Both methodologies have been 
shown to be utilized in the 
literature, and both may provide 
insights into the outcome of the 
Afghan counter-insurgency. 
Table 3. COIN Analysis - Variables, Selection and Rationale 
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Variable 
 
Data 
 
Data Sources 
 
Engagement Space 
 
Population 
 
32,358,000 
 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/306.html 
 
Area (square 
kilometres) 
 
652,090 
 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx#Summary 
 
Insurgency Size 
 
Low Estimate 
 
20,000 
 
ISAF, Press Briefing, 3 December 2009 
 
High Estimate 
 
36,000 
 Dr. Antonio Giustozzi, London School of Economics 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/Experts/a.Giustozzi@lse.ac.uk# 
 
Counterinsurgency Size 
 
ISAF forces only 
 
132,000 
 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php. 
 
ANSF forces only 
 
270,000 
 
Ibid: this represents 118,000 ANP and 152,000 ANA 
 
ISAF plus ANSF 
forces 
 
402,000 
 
Ibid 
 
Force Ratio Analysis 
 
Counterinsurgent/Insurgent Ratios 
 
Case 1: ISAF Forces 
Only/Low Insurgent Estimate 
 
6.6 
 
Case 2: ISAF Forces 
Only/High Insurgent Estimate 
 
3.6 
 
Case 3: ANSF Forces 
Only/Low Insurgent Estimate 
 
13.5 
 
Case 4: ANSF Forces Only: 
High Insurgent Estimate 
 
7.5 
 
Case 5: ISAF plus ANSF 
Forces/Low Insurgent 
Estimate 
 
20.1 
 
Case 6: ISAF plus ANSF 
Forces/High Insurgent 
Estimate 
 
11.1 
 
Counterinsurgent/Population Ratios 
 
Case 1: ISAF Forces 
Only/Population per 1000 
 
4 
 
Case 2: ANSF Forces 
Only/Population per 1000 
 
8.3 
 
Case 3: ISAF plus ANSF 
Forces/Population per 1000 
 
12.4 
 
Case 4: ANP/Population per 
1000 
 
3.6 
 
Table 4. Afghanistan COIN Macro Level Force Ratio Analysis as at March 2011 
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Analysis: Counter-insurgent to Insurgent Ratios 
 
The analysis in Table 5 reveals a range of counter-insurgent to insurgent ratios from 6.6 
to 20.1 which is the product of two major factors: the estimated size of the insurgency 
and the combinations of ISAF and ANSF forces. The range is wide enough to satisfy the 
requirements of the predominant theories although FM 3-24 (10–15:1) and Galula (10–
20:1) are satisfied only by cases 3, 5, and 6, while Cable (2:1) and Theil (4:1) are 
satisfied by all cases. 
 
A critical supporting variable to this analysis is the effectiveness of ANSF forces. For 
example, Case 3 assumes that only ANSF forces are engaged against the low insurgent 
estimate, and this is the only case where ANSF alone achieves a ratio within the doctrinal 
range of 10–15:1. Two factors are germane to this variable. First, it has already been 
stated that ISAF will withdraw the majority of its troops from Afghanistan by 2014 (if 
not earlier), and the prospect of ANSF leading the counter-insurgency campaign is, 
therefore, all too probable. If so, the effectiveness of that force, as opposed to its 
numerical size, becomes the critical factor, and based on my earlier analysis of the status 
of the ANSF at the end of 2011, the potential problem becomes obvious.  
 
For example, it will be recalled that of as of early 2012 only 11 of 168 Army Kandaks 
were rated as independent, and if this ratio remains, this would represent approximately 6 
percent of the total ANA.
301
 If this percentage were applied to the ANA force size in 
March 2011 and assuming a 50 percent ANP effectiveness level (which has not yet been 
achieved) the results of Case 3 would drop to a ratio of 3.4:1 (low insurgent estimate) or 
1.89:1 (high insurgent level) respectively, results potentially lower than even Cable’s 
theory which assumes that a large portion of the force remains out of contact.  
                                                 
301. Brookings Afghanistan Index (May 16 2012), accessed 5 September 2013; available from 
http://www.brookings.edu/afghanistanindex. 
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Analysis: Counter-insurgent to Population Ratios 
 
The analysis reveals a range of counter-insurgent to population ratios of 4 to 12.4 
counter-insurgents per 1000 population, and this range fails to achieve the level of forces 
desired by FM 3-24 (20–25), McGrath (13.6) and Kozelka (20), it meets the threshold 
range set by Quinlivan (6.6–20) and exceeds that of Goode (2.8). The analysis also 
revealed that an ANP to population ratio of 3.6  is below the target of 4 police per 1000 
population suggested by McGrath, but this again assumes an unrealistic 100 percent ANP 
effectiveness rate. 
 
The challenge to this methodology is the identification of the specific engagement space 
in which the counter-insurgency is being conducted. While the macro analysis selected 
the entire country (based on an awareness that the insurgency was operating throughout 
Afghanistan in 2011) and in relation to ISAF’s mission objectives, it may be assumed 
that, like the population itself, counter-insurgent forces were not distributed evenly across 
the entire space. While counter-insurgent forces may move in order to mass in a specific 
area of operations in order to generate a high counter-insurgent to population ratio for a 
period of time, so too could the insurgents. Therefore, any overwhelming force ratio in 
favour of counter-insurgents in a localized area is likely to be temporary if they are 
unable to remain there for an extended period or if there are insufficient force levels 
overall (which this analysis would suggest was the case in March 2011) and this could 
result in overwhelming force ratios in favour of the insurgents in a different area of 
operations. 
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Chapter 4: The “State” of Afghanistan: Failure of the Comprehensive Approach 
 
Aim 
 
Chapter 2 provided the historical narrative of NATO’s growing involvement in 
Afghanistan and the background to its adoption of the Comprehensive Approach. As the 
Afghan mission thickened at all levels, NATO increasingly recognized that attaining and 
maintaining an appropriate security-development nexus was vital to achieving the 
international community’s desire to rid Afghanistan of the terrorist networks which had 
flourished prior to 9/11 and to building a fully functioning Afghan state, capable and 
willing of resisting the return of those terrorist elements in the future. Given that NATO 
did not possess the necessary civil capacity to engage in the full range of state-building 
endeavors envisioned and required, it adopted the Comprehensive Approach strategy in 
order to address the identified capacity gap.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the status of Afghanistan’s level of 
progress towards stabilization, reconstruction and development over the period 2006 to 
2011. This is achieved, first, via an overview of two key evaluation regimes—the Afghan 
National Development Strategy and the ISAF Campaign Plan—in order to describe the 
key state-building objectives of NATO and the Afghan national government, and second, 
through a comparative analysis of key effects and outcomes embedded in those regimes 
to empirical open-source data from various actor cluster perspectives. The conclusion of 
the summary evaluation is that in 2011 Afghanistan may be evaluated as a failing, if not 
failed, state and that state building initiatives by NATO and other entities failed to 
achieve their objectives. More specifically, the desired end state of the ISAF campaign 
design was not achieved nor were most of the expected outcomes of the ANDS. 
 
 
Of course, NATO was not alone in Afghanistan. The US, as both lead NATO actor and 
an important actor unto itself, was also engaged in state-building efforts, and many of the 
criticisms offered with respect to the Comprehensive Approach may be applied equally to 
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the US and other Alliance members who adopted similar concepts. In addition to NATO 
and the US, many important international organizations, such as the UN, attempted to 
improve conditions in Afghanistan, and thousands of non-governmental organizations, 
ranging from the very largest to the very smallest, were on the ground, as indeed many of 
them were prior to the US intervention in 2001.
1
 
 
That said, NATO assessed the complexity involved in state building and accepted, if 
reluctantly, that challenge, leading to a decision to attempt to engage and coordinate all of 
the disparate actors in the Afghan theatre of operations. This, in turn, led to the adoption 
of the Comprehensive Approach strategy. To affirm that NATO expended considerable 
effort at strategic, operational and tactical levels to achieve this in Afghanistan is correct; 
to assert that it failed to achieve the necessary synergy is also correct and, more 
importantly, that the results of those efforts were ultimately insignificant. It is to those 
results that I now turn. 
 
Campaign Assessment and Evaluation Regimes 
 
Unlike conflicts in which tactical military action may decide the outcome of an 
operational-level campaign and produce a decisive strategic victory, efforts to stabilize 
and reconstruct Afghanistan in the midst of an active insurgency engendered a different 
concept of victory, based on the degree to which the state was stabilizing and developing 
consistent with a Western-imposed model. Thus, military assessments and civilian 
evaluations
2
 of how the state and its component characteristics and elements were 
changing over time generated a vast array of data through which attempts were made to 
judge the status of the campaign and provide evidence of the extent to which its 
operational and strategic objectives were being achieved.  
 
                                                 
1. “Afghanistan has two main categories of registered, nongovernmental, not for profit 
organizations with legal entity status: NGOs which number approximately 2000 and social organizations 
which number approximately 3100 both as of April 2012.” Council on Foundations - United States 
International Grantmaking,  accessed 5 September 2013; available from 
http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/afghanistan.asp. 
2. For clarity, the term “assessment” will refer to a military assessment regime, such as a campaign 
design, while the term “evaluation” will refer to civilian programs. 
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Much like the story of the blind man and the elephant, assessments and evaluations of 
progress in Afghanistan were linked to the perspectives of the actors undertaking them, 
and six major actor clusters may be identified: 
 
Afghan cluster including national-, provincial- and district-
level government entities, Afghan-led NGOs and other 
Afghan civil-society entities; 
Military cluster including NATO (NATO Alliance Council, 
Supreme Allied Command Operations, Headquarters Joint 
Force Command Brunssum, ISAF)  and participating 
Alliance members; 
International organization cluster including United Nations, 
World Bank and European Union; 
Donor cluster including individual nations which provided 
financial or other aid on a direct bi-lateral basis including 
nations which deployed provincial reconstruction teams; 
Non-governmental cluster including the International Red 
Cross and Crescent, CARE, the International Crisis Group, 
and Médecins Sans Frontières; and 
Analytical community cluster including such organizations as 
the Brookings Institute, Afghan Analysts Network (AAN), 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), British 
Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) and the European 
Network of National Civil Society Organizations (ENNA). 
 
Each of these clusters and the individual organizations that constituted them focused on 
aspects of change within the country based on their perspective, organizational mission 
and specific objectives, and as a result, a plethora of assessment and evaluation regimes 
produced a vast quantity of information, frequently producing incongruous findings. This 
is true within NATO itself, wherein different versions of campaign assessment 
methodologies and metrics were maintained at strategic, operational and tactical levels, 
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and decisions as to which metrics would be tracked and analysed frequently changed with 
theatre-level headquarter rotations to meet the desires of an incoming commander.
3
  
 
Campaign assessment is a relatively recent operational concept and is defined as “the 
continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of a joint 
operation toward mission accomplishment.”4 In complex operations, such as the 
Afghanistan mission, many facets of the operational environment may provide 
indications of campaign progress (or lack thereof), and the selection of what to measure, 
by whom and when was extremely important. As an example of the difficulties associated 
with determining how to conduct and maintain campaign assessment effectively, the 
following issues were identified following a study by me of the status of campaign 
assessment practices in JFCB in 2006: 
There was not widespread knowledge of campaign assessment 
throughout JFCB and the concentration of those few people 
involved with it continually rotated out. There was no 
institutionalized method to ensure that their knowledge was captured 
and passed on to the next generation of planners, operators and 
analysts who were subsequently responsible for campaign 
assessment both in the field and in the HQ. There was a tendency to 
focus on short-term issues and specific problems that were raised in 
most campaign assessment reports and campaign assessment 
evolved into a short-term issue focused reporting mechanism. As a 
result, its primary value as a gauge towards mission end-state was 
undermined. There was no official NATO doctrine related to 
campaign assessment and the gradual transition towards an effects-
based approach to operations created gaps in knowledge and 
provided unintended opportunities for individuals and staffs to fill 
those gaps with ad hoc solutions.
5
 
 
                                                 
3. At one stage, Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCB), the operational-level headquarters 
overseeing ISAF, was tracking (with my assistance) approximately 300 campaign metrics on a monthly 
basis in order to provide the commander with an overall assessment of how well the ISAF mission was 
progressing. That many of these metrics were qualitative in nature, and thus subject to the interpretation of 
personnel assigned to collect them in the field, added to the scepticism surrounding the assessment process 
in general, and the accuracy of the reported data on which important decisions needed to be based. 
4. United States, United States Joint Publication 3, Joint Operations, 45. 
5. D. D. Eustace, Best Practices for Campaign Assessment and Associated Analysis Support, 
Version 2.3, paper written for Allied Joint Force Command HQ Brunssum (July 2006), 5. The NATO 
Operations Assessment Handbook, Interim Version 1.0 was published on 29 January 2011. 
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Assessment and Evaluation in Afghanistan 
 
It is necessary to distinguish between campaign assessment, which is a military-driven 
activity, and the act of tracking and evaluating social, economic and other data for public 
policy purposes or in order to support the targeting of aid or development efforts or 
funding. The former activity is designed to provide military commanders and planners 
with information regarding the status of objectives embedded within a military campaign 
or operations plan, while the latter is undertaken to support public policy and 
development objectives in the broadest sense.  
 
In the Afghanistan scenario, these two distinct activities became conflated as NATO 
elected to embed public policy and development indicators within their military plans. 
This was based on a rationale that achievement of an appropriate security-development 
nexus was key to stabilizing the country and region and, therefore, to mission success. 
That very few of the development indicators (and the assets and actions necessary to 
improve them) were controlled by NATO created a situation in which either military 
resources were expended in non-military spheres (such as the delivery of humanitarian 
aid or funding of development projects) or military organizations attempted to control 
how civilian organizations operated in order to align their activities and objectives with 
the military campaign: this may be appreciated as another interpretation of the 
Comprehensive Approach in action. 
 
While it is clear that a large number of assessment and evaluation regimes were utilized 
by a multitude of organizations to track change in Afghanistan, for the purpose of this 
thesis, I am primarily concerned with the regimes utilized by NATO and the Afghan 
national government. NATO, and more specifically its subordinate headquarters ISAF, 
developed the ISAF campaign plan which evolved over time in response to changing 
conditions on the ground. That said, it remained relatively consistent over the entire 
period in relation to its end state, major lines of operation and desired effects. The 
success of this campaign plan, or lack thereof, may be considered as a benchmark of 
NATO’s Comprehensive Approach strategy, as it fully incorporated both military and 
non-military goals and its end state sought an integrated civil-military solution.  
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With respect to the Afghan perspective, the ANDS provided the plan for how the Afghan 
national government sought to portray and pursue its overarching development objectives 
and align them with the actions, objectives and resources of the international community. 
The ANDS outlined goals which were supported by specific development metrics across 
all aspects of Afghan society, economy and governance, and it is, therefore, appropriate 
that while I examine the degree to which NATO achieved its objectives, the perspective 
of the Afghan state itself is highly germane to any evaluation of the intervention.  
The Afghanistan National Development Strategy: Historical Lineage 
 
The ANDS has its historical roots in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) of September 2000.
6
 The MDGs addressed the following development-related 
objectives: 
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 
achieve universal primary education; 
promote gender equality and empower women; 
reduce child mortality; 
improve maternal health; 
combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 
ensure environmental sustainability; and 
develop a global partnership for development. 
 
Each of these MDGs incorporated a series of specific targets to be achieved generally by 
the year 2015. MDG 1, for example, included a target to “halve, between 1990 and 2015, 
the proportion of people whose income is less than $1.25 a day.”7 The MDGs were the 
primary expression of the UN Millennium Declaration (Declaration) embodied in UN 
                                                 
6. See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml. 
7. Ibid. 
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General Assembly Resolution 55/2 which outlined the UN’s commitment to a series of 
shared values and principles, leading to a number of key objectives.  
 
These objectives addressed and defined the UN’s goals with respect to peace, security 
and disarmament; development and poverty eradication; protecting the common 
environment; human rights, democracy and good governance; protecting the vulnerable; 
meeting the special needs of Africa; and strengthening the United Nations.
8
 Embedded 
within each of these key objectives were several time-bound resolutions to take specific 
actions to address global issues or to achieve the objectives of previously approved 
international programs.
9
 
 
Following the Declaration, the UN mounted the UN Millennium Campaign and the 
Millennium Project in 2002 in order to “develop a concrete action plan for the world to 
achieve the MDGs and to reverse the grinding poverty, hunger and disease affecting 
billions of people.”10 The project resulted in a report to the UN Secretary General in 2005 
entitled “Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals.”11 
 
With respect to Afghanistan, the Afghanistan constitution approved in January 2004 
evolved out of the Afghan Constitution Commission as mandated by the Bonn 
Agreement of 2001. Although the constitution did not specifically refer to the MDGs, the 
preamble provided a series of statements related to civil society; the rule of law; social 
justice; protection of human rights; and the “strengthening of political, social, economic, 
and defensive institutions of the country.”12 It indicated as well that the constitution 
observed the United Nations Charter and respected the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 
                                                 
8. United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 55/2, 18 September 2000.  
9. As an example of the latter, Para 25 of the section addressing Human Rights, Democracy and 
Good Governance includes the resolution to combat all forms of violence against women and to implement 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (noted as UN General 
Assembly Resolution 34/180, annex). 
10. See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml. 
11. See http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/fullreport.htm. 
12. Preamble toThe Afghanistan Constitution, 2004. See http://www.afghan-
web.com/politics/current_constitution.html#preamble. 
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In March 2004, the Afghan national government endorsed the Millennium Declaration 
and the MDGs with a caveat that extended the target dates from 2015 to 2020 with an 
Afghan-specific baseline of 2002 to 2005. This was due to “lost decades and the lack of 
available information.”13  
 
On 31 January 2006, the Afghan national government and the international community 
met in London in order to “strengthen their partnership to improve the lives of Afghan 
people, and contribute to national, regional, and global peace and security.”14 The result 
of the London Conference was the Afghanistan Compact, essentially a political 
agreement binding the Afghan national government and the international community 
towards the achievement of the Afghan MDGs (AMDGs).  
 
This political agreement was closely joined to the Interim Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (I-ANDS), also published in 2006, which provided for the first time 
a detailed roadmap of the Afghan government’s plan to achieve the AMDGs. The I-
ANDS represented a significant initiative given that it was Afghan-led and incorporated 
not only specific targets and indicators across the full spectrum of security, governance as 
well as economic and social development but also direction for the execution of plans to 
meet those targets, including a delineation of budget management and monitoring and 
coordination processes and structures such as the Joint Coordination and Monitoring 
Board, the Afghanistan Development Forum and the Agency Coordinating Body for 
Afghan Relief.  
 
The Afghanistan National Development Strategy: 2008 
 
The I-ANDS remained extant until the promulgation of the full ANDS in 2008, which laid 
out national development targets for the five-year period 2009–2013. The ANDS reads, in 
part: 
                                                 
13. See 
http://www.undp.org.af/demo/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=62&Itemid=68. 
14. Preamble to The Afghanistan Compact. See http//www.scribd.com/doc/34297177/Interim-
Afghan-National-Development-Strategy. 
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The ANDS serves as Afghanistan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) and uses the pillars, principles and benchmarks of the 
Afghanistan Compact as a foundation. The pillars and goals of the 
ANDS are: 
1. Security: Achieve nationwide stabilization, strengthen law 
enforcement, and improve personal security for every Afghan. 
2. Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights: Strengthen 
democratic processes and institutions, human rights, the rule of law, 
delivery of public services and government accountability. 
3. Economic and Social Development: Reduce poverty, ensure 
sustainable development through a private-sector-led market 
economy, improve human development indicators, and make 
significant progress towards the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). 
A further vital and cross-cutting area of work is eliminating the 
narcotics industry, which remains a formidable threat to the people 
and state of Afghanistan, the region and beyond.
15
  
 
The three pillars of security, governance and the economy represent the core of the 
ANDS, and these pillars incorporated 124 expected outcomes, generating 760 specific 
policy actions or activities, supported by 253 indicators. Expected outcomes ranged from 
the very broad to the very specific, and the associated policy actions conformed to this 
pattern. The 253 indicators are predominantly quantitative in nature and were 
accompanied by baseline data and targets, although a significant number of these 
remained “under assessment.” 
 
Given the fragile status of Afghanistan’s nascent governmental, organizational and 
structural capacities during this period, the number, scope and sophistication of the 
ANDS-expected outcomes and policy actions arguably reflected a Western-oriented 
perspective towards state building, and although the ANDS was ostensibly an Afghan 
project, the document reveals a propensity towards outcomes and actions which would be 
consistent with those IOs and NGOs from which the funding for these initiatives would 
be largely derived. 
                                                 
15. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008, i. 
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ISAF Campaign Plan 
 
As previously discussed, ISAF was created as a result of UNSCR 1386 in December 
2001 with a mandate to “assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of 
security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well 
as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.”16 Between 
December 2001 and August 2003 the ISAF mission was led successively by the UK, 
Turkey and Germany (ISAF I, II and III) and in August 2003, NATO formally accepted 
command of ISAF. Although NATO originally intended to assign responsibility for ISAF 
IV to Regional Headquarters Allied Forces North (RHQ AFNORTH), it was determined 
that it was not fully prepared to deploy, and as a result, the mission was delegated to Joint 
Headquarters Centre (JHQ CENT), an army-centric, tactical-level headquarters 
subordinate to RHQ AFNORTH.
17
  
 
Although authorized by the UN in October 2003 to expand beyond Kabul to all of 
Afghanistan, ISAF IV was not sufficiently resourced with troops or equipment to 
accomplish this, and the focus remained on Kabul and its immediate environs throughout 
its seven-month tour. During this period, the ISAF IV campaign plan was developed 
based on staff work previously undertaken by ISAF III; the ISAF IV campaign plan 
schematic is shown at Figure 10.
18
 
 
                                                 
16. UNSCR 1386, dated 20 December 2001. 
17. The revised NATO command and control structure adopted in 2004 resulted in RHQ 
AFNORTH being designated as Headquarters Joint Force Command Brunssum (HQ JFCB), and JHQ 
CENT was renamed to Component Command – Land Headquarters Heidelberg (CC-Land HQ HD). 
18. The DPs highlighted in blue (DP 11 Loya Jirga and DP 13 General Election) were considered 
vitally important to the achievement of the overall campaign. The ISAF IV Campaign Plan schematic and 
all subsequent examples of ISAF products were kindly provided by LCol K. W. Smith (Retired), a former 
member of the ISAF IV planning staff. 
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Figure 10. ISAF IV Campaign Plan - Schematic 
 
 
The purpose of campaign design is to “understand conceptually the broad solutions for 
attaining mission accomplishment and to reduce the uncertainty of a complex operational 
environment.”19 Figure 10 is a typical example of a military campaign design in that it 
illustrates several standard conceptual design elements including (in this instance) five 
lines of operation, supported by several decisive points (DPs), leading to a “centre of 
gravity” and the achievement of an “end state.” 
 
Lines of operation signify conceptual progressions of mission accomplishment 
represented by a series of linked DPs or effects denoting physical or nonphysical changes 
in a significant aspect of the strategic, operational or tactical environment; although this 
concept is most frequently applied at the operational level. It should be noted that DPs do 
not equate to decision points, which are often anticipated in temporal, conditional or 
physical aspects of a campaign and which may cause the commander to take a decision 
upon realization of such aspects. The concept of a centre of gravity, a key Clausewitzian 
concept, is defined as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything 
                                                 
19. United States, Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine Publication 05, Joint Operation 
Planning, Issued August 2011, 45. 
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depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.”20 As can be 
noted in the ISAF IV campaign design this was defined as “Afghan willingness and 
capability to act responsibly.”  
 
I submit three observations with respect to this campaign design in particular. First, there 
is no necessary conceptual dependency between the successful achievement of the centre 
of gravity and the attainment of the end state; the ISAF perception of what constituted 
acting responsibly would not necessarily lead to the establishment of a fully constituted 
and functioning Afghan security force. Second, while the end state envisioned for ISAF 
IV concentrated on the future capability of the Afghan security force, it is evident that 
several DPs clearly supported humanitarian, reconstruction or governance objectives (for 
example DPs 1, 5, 8, 12, 13 and 14). As such, this represents an early indication of 
ISAF’s appreciation that more than merely military force was required to achieve the 
strategic objective. Third, there are no dependencies displayed between or amongst the 
DPs appearing on different lines of operation. For example, DP 8, the attainment of full 
operational capability for Kabul International Airport (KIA), was critical for the 
attainment of DPs 5 and 14—establishment and handover of humanitarian/reconstruction 
structures—yet it remains isolated in the “protect the mission” line of operation.  
 
The overall ISAF campaign was conceived as a series of phases, and each phase resulted 
in adaptations to the original campaign design. Phase I, Assessment and Preparation, 
included operations to secure Kabul and environs; this phase was essentially completed 
by October 2004. Phase II addressed the physical expansion of ISAF forces throughout 
Afghanistan and was concluded by October 2006. Phase III, Stabilization, was initiated in 
2006 and remained arguably extant throughout 2011. 
 
Given the announcement by NATO and the US to be fully disengaged from combat 
operations by 2013 leading to a significant withdrawal of troops by 2014, it is clear that 
the emphasis placed on conditions allowing for the adoption of the transition phase was, 
over time, superseded by a pre-determined decrease in force-level requirements. By 2006, 
the ISAF campaign design had evolved into one that focused on three major pillars of 
                                                 
20. Clausewitz, On War, 596. 
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security, governance and social-economic development in order to mirror the priorities of 
the ANDS and this campaign design, with minor variations, remained extant throughout 
2011; this design is shown at Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11. Campaign Design - COMISAF Vision of Resolution 
 
In addition to grouping numerous effects within the three pillar model, this design also 
highlighted a number of significant, if subtly illustrated, concepts and intentions. First, it 
should be noted that while NATO opted to lead the security pillar and support the 
governance and social-economic development pillars, these pillars, in fact, overlapped, 
and this underscored the direct participation by NATO in these non-security related 
functions.  
 
Second, while the design provided for multiple end states, (ISAF, NATO, Government of 
Afghanistan and the UN), the end states were not clearly articulated but appear to be 
represented by the achievement of a cluster of DPs across all three pillars. Similarly, it is 
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not clear which effects in which pillars are linked to a given end state. For example, could 
the ISAF end state be achieved if the effect related to establishing basic civil 
infrastructure was not accomplished?  
 
Third, while each of the three pillars supported a desired outcome, the design did not 
provide a means of understanding how these outcomes were interlinked, nor did it 
provide any indication of relative criticality or suggest that variations in time to 
accomplish these conditions were considered. As mentioned previously, while the ISAF 
campaign plan did evolve over time (primarily in response to the lack of progress on the 
ground), it remained quite consistent throughout the period of study, and this was 
reflected in the new COMISAF’s initial assessment of the situation in 2009. 
 
Farrell and Rynning submit that NATO “had an operational plan but no real campaign 
plan and no strategic guidance.”21 As a member of the operational analysis branch in HQ 
JFCB in 2005-2006, and a staff officer in ISAF HQ in 2008, I would offer a view that 
NATO invested a great deal of effort to develop ISAF campaign plans which were nested 
in a higher level political, i.e. strategic, setting. That said, I would agree with Osinga and 
Russell’s later assessment that “the organization [NATO] proved itself unable to develop 
strategic coherence on the ground in Afghanistan,”22 as, indeed, this speaks directly to the 
difficulties associated with the Comprehensive Approach as state-building strategy.    
 
Prior to transitioning to the central issue of assessing the effectiveness of the ISAF 
campaign in the context of the Comprehensive Approach, it will be useful to briefly 
highlight the theoretical and terminological differences between military assessment and 
civilian evaluation regimes. Having already introduced a variety of military terms to 
describe aspects of a campaign and campaign design and the relevance of these to the 
achievement of operational and strategic objectives, it will be profitable to situate this 
within a broader theoretical model of evaluation. 
                                                 
21. Farrell, Theo and Sten Rynning, “NATO’s Transformation Gaps: Transatlantic Differences 
and the War in Afghanistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 5 (21 October 2010 online): 693. 
22. Frans Osinga and James A. Russell in Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James A. Russell, eds., 
Military Adaptation in Afghanistan. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013, 311. 
Chapter 4: The “State” of Afghanistan: Failure of the Comprehensive Approach 
 
 
197 
 
Terminology Mapping Between Military Assessment and Civilian Evaluation 
Regimes 
 
Table 5 maps comparative civilian and military terms utilized in respective evaluation 
regimes. Underpinning both civilian and military evaluation regimes is an acceptance of 
systems’ theory as a means of understanding the environment in which a military 
campaign or civilian program will be undertaken, and general systems’ theory provided 
the basis of NATO’s EBAO doctrine, which was previously identified as a precursor to 
the Comprehensive Approach.
23
  
 
 
Civilian
24
 Military (NATO) 
Program goals End state 
Descriptive program theory Systemic analysis 
Normative program theory Effects-based plan 
Generalization theory No direct comparison 
Intervening mechanism theory Effects development and linkage with actions 
Impact theory Change in effects 
Outcome theory Effects 
Implementation environment theory Considered as part of actions 
Treatment theory Actions 
Generalization evaluation No direct comparison, but considered implicitly 
Intervening mechanism evaluation Effect-action analysis 
Impact evaluation MOE analysis 
Outcome evaluation Effects development 
Implementation environment evaluation Considered as part of MOP analysis 
Treatment evaluation MOP analysis 
Table 5. Terminology Mapping Between Military Assessment and Civilian Evaluation Regimes 
 
                                                 
23. Brook Smith-Windsor, “Hasten Slowly – NATO’s Effects-based and Comprehensive 
Approach to Operations,” NATO Research Paper No. 38, (Rome, NATO Defense College, July 2008). 
24. H. T. Chen, Theory-driven Evaluations (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990). 
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In this context, systems’ theory posits that actions or treatments taken in relation to 
specific aspects of the environment will produce effects or outcomes which are 
measureable via analysis or evaluation. Both regimes distinguish between the degree of 
accomplishment of an action or treatment (in military terminology a measure of 
performance [(MOP)] and the degree of accomplishment of an effect or outcome (in 
military terminology a measure of effectiveness [(MOE)]. Again, in both regimes, there 
is a desire to understand how actions or treatments generate effects or outcomes, as this 
analysis may lead to adjustments in the overall campaign or program. 
 
It was earlier identified that DPs denote physical or nonphysical changes or effects in an 
aspect of the operational environment and, as such, they are generally equated with 
effects and written so as to describe the desired condition or change in the environment. 
For example, from Figure 11 the DP “Afghan Borders Controlled” describes a condition 
which was not present in the operational environment at the point in time in which the 
campaign design was developed but was considered to be a significant and desirable 
effect to be achieved. In contrast, from Figure 10, DP 7 “Initiate synchronized 
operations” is not in fact a DP or an effect, but a description of an intended set of actions. 
These examples illustrate the evolution and more nuanced understanding of effects-based 
theory in military planning between 2003 and 2008. 
 
Methodology 
 
Having now described the history, context and underlying theories associated with the 
ISAF campaign design for Afghanistan and the Afghan National Development Strategy, it 
will be useful to map the ISAF desired effects to key ANDS expected outcomes, given the 
theoretical equivalency of effects and outcomes in this context. From a temporal 
perspective, the comparative analysis focuses on the period from approximately 2006 to 
2011; 2006 being the year in which the I-ANDS was initially promulgated and NATO 
formally adopted the Comprehensive Approach and which was reflected in the ISAF 
three-pillar model featured in its campaign design.  
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While each of the ANDS 124 expected outcomes may be considered important in the 
context of the overall plan, this analysis identified those outcomes most comparable to 
the ISAF effects displayed in Figure 11. The advantages of this approach are that: first, it 
allows for a reasonably direct comparison of effects and outcomes viewed as significant 
to both ISAF and the Afghan national government, and second, the 26 ISAF effects 
included in the campaign design relate to highly critical elements of the ANDS, and it 
may be posited that a study of these representative elements may lead to an appreciation 
of the whole. 
 
Annex A to Chapter 4 maps the ISAF desired effects illustrated in Figure 11 to 
corresponding ANDS expected outcomes, and these have been organized in accordance 
with the three pillars of security, governance and social-economic development. 
Consistent with the campaign design for those security effects which overlapped the other 
two pillars, these have been organized into distinct “sub-pillars.” For each ISAF effect, a 
corresponding ANDS expected outcome has been identified and in several instances it 
was deemed necessary to include more than one expected outcome along with their 
corresponding indicators, baselines and target data from the ANDS (if provided).  
 
Evaluation Data Sources 
 
For each pillar, sub-pillar and overall summary, an evaluation of the degree to which the 
ANDS expected outcomes were achieved for approximately the period 2006–2011 is 
offered based on the availability of data in relation to the corresponding ANDS indicators. 
In some cases, data corresponding to the indicator or the timeframe was not available, 
and where data not corresponding to the timeframe is used to support an evaluation this is 
noted.  
 
With respect to evaluation data sources, a number of selected data schemas from each of 
the six actor assessment and evaluation clusters introduced earlier were identified and 
studied. The selected actors are provided at the end of the bibliography, and data selected 
to support evaluation identified in specific sources is cited for each specific observation. 
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It should be noted that in all cases the data cited emanates from non-classified sources. 
While this is necessary in order to allow for dissemination of this thesis into non-
classified environments, this is not unduly restrictive. Many classified reports necessarily 
draw on unclassified sources given that various international, governmental and non-
governmental organizations possess the focus, credibility and expertise required to 
analyze specific aspects of the environment in question. Given the size, scope and 
organizational maturity of the actors selected for this analysis it was possible, in most 
cases, to identify data points for both the 2006 and 2011 timeframes from the same 
source(s). This is important, of course, given that this significantly improves the 
probability that the data collection processes and subsequent analysis was consistent over 
time and therefore validates the ability to make the observations and comparisons 
offered. In all cases, the data was drawn from readily accessible print-based or on-line 
published reports.   
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Annex A to Chapter 4: Mapping ISAF-Desired Effects and Corresponding ANDS-Expected Outcomes to Selected Indicator Results, 2006–2011 
 
Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Security S1 Afghans accept ISAF’s role No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent 
 S1 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: No equivalent 
 
Selected Indicators:  
1.Between 2006 and 2011, the percentage of Afghans surveyed who believed the country was “moving in the wrong direction” due to security issues increased from 6 to 45%.1  
2.Between 2006 and 2011, the percentage of Afghans surveyed who cited insecurity as the country’s biggest problem increased from 27 to 38%.2 
3.In 2010, 6% of Afghans surveyed believed that violence was due to foreign forces—this increased to 8% in 2011.3 
4.In 2011, 76% of Afghans surveyed indicated that encountering foreign forces was their greatest cause of fear (higher than any other category).
4
 
5.In 2011, 21% of Afghans surveyed believed that the main reason illegally armed groups (IAGs) were fighting was due to the presence of foreign troops.
5
 
6.Of those surveyed by the United Nations Development Program  in 2010, 55% were “unfavourable” towards ISAF and international forces.6 
 
Quote: “The international forces are considered responsible for inadequately taking into consideration the consequences their operations can have on the civil population; for their incapability to distinguish 
the innocent civilians from the ‘rebels’; for their indiscriminate air-bombings and night raids, and for house-searching. One of the most commonly heard complaints is the feeling that the foreign troops do 
not act within the limits of a defined legal system, and instead exclusively respond to their own code of conduct, free of any public accountability. All the interviewees ask for clear and accessible 
instruments that they can use when they feel a situation of injustice is being imposed on them by the foreign troops.”7 
 
Evaluation: ISAF’s desired effect of having Afghans “accept ISAF’s role” is an early expression of what will later be labelled “winning hearts and minds” in the context of conducting counter-insurgency 
operations (COIN). It also reflects a desire on the part of ISAF to be able to conduct operations without interference from the indigenous population and, at the very least, not support IAGs, i.e. the Taliban.  
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect S1 was not achieved by 2011. 
                                                 
1. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2006 and 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. United Nations Development Program, Police Perception Survey 2010 – The Afghan Perspective. 
7. INTERSOS, The Foreign Troops Through the Afghan Eyes: opinions, perceptions and rumors in Herat, Farah and Badghis, November 2011 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Security S2 Afghans accept Afghan National 
Army 
Enhanced public trust on 
government ability to deliver justice 
and security as IAGs are disbanded 
and reintegrated. 
# of districts cleared from IAGs 21 districts complied 51 districts targeted 
 S2 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: # of districts cleared from IAGs. 
 
Selected Indicators:  
1.Over the 12 months between 1 July 2010 and 30 June 2011,a total of 2099 damaging attacks were recorded in Afghanistan, with damaging attacks classed as operations by sub-state armed actors 
which directly resulted in loss of life, damage, or disruption.
8
  
2.These attacks represent a 19.3 % increase from the preceding 12 months and equate to an average operational tempo of 175 attacks per month.
9
  
3.These attacks occurred in all 33 provinces of Afghanistan.
10
 
4.The majority of insurgent violence in the period was recorded in the south of Afghanistan, with the provinces of Helmand (372 attacks) and Kandahar (262 attacks) accounting for 30 % of all 
recorded attacks.
11
 
 
Quote: “These two southern provinces remain the heartland of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and levels of violence were significantly high for a number of reasons. Firstly, ISAF forces had a 
significant contingent of troops in the region, with an estimated 16,200 soldiers in Helmand alone, providing a significant and attractive target of opportunity. Secondly, ISAF and Afghan forces attempted to 
clear insurgent-held areas in these provinces and hold them in order to promote stability, governance, and central government rule. Such operations increasingly made security forces the target of insurgent 
operations.”12 
 
Evaluation: The ANDS indicator assumes that once a district or area has been “cleared from IAGs” that the IAGs will not return to that location as they are “disbanded or reintegrated.” This assumption has 
been clearly and consistently shown to be incorrect over the entire period of 2001–2011. During earlier periods, the northern and western sectors of the country were relatively violence-free, but by 2008, 
IAGs were attacking ISAF and Afghan-government targets throughout the country. Several districts, particularly in southern Afghanistan, have been fought for on successive occasions as the IAGs seek to 
regain control over vital population areas or key logistic points or transit routes. In 2011, it was accepted that IAGs were capable of striking anywhere in the country.  
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect S2 was not achieved by 2011. 
                                                 
8. Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, accessed 5 September 2013; available from:http://www.janes.com/products/janes/security/terrorism-insurgency-intelligence-centre/index.aspx; Internet. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Ibid. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Security S3 Afghan General Staff and Ministry 
of Defence Mission Capable 
ANA operationally capable of 
performing those missions and tasks 
assigned. 
# of recruited ANA personnel 64,996 (Apr 2008) 80,000 (end 2009) 
% of ANA personnel trained 77% (2008) 100% (2013) 
 S3 Evaluation  ANDS Indicators: # of recruited ANA personnel / % of ANA personnel trained 
 
Selected Indicators:  
1.As at October 2011, the ANA had 173,150 personnel on strength.
13
 
2.As at October 2011, the ANA annual attrition rate was 32.4%.
14
 
3.In August 2011, the total number of reporting ANA units in the field increased to 204, and the number of units achieving an operational effectiveness rating of “effective with assistance” or higher 
was sustained at 147; alternatively, 37 units (18 %) of fielded ANA units are in the lowest assessment categories, “developing” or “established,” due to an inability to perform their mission or 
the immaturity of a newly fielded unit.
15
 
4.The ANA’s highest-rated kandak, 2nd kandak, 2nd Brigade, 205th Corps, which achieved the rating of “independent” remains dependent on ISAF for combat support and combat enablers. In 
locations without a large ISAF footprint, the ANA has exhibited little improvement and there is little reporting on their operational strengths and weaknesses.
16
  
 
Evaluation: When the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) stood up in November 2009, the focus was on reversing the negative growth trends of the Afghan National Security Force and 
producing soldiers and police to meet the needs of counter-insurgency operations. By 2011, the size of the ANA had increased well beyond the original projections as laid out in the ANDS due to the growing 
understanding of the international community that the Afghan national government would require a large, capable military force to ensure security and stability once ISAF forces withdrew. While the size of 
the force increased as the international community assigned significant funding and personnel to the training mission, the overall quality remained highly fragile with virtually no formed Afghan units 
capable of operating independent of ISAF forces or without direct ISAF enabling support.  
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect S3 was partially achieved by 2011. 
                                                 
13. NATO Training Mission Afghanistan, Information Paper on ANSF Assuming the Lead, 18 October 2011, NATO Unclassified. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Centre for International and Strategic Studies, The Afghanistan-Pakistan War at the End of 2011, 15 November, 2011. 
16. Ibid. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Security S4 Afghans accept Afghan National 
Police (ANP) 
Enhanced public trust on 
government ability to deliver justice 
and security as IAGs are disbanded 
and reintegrated. 
# of districts cleared from IAGs 21 districts complied 51 districts targeted 
 S5 Security and governance in key 
zones 
Enhanced public trust on 
government ability to deliver justice 
and security as IAGs are disbanded 
and reintegrated. 
# of districts cleared from IAGs 21 districts complied 51 districts targeted 
 S6 IAGs integrated or marginalized Enhanced public trust on 
government ability to deliver justice 
and security as IAGs are disbanded 
and reintegrated. 
# of districts cleared from IAGs 21 districts complied 51 districts targeted 
 S4/S5/S6 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: # of districts cleared from IAGs. 
 
Selected Indicators, Sources and Evaluation: As per S2 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Security S7 ANP sufficiently developed ANP operationally capable of 
performing those missions and tasks 
assigned and crime rates reduced. 
# of recruited ANP personnel 
 
% of ANP personnel trained 
80,426 (Apr 2008) 
 
55% (Apr 2008) 
82,000 (end 2008) 
 
100% (2010) 
 S7 Evaluation  ANDS Indicators: # of recruited ANP personnel / % of ANP personnel trained 
 
Selected Indicators:  
1.As at October 2011, the ANP had 139,070 personnel on strength.
17
 
2.As at October 2011, the ANP annual attrition rate was 16%.
18
 
3.The ANP has demonstrated improvement in its ability to conduct limited, independent policing operations and to coordinate operations with other Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
elements. These improvements are largely attributable to a number of exogenous factors, including low insurgent threat levels in the given operating environment and ISAF enablers. ISAF 
mentor reporting shows that the majority of ANP units still rely heavily on coalition assistance, especially in contested areas.
19
  
4.As with the ANA, the operational performance of ANP units is also suffering from US and coalition force reductions. Each of the three ANP pillars saw an increase in the number of units that 
were not assessed due to recently fielded units that are not reporting or not partnered due to lack of available coalition forces. Within the Afghan Border Police (ABP), 11 of the 12 units were 
not assessed due to long-standing partnering shortages. Additionally, four Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) kandaks located throughout theatre were not assessed. Finally, within the AUP in 
key terrain districts, 17 of the 22 units not assessed were in Regional Command-Centre.
20
 
 
Quote: “The ANP development effort is being rushed, funding is being cut, and there are significant trainer and partner shortfalls. The ANP are not supported by effective rule of law in terms of courts, 
detention facilities and a functioning legal system. The most effective element, the ANCOP, has an unacceptable attrition rate. Other police units have major problems with leadership corruption and loyalties 
to local power brokers. The border police are particularly corrupt. The Afghan Local Police work as long as they are supported by large elements of Special Forces, but these forces are not large enough to 
meet current expansion goals, and it is unclear what will happen when Special Operations Forces (SOF) advisors leave.”21 
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect S7 was partially achieved by 2011. 
 S8 Insurgency contained Enhanced public trust on 
government ability to deliver justice 
and security as IAGs are disbanded 
and reintegrated. 
# of districts cleared from IAGs 21 districts complied 51 districts targeted 
                                                 
17. NATO Training Mission Afghanistan, Information Paper on ANSF Assuming the Lead, 18 October 2011, NATO Unclassified. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Centre for International and Strategic Studies, The Afghanistan-Pakistan War at the End of 2011, 15 November, 2011. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
 S8 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: # of districts cleared from IAGs. 
 
Observation, Sources and Evaluation: As per S2 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Security S9/ 
S10 
Afghan borders controlled Operational border posts able to 
protect national sovereignty. 
 
Operational border posts able to 
protect national sovereignty. 
Index on equipping the border posts 
 
Index on equipping the border posts 
Under assessment 
 
Under assessment 
100% (2013) 
 
100% (2013)  
 S9/S10 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: Index on equipping the border posts 
 
Selected Indicators:  
1.There was no available data on the equipping of border posts. 
2.No Afghan government has ever accepted the Durand Line as an international border. This refusal has continued for more than a century under regimes of all political stripes, some of which called for 
the reincorporation of the territory into Afghanistan or the creation of a new state of Pashtunistan. Pakistan, by contrast, has always insisted that the Durand Line constitutes its recognized 
international border with Afghanistan.
22
  
3.There are approximately 100 border posts on the Afghan side of the Durand Line.
23
 
4.There are approximately 1000 border posts on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line.
24
 
5.As of September 2011, the Afghan Border Police end strength was 20,852 personnel. The ABP remains on schedule to meet all growth objectives for officers and patrolmen, but remains short of non-
commissioned officers, with only 3,800 of an assigned total of 5,600. This shortfall, as well as the shortfall of untrained patrolmen, remains the primary focus for training efforts.
25
 
6.Despite some small strides in policing the border, police on both sides have been mostly ineffective. This is particularly evident south of Kabul in the Zabul, Kandahar and Helmand provinces that 
border the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Pakistani Baluchistan. IAGs in these provinces have benefitted tremendously from the support of networks in Pakistan that need not fear 
any effective border control.
26
 
7.Past attempts by US representatives to persuade both countries to conduct joint border patrols have failed due to a lack of trust. Pakistani reluctance has been the major factor in the failure to launch 
joint patrols; the government in Islamabad wants a much larger commitment from Afghan leaders before acknowledging that such exercises might be a success. In particular, leaders in Islamabad 
have said they are unwilling to discuss joint patrols until the Afghans come closer to establishing more posts on their side of the border.
27
 
 
Quote: “For the people who live along it, the Durand Line has never constituted an international border. They act as if it does not exist, crossing freely from one side to another as they please wherever they 
please, in part because in many places the line’s location is only vaguely known. There are villages located in Pakistan that have their farmland in Afghanistan and vice versa. Governments recognize this 
fact by not demanding papers from local people even at formal border crossings. In this regard, one participant familiar with police issues noted that about half the population of the Pakistani border town of 
Chaman on the road to Qandahar crosses the border daily into Afghanistan. This includes the Afghan police employed at Spin Boldak border crossing a kilometer away who commute to their post from 
homes in Pakistan.”28 
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that the intent of ISAF Desired Effects S9 and S10 were not achieved by 2011; it cannot be determined if the ANDS indicator, per se, was 
achieved. 
                                                 
22. American Institute of Afghanistan Studies, The Durand Line: History, Consequences, and Future. 
23. East-West Institute, Recognizing the Durand Line. 
24. Ibid. 
25. United States Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Security S11 ANSF tactically and operationally 
self-sufficient 
As per S3 and S7. As per S3 and S7. As per S3 and S7. As per S3 and S7. 
 S11 Evaluation  
 
Observation, Sources and Evaluation: As per S3 and S7 
 S12 ANA able to assume coordinating 
authority 
Effectively coordinated security 
sector. 
Index on progress of establishing 
joint coordination centers for the 
ANA and ANP 
Under assessment, 13 coordination 
centers proposed 
Enhanced coordination amongst 
security sector ministry/departments 
(2013) 
 S12 Evaluation  
 
Observation, Sources and Evaluation: As per S3 and S7 
SECURITY PILLAR EVALUATION 
 
Of 12 ISAF Desired Effects related to the security pillar 8 (S1, S2, S4, S5, S6, S8, S9, S10) were evaluated as not having been achieved by 2011. Of prime significance is the fact that the focus of the security aspect of the 
campaign was on defeating the insurgency in order to allow the country to stabilize and thereby improve its governance and social-economic capacities. By 2011 the insurgency was not defeated and Afghanistan remained 
unable to move forward. In addition, there was a growing trend towards so-called “green on blue” attacks. These occur when Afghans from the ANA or ANP (or at least dressed as such) attack ISAF or US forces. Between 
2005 and 2010 there were 13 such attacks, while in 2011 there were 9 and in 2012, through March alone, there were 12.
29
 
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that the security pillar was partially achieved by 2011. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
26. East-West Institute, Recognizing the Durand Line. 
27. Ibid. 
28. American Institute of Afghanistan Studies, The Durand Line. 
29. Brookings Institute, Afghanistan Index, May 16, 2012. 
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Sub-Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Security/ 
Governance 
SG1 Key Enabling Strategic 
Infrastructure 
ANA operationally capable of 
performing those missions 
and tasks assigned 
Index on equipping the ANA 
training centers 
Under assessment TBD 
Government offices physically 
equipped to fulfill their role. 
Index on the progress of providing 
basic facilities and amenities to all 
government offices. 
Under assessment By end 2013, all the councils and 
offices including municipalities will 
have basic facilities and amenities 
including adequate built up space, 
computers, communication facility 
and furniture. The key officials at 
national and sub national level will 
have adequate means of mobility to 
make connection with the 
communities they are serving 
Justice institutions have access to 
infrastructure, transportation, 
equipment, and supplies adequate to 
support effective delivery of justice 
services. 
Index on the progress of providing 
justice institutions access to 
infrastructure, transportation, 
equipment, and supplies adequate to 
support effective delivery of justice 
services 
Under assessment By end 2010, justice institutions will 
be fully functional and operational in 
each province of Afghanistan, and 
the average time to resolve contract 
disputes will be reduced as much as 
possible  
Chapter 4: Annex A 
 
210 
Sub-Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Security/ 
Governance 
SG1 Evaluation  ANDS Indicators: 
1. Index on equipping the ANA training centers. 
2. Index on the progress of providing basic facilities and amenities to all government offices. 
3. Index on the progress of providing Justice institutions access to infrastructure, transportation, equipment, and supplies adequate to support effective delivery of justice services. 
Selected Indicators:  
 
1. As of July 2006, all training and education in the Army is managed and implemented by the newly formed Afghan National Army Training Command (ANATC), a two-star command which reports directly 
to the Chief of the General Staff. All training centres and military schools are under ANATC HQ. Individual basic training is conducted primarily by Afghan National Army instructors and staff at ANATC’s 
Kabul Military Training Center, situated on the eastern edge of the capital. The ANA are still supported, however, with various levels of Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) 
oversight, mentorship, and assistance. Formal education and professional development is currently conducted at two main ANATC schools, both in Kabul. The National Military Academy of Afghanistan 
(NMAA), located near Kabul International Airport, is a four-year military university, which will produce degreed second lieutenants in a variety of military professions. NMAA’s first cadet class entered its 
second academic year in spring 2006. The Command and General Staff College, located in southern Kabul, prepares mid-level ANA officers to serve on brigade and corps staffs. A National Defense 
University has been established at a site in northwestern Kabul. All initial officer training has been re-located to the new NDU facility.  
2. After the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, the government of Afghanistan and the donor community recognized from the very outset that government institutions were mere weak skeletal 
structures. Two years after the Taliban were ousted from power, most of the district headquarters in Afghanistan did not even have proper buildings from which to run local administration. In 2004, in an 
effort to strengthen local governance, the government of Afghanistan launched the Afghanistan Stabilisation Programme (ASP). The main objectives of the ASP were to extend the reach of the government of 
Afghanistan into the districts and provinces through building physical infrastructure and enhancing the capacity of local governance. When the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) was 
established in 2007, the ASP was subsumed in it. However, due to changes in leadership and the lack of trust from the donor community, the program still has not achieved what was envisioned in the original 
plan. According to the August 2010 report of the ASP, since 2005 only the Asian Development Bank and the Government of Afghanistan, using funds from the national budget, had contributed US$16.5 
million to the program. The ASP contracted an additional 59 infrastructure and 82 equipment projects, but according to the ASP program manager they do not have enough money to pay for all contracted 
projects once they are completed. According to the ASP’s report issued in August 2010, the projected cost of the program until 2014 is US$357,547,000, but only US$5,520,174 is committed, resulting in a 
shortfall of US$352,026,826.  
3. The Afghan justice system lacks sufficient resources and an adequately trained staff. Only 11.6% of judges have a university law degree, and only 56.7% had completed any judicial training prior to their 
appointment. Construction or rehabilitation is needed in 97.8% of Afghanistan’s court facilities, and there is a severe shortage of professional resources—such as access to Afghan laws and Supreme Court 
decisions and to textbooks.  
4. While there are improvements in Afghan government revenue collection with a projected 32% increase in fiscal year (FY) 2010–11 (International Monetary Fund, 2011), the tax to GDP ratio in FY2010 is 
still only 9.1 %—among the lowest in the world—and the Ministry of Finance (MoF), whose basic operating budget is only two-thirds met by national resources (excluding all development assistance), has 
itself warned of the increasing gap between domestic revenues and external financing. US estimates of the costs for the training mission and funding support for the ANSF in FY2012 is $12.8 billion. The 
MoF predicted that revenue for year (FY2011/12) will reach $1.5 billion and for recurrent costs (salaries, hazard pay and food), Afghan revenues would pay for a fifth of the costs of the ANP and a third of the 
costs of the ANA. It is likely that the donor footprint will gradually shrink, with total grants projected to decline from an estimated more than 40 percent of GDP in 2010/11 to less than 30 percent of GDP in 
2013/14. These developments will weigh heavily on economic activity and require difficult decisions to ensure fiscal survival.  
 
Evaluation: With the emphasis placed on increasing the size of the ANSF, significant funding for military training facilities, primarily donated by the US, has resulted in the development and equipping of 
numerous army and police training facilities across Afghanistan. The issue going forward is the ability and willingness of the international community to continue funding these as the NATO and US missions 
wind down. Of course, this issue is linked with the wider challenge of funding the Afghan security sector writ large, and selected indicator No 4 highlights the overall fiscal challenge that the country faces.  
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect SG1 was partially achieved by 2011. 
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Sub-Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Security/ 
Governance 
SG2 Narco-criminal influences isolated Eventual eradication of poppy 
production and crack down on drug 
trafficking. 
# hectares ( ha) of poppy cultivated 
land area 
193,000 ha By 2013, the area under poppy 
cultivation will be reduced by half 
compared to 2007 levels 
 SG2 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: # ha of poppy cultivated land area 
 
Selected Indicators:  
 
1.Opium poppy-crop cultivation in Afghanistan reached 131,000 ha in 2011, 7 % higher than in 2010.
30
 
2.Opium poppy-crop cultivation in 2007 was 193,000 has (one-half would be 96,500 hectares).
31
 
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect SG2 was not achieved by 2011. 
 
SECURITY/GOVERNANCE SUB-PILLAR EVALUATION 
 
While ISAF Desired Effect SG1 was evaluated as partially achieved by 2011, SG2 was clearly not. Given the criticality of poppy production to the related effect of corruption and the relationship between narcotics 
production and the funding of criminal and insurgent activity, the failure to achieve SG2 compromised the sub-pillar and weakened the overall campaign outcome.  
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that this sub-pillar was not achieved by 2011. 
Security/ 
Social-
economic 
Development 
SSED1 Freedom of Action in Key Zones Enhanced public trust on 
government ability to deliver justice 
and security as IAGs are disbanded 
and reintegrated. 
# of districts cleared from IAGs 21 districts complied 51 districts targeted 
 SSED2 Freedom of Action Established Enhanced public trust on 
government ability to deliver justice 
and security as IAGs are disbanded 
and reintegrated. 
# of districts cleared from IAGs 21 districts complied 51 districts targeted 
 SSED1 and SSED2 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: # of districts cleared from IAGs. 
 
Selected Indicators, Sources and Evaluation: As per S2 
                                                 
30. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN), 2011 Afghan Opium Survey. 
31. Ibid. 
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Sub-Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
SECURITY/SOCIAL-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SUB-PILLAR EVALUATION 
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that this sub-pillar was not achieved by 2011. 
 
Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Governance G1 Independent media functioning Free and independent media. Index on progress of creating an 
environment for free and 
independent media 
Media law is drafted, needs 
amendments 
Media law to be passed and 
implemented by 2008 
 G1 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: Index on progress of creating an environment for free and independent media 
 
Selected Indicators:  
 
1.In 2006, Afghanistan was ranked 130 out of 168 states in terms of press freedom.
32
 
2.In 2011/2012, Afghanistan was ranked 150 out of 179 states in terms of press freedom and trending downwards.
33
 
3.In Afghanistan, violence remained the main concern for journalists, who were under constant threat from the Taliban, religious extremists, separatist movements and political groups.
34
  
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect G1 was not achieved by 2011. 
                                                 
32. Reporters without Borders, Press Freedom Index, 2012. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Governance G2 Representative government elected Strong and capable Independent 
election commission holding regular 
national and sub- national elections 
as mandated by the constitution. 
Index on the progress of creating a 
strong and capable independent 
election commission holding regular 
national and sub national Elections 
as mandated by the Constitution. 
Under assessment The Afghanistan Independent 
Electoral Commission will have the 
high integrity, capacity and 
resources to undertake elections in 
an increasingly fiscally sustainable 
manner by end-2009, with the 
Government of Afghanistan 
contributing to the extent possible to 
the cost of future elections from its 
own resources. 
 G2 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: Index on the progress of creating a strong and capable independent electoral commission holding regular national and sub national Elections as mandated by the 
constitution. 
 
Selected Indicators:  
1.According to Article 156 of the constitution of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) has the authority and responsibility to administrate and supervise all 
kind of elections as well as refer to general public opinion of the people, in accordance the provision of the law.
35
 
2.Presidential and provincial council elections took place for the second time in August 2009, this time directly managed by the Afghan-led IEC.
36
 
3.Turn-out was significantly lower than in 2004/05, due to poor security, but it was an important indication of reduced public interest (and disapproval of the incumbent government). Reports of 
widespread fraud necessitated an extensive re-count. In the end, a second round of elections did not take place, due to the opposition candidate withdrawing; President Karzai was sworn in on 19 
November 2009.
37
 
4.Flawed parliamentary elections in September 2010 led to fallout that, in 2011, threatened to seriously destabilize the country. Following the certification of election results by the IEC, President 
Hamid Karzai took the unprecedented step of creating a special court to review the results. After street protests in Kabul and eight months during which parliament was immobilized by 
uncertainty, the special court disqualified 62 members of parliament out of 249 seats. A compromise in September 2011resulted in nine members of parliament being removed.
38
 
 
Quote: “President Hamid Karzai’s re-election on 2 November 2009, following widespread fraud in the 20 August presidential and provincial polls, has delivered a critical blow to his government’s 
legitimacy. The deeply flawed polls have eroded public confidence in the electoral process and in the international community’s commitment to the country’s nascent democratic institutions. Concentration 
of power in the executive to the exclusion of the legislature and judiciary has also resulted in a fundamental breakdown in governance while strengthening the hand of the insurgency.”39 
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect G2 was partially achieved by 2011. 
                                                 
35. European Union, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan (2007–13) and Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011–13. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan Country Summary, January 2012. 
39. International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing 96, Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance, 25 November 2009. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Governance G3 Governance to provinces Sub-national governance policy 
developed. 
Index on the progress of putting in 
place legal, policy, institutions and 
other systems and procedures for 
strengthening the sub-national 
governance. 
Under assessment By end March 2011, the government 
will ensure formulation and 
implementation of sub-national 
governance policy and, its legal and 
regulatory framework. This will be 
done through a national dialogue on 
subnational governance and with 
technical support of international 
community. 
 G3 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: Index on the progress of putting in place legal, policy, institutions and other systems and procedures for strengthening the sub-national governance. 
 
Selected Indicators:  
 
1.Creation of the IDLG in September 2007 was the first major step in reform of the sub-national governance system. IDLG initiated a draft sub-national governance policy with the help of inter-
ministerial committees.
40
 
2.The 34 provincial councils (PC) in Afghanistan are the only directly elected formal local body. Its role depends largely on the incumbent chair and his or her relations with the governor in the 
province. Although the PC is expected to play a key role once the policy is adopted, it is currently under-resourced and largely marginalized by other key actors at the sub-national level.
41
  
3.The provincial and district governors are appointed by the President, with support from the IDLG. They play a key role, including the chairing of the provincial development councils (PDCs), where 
all development funds are managed. Moreover, the governor has significant authority over the police in the province and direct authority over the district governors.
42
 
4.In addition to the formal institution there are many non-statutory bodies and informal governance institutions in Afghanistan. The former includes the community development councils (CDCs), the 
district development assemblies (DDAs), PDCs and the shuras, jirgas, mirabs, maliks, manteqas and ulemas. These institutions continue to play a key role at the sub-national level where 
governance is as likely to be sought from traditional tribal structures or in some areas from the insurgents. This most likely reflects the absence of a state alternative rather than a deliberate 
choice.
43
 
5.As of September 18, 2011, only 60% of civil servant positions were filled in the 14 most insecure provinces. This is an improvement from April 2011—when only 50% of positions were filled—but 
lack of security and candidates’ lack of experience and education continue to pose challenges in filling local positions.44 
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect G3 was partially achieved by 2011. 
                                                 
40. European Union, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan (2007–13) and Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011–13. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Afghanistan, The Uncertain Economics of Transition, April 18, 2012. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Governance G4 Rule of law established Public can rely on effectively 
organized and professionally staffed 
justice institutions. 
 
 
 
Criminal and Civil justice is 
administered effectively, and in 
accordance with law, the 
Constitution, and international 
standards. 
Index on the progress of putting in 
place systems so that public can rely 
on effectively organized and 
professionally staffed justice 
institutions. 
 
Index on the progress of putting in 
place systems so that Criminal and 
Civil justice is administered 
effectively, and in accordance with 
law, the Constitution, and 
international standards. 
Under assessment 
 
 
 
 
 
Under assessment 
By end 2010, reforms will 
strengthen the professionalism, 
credibility and integrity of key 
institutions of the justice system (the 
Ministry of Justice, the Judiciary, 
the Attorney-General’s Office, the 
Ministry of the Interior and the 
National Directorate of Security) 
 G4 Evaluation  ANDS Indicators: Index on the progress of putting in place systems so that public can rely on effectively organized and professionally staffed justice institutions; 
Index on the progress of putting in place systems so that Criminal and Civil justice is administered effectively, and in accordance with law, the Constitution, and international l standards. 
 
Selected Indicators:  
 
1.Judicial structures have been established in accordance with the 2004 Constitution. The Afghan government has finalized a National Justice Sector Strategy (NJSS) and has 
agreed to implementation of reforms with the assistance of the international community through a National Justice Programme (NJP). Progress on reforms though has been slow.
45
 
2.Some courts and prosecutors’ offices have benefited from the provision of equipment, human resources and training. However, perceptions of improvements in securing the 
rule of law remain weak.
46
 
3.The legal institutions are still largely failing to fulfill their duties in protecting people under the law and in addressing past and current human rights abuses and corruption.
47
  
4.Access to justice, in particular for women, remains difficult.
48
  
5.The inability of the formal justice sector to deliver increases the chance of parts of the population turning to the Taliban for justice.
49
 
 
 
Quote: “Afghanistan’s justice system is in a catastrophic state of disrepair. Despite repeated pledges over the last nine years, the majority of Afghans still have little or no access to judicial institutions. 
Lack of justice has destabilised the country and judicial institutions have withered to near non-existence. Many courts are inoperable and those that do function are understaffed. Insecurity, lack of proper 
training and low salaries have driven many judges and prosecutors from their jobs. Those who remain are highly susceptible to corruption. Indeed, there is very little that is systematic about the legal 
system, and there is little evidence that the Afghan government has the resources or political will to tackle the challenge. The public, consequently, has no confidence in the formal justice sector amid an 
atmosphere of impunity. A growing majority of Afghans have been forced to accept the rough justice of Taliban and criminal powerbrokers in areas of the country that lie beyond government control.”50  
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect G4 was not achieved by 2011. 
                                                 
45. European Union, Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan (2007-13) and Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011–1. 
46. Ibid. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Governance G5 Reduced corruption in governance Corruption reduced. Index on the progress of introducing 
systems, mechanisms and 
procedures to reduce and monitor 
corruption at different levels in the 
government and the judiciary. 
Under assessment By end-2013, the corruption in the 
judiciary and the government at all 
levels especially in security, 
customs, civil administration and 
municipalities will be significantly 
reduced. 
 G5 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: Index on the progress of introducing systems, mechanisms and procedures to reduce and monitor corruption at different levels in the government and the judiciary. 
 
Selected Indicators:  
 
1.The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index, drawing on corruption-related data from expert 
and business surveys carried out by a variety of independent and reputable institutions. Afghanistan’s score for 2011 was 1.5/10—this produced a ranking of 180/183 states—one of the very worst 
rankings on the globe.
51
 
 
Based on the indicator selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect G5 was not achieved by 2011. 
 G6 Governance to districts Sub-national governance policy 
developed. 
Index on the progress of putting in 
place legal, policy, institutions and 
other systems and procedures for 
strengthening the sub-national 
governance. 
Under assessment By end March 2011, the 
Government will ensure formulation 
and implementation of sub-national 
governance policy and  its legal and 
regulatory framework. This will be 
done through a national dialogue on 
subnational governance and, with 
technical support of international 
community. 
 G6 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: Index on the progress of putting in place legal, policy, institutions and other systems and procedures for strengthening the sub-national governance. 
 
Selected Indicators, Sources and Evaluation: As per G3 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Ibid. 
50. International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing 195, Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary, 17 November 2010. 
51. Transparency International. Downloaded from http://www.transparency.org/country#AFG. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
GOVERNANCE PILLAR EVALUATION 
 
While ISAF Desired Effects G2, G3 and G6 were evaluated as partially achieved by 2011, G1, G4 and G5 were evaluated as not having been achieved and the issue of corruption remains at the very top of the 
international community’s list of concerns. There does not appear to be any viable solution to this problem, and it may result in a significantly reduced level of international donor funding following the withdrawal of ISAF 
and US forces from Afghanistan in 2014.  
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that this pillar was not achieved by 2011. 
Social and 
Economic 
Development 
SED1 Displaced persons and refugee 
(DPREs) return issues resolved. 
Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) return voluntarily 
according to agreed principles and 
procedures. 
# of returnees (male, female) 3 million refugees (Pakistan 2.1 
million, Iran 900,000) and 140,000 
IDPs (estimated) 
Scenario One. Present trend lines 
improve permitting 800,000 – 1 
million returns 
Scenario Two. Current trends 
continue permitting 600,000–
800,000 returns 
Scenario Three. Current trends 
deteriorate permitting 400,000–
600,000 returns 
 SED1 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: # of returnees (male, female) 
 
Selected Indicators:  
 
1.According to the National IDP Task Force, 330,298 IDPs were displaced by armed conflict, human rights abuses and other general violence as of 31 October 2010.
52
  
2.Although more than five million Afghan refugees returned between 2002 and 2008, more than two million registered refugees remain in Pakistan and 900,000 in Iran.
53
 
3.The number of conflict-induced IDPs has been rising steadily since 2007, increasing by 27 % in 2011 and almost doubling since the end of 2008. Of these, 76% reported being forced to leave their 
homes at some point during the conflict. Of these, 41% were internally displaced, 42% were externally displaced and 17% were both internally and externally displaced. Many individuals were 
displaced multiple times.
54
 
4.When asked about the current conflict, 17% surveyed stated that they are currently thinking of leaving the country.
55
  
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect SED1 was not achieved by 2011. 
                                                 
52. OCHA, Downloaded from http://ochaonline.un.org/afghanistan/Clusters/Protection/IDPTaskForce/tabid/5731/language/en-US/Default.aspx. 
53. OXFAM International, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009. 
54. Ibid. 
55. Ibid. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Social and 
Economic 
Development 
SED2 Alternative livelihoods in key zones Reduced poppy cultivation through 
alternative livelihood. 
Index on the progress of reducing 
poppy cultivation through 
alternative livelihoods 
TBD By end 2010, decrease in the 
absolute and relative size of the drug 
economy in line with the 
Government’s Millennium 
Development Goal target 
 SED2 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: Index on the progress of reducing poppy cultivation through alternative livelihoods 
 
Selected Indicators:  
1.Gross revenues from opium trade are estimated to be equivalent to as much as third of measured GDP (opium is not reflected in the official GDP numbers).
56
  
2.Afghanistan is the source of 9% of the world’s opium production and the area under cultivation more than doubled from 2003 to 2007.57 
3.The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Opium Risk Assessment 2012, released in April, predicts a rise in opium cultivation in Afghanistan in 2012.
58
 
4.While 98% of Afghan opium farmers are ready to stop opium poppy cultivation if access to an alternate livelihood is provided, relatively few of them have realistic alternatives available.
59
 
5.Afghan Deputy Minister for Counternarcotics Mohammed Azhar declared, “The price of opium is now seven times higher than wheat … our farmers have no disincentive to cultivate poppy.”60 
6.In 2011, there was a 43% increase in the price of dry opium at harvest time compared to 2010, and that farmers surveyed in 2011 cited the high sale price as the most important reason (59%) for 
cultivating opium poppy.
61
 
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect SED2 was not achieved by 2011. 
                                                 
56. World Bank, Downloaded from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT. 
57. John A. Glaze, “Opium and Afghanistan, Re-Assessing US Counter-Narcotics Strategy,” Carlisle PA: US Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, October 2007. 
58. UNDOC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012, April 2012. 
59. Ibid. 
60. Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. 
61. UNDOC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011, October 2011. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Social and 
Economic 
Development 
SED3 Key enabling structures Expanded public power grid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Improved connectivity throughout 
Afghanistan and to the foreign 
destinations within the region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% of households electrified in urban 
areas 
 
% of households electrified in rural 
areas. 
 
% of non-residential consumers 
provided electricity. 
 
% of target 3263 km of regional 
highways or roads to the 
neighbouring countries fully 
upgraded and rehabilitated. 
 
% of all villages connected by all-
weather roads  
 
 
30% 65% (2011) 
 
10% 
25% (2011) 
 
 
35% 
90% (2011) 
 
2236 kilometers (km) has been 
rehabilitated 
 
Fully upgraded and maintained ring 
road and roads to neighbouring 
countries by March 2009. 
 
 
Target has achieved 25% (Out of 
38,000 villages 9,954 villages have 
access to rural roads)  
 
 
40% of all villages to be connected 
by all-weather roads to the national 
road system by the end of 2010. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
Increased domestic and international 
passengers and freight traffic by air. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increased access for urban 
households to basic services. 
Index on the progress of the process 
of completion of International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
compliance for Kabul and Herat 
Airports. 
 
% of households having access to 
safe water supply in Kabul. 
 
% of households having access to 
piped water supply in other major 
urban areas except Kabul. 
 
% of households having access to 
sanitation facilities in Kabul. 
 
% of households having access to 
sanitation facilities in other major 
urban areas except Kabul. 
Index on the progress of providing 
increased availability of affordable 
shelter. 
40% Kabul 
 
0% Herat 
 
18–21% h/h has access to safe piped 
water 
 
 
15–18% h/h has access to safe piped 
water 
 
5–8% h/h have access to improved 
sanitation 
Kabul International Airport and 
Herat Airport are in compliance with 
the International Civil Aviation 
Organization’s (ICAO) and the 
International Air Transport 
Association’s (IATA’s) 
requirements by March 2011. 
 
In line with MDG investment in 
water supply and sanitation will 
ensure that 50% of h/h in Kabul has 
access to safe piped water 
 
30% of h/h in other major urban 
areas will have access to piped water 
by March 2011 
 
50% by March 2011 
Social and 
Economic 
Development 
10–12% h/h have access to 
improved sanitation 
30% by March 2011 
 60% by 2013 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
 SED3 Evaluation  ANDS Indicators: 
1.% of households electrified in urban areas 
2.% of households electrified in rural areas 
3.% of non-residential consumers provided electricity 
4.% of target 3263 km of regional highways or roads to the neighbouring countries fully upgraded and rehabilitated 
5.% of all villages connected by all-weather roads 
6.Index on the progress of the process of completion of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) compliance for Kabul and Herat Airports 
7.% of households having access to safe water supply in Kabul 
8.% of households having access to piped water supply in other major urban areas except Kabul 
9.% of households having access to sanitation facilities in Kabul 
10.% of households having access to sanitation facilities in other major urban areas except Kabul 
11.Index on the progress of providing increased availability of affordable shelter 
(Corresponding) Selected Indicators: 
 
% of h/h electrified in urban areas 
 As of 2010 the Afghan Electrical Power Authority (DABS) reported a total of 786,302 customers nationally; of these, 454,098 were located in Kabul Herat or Kandahar. This represents approximately 70% of the 
households in Kabul. 
 Demand in Kabul has tripled over the past five years and is rising each year. Samadi estimates Afghanistan will need around 3,000 megawatts (MW) to meet the country's needs by 2020, compared with current 
supply of around 600 MW.
62
 
 
% of h/h electrified in rural areas 
 
 Access to electricity in rural areas is very limited; some estimates put it at 7% of the total Afghanistan population. (There are no reliable estimates of rural electricity coverage). Sources of power, except for those 
villages in the close proximity of the grid, are micro hydro power, private diesel generation, candles, batteries, solar lanterns and hurricane lamps for light and biomass for cooking.
63
 
 
% of non-residential consumers provided electricity 
 
 In 2010 DABS reported a total of 70,688 non-residential customers on the electrical grid.64  
 
 
                                                 
62. Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), Downloaded from http://www.dabs.af/en/. 
63. United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/South Asia Regional Initiative for Energy, Downloaded from http://www.sari-
energy.org/PageFiles/Countries/Afghanistan_Energy_detail.asp#generation. 
64. Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), Downloaded from http://www.dabs.af/en/. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
% of target 3263 km of regional highways or roads to the neighbouring countries fully upgraded and rehabilitated 
 
 By the end of 2008, some 86% of the regional road network was operational, with the remainder to be completed by 2010. Work was under way or funding confirmed for the remaining regional roads, with the 
exception of a 50 km section east of Herat. The improved roads include almost 2,100 km (63%) of regional roads,650 km (14%) of national roads; and 6,000 km (22.5%) of provincial and rural roads.
65
 
 
% of all villages connected by all-weather roads 
 
 Proportion of households within 2 km distance from drivable road; (urban, rural, Kuchi), national (93.9, 65.7, 60.9) National Avg = 70.766 
 
Index on the progress of the process of completion of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) compliance for Kabul and Herat Airports 
 
 Italy has pledged 137 million Euros for the expansion of the Herat airport, the second largest after Kabul airport.67 
 Implementation of Kabul International Airport Transition Plan: The objective of this project, funded by the Government of Afghanistan, was to enhance the capability of the Ministry of Transport and Civil 
Aviation (MoTCA) to take over responsibility for the management, operation and maintenance of those facilities and services at Kabul International Airport that will be transferred from the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to MoTCA at the end of the transitional period covered by the project. This project, which began in December 2007, was extended through 
March 2011 and is now completed.
68
 
 Flight Safety Oversight: The objective of this project, funded by the Government of Afghanistan, was to enhance the flight safety oversight capability of the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (MoTCA). 
This project, which began in September 2008, was extended through February 2011 and is now completed.
69
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% of h/h having access to safe water supply in Kabul 
% of h/h having access to piped water supply in other major urban areas except Kabul 
 
 Proportion of population using an improved drinking water source in all urban areas was 58.1 percent70 
                                                 
65. Asian Development Bank, Development Effectiveness Brief – Afghanistan, 2010. 
66. Afghan Central Statistics Organization, National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 2007/2008. 
67. Afghanistan, Office of the President, News Release, 17 December 2011, Downloaded from http://president.gov.af/en/news/5577. 
68. International Civil Aviation Organization, Annual Report of the Council 2011. 
69. Ibid. 
70. Afghan Central Statistics Organization, National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 2007/2008. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
 
% of h/h having access to sanitation facilities in Kabul 
% of h/h having access to sanitation facilities in other major urban areas except Kabul 
 
 Proportion of population using an improved sanitation facility was 37% nationally; there was no change between 2007 and 201071 
 
Index on the progress of providing increased availability of affordable shelter 
 
 Proportion of urban population living in slums was 92.8 percent72 
 Proportion of households with secure tenure was 56.2 percent73 
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect SED3 was partially achieved by 2011. 
Social and 
Economic 
Development 
SED4 National emergency response 
capability established 
Nation prepared for disaster 
management. 
Index on the progress of putting 
plans, systems and mechanisms in 
place at all levels for disaster 
management. 
Under assessment By end 2010, an effective system of 
disaster preparedness and response 
will be in place. 
                                                 
71. World Bank Institute, Worldwide Governance Indicators, Country Data Report for Afghanistan, 1996-2010. 
72. Ibid. 
73. Ibid. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
 SED4 Evaluation  ANDS Indicator: Index on the progress of putting plans, systems and mechanisms in place at all levels for Disaster Management. 
 
Selected Indicators:  
 
1.Long-term capacity development for risk and vulnerability reduction has not been adequately addressed by the Afghan government and the international community. Accordingly, significant 
capacity development is still required within existing institutions of the Afghan government, specifically the Afghan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), the main institution 
focused on managing natural disaster prevention, preparedness and emergency response.
74
 
2.The failure to closely link the work of humanitarian and development actors in Afghanistan has caused challenges associated with recurrent environmental hazards to persist. Limited snow and 
rainfall during the past winter and spring caused a slow-onset drought, which affected the food security of people in 14 provinces in 2011. The drought (which is the eighth in 11 years) reflects the 
critical importance of implementing not just short-term humanitarian relief but also longer-term resilience-building measures. It prompted the revision of the 2011 Consolidated Appeal (CAP) on 
2 October 2011 to include US$2142 million to ensure immediate assistance to affected people through September 2012.
75
 
 
Quote: “The revised National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP) takes into account the current status of risks, in terms of hazards, vulnerability, infrastructure availability, institutional capacities and 
constitutional clarity in Afghanistan. In accordance, it provides procedures that may be implemented with immediate effect and subsequently upgraded as more resources become available and capacities 
of stakeholders get built. Its immediate purpose is to bring about greater role-clarity and coordination amongst national level disaster response agencies. The Plan needs to be followed up with elaborate 
and long-term interventions as the country’s capacity grows. Detailed risk analysis needs to be carried out for this. It strives to be the starting point of a long-term exercise (in line with Hyogo Framework 
for Action 2005–2015) that will ensure efficiency in disaster risk reduction in all sectors and at all levels in the country. Such an exercise will need to go down to the grassroots and work with 
communities.”76 
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that ISAF Desired Effect SED4 was partially achieved by 2011. 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PILLAR EVALUATION 
 
ISAF Desired Effects SED1, SED2 and SED3 were evaluated as not having been achieved by 2011, although SED4 was partially achieved. Given the centrality of these indicators to the human conditions in Afghanistan, 
the failure to progress in these areas seriously compromised the pillar and ensured that the overall campaign outcome could not be achieved.  
 
Based on the indicators selected, it may be evaluated that this pillar was not achieved by 2011. 
                                                 
74. United Nations Operations (UNOPS), Downloaded from http://www.unops.org/ENGLISH/WHATWEDO/LOCATIONS/EUROPE/AFGHANISTAN-OPERATIONS-CENTRE. 
75. United Nations, 2012 Consolidated Appeal. 
76. Afghan National Disaster Management Plan, 2010. 
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Pillar ISAF Desired Effect ANDS Expected Outcome ANDS Indicators ANDS Baseline ANDS Target 
SUMMARY EVALUATION 
 
Given the lack of significant achievement across all pillars studied in this analysis, it is clear that the overall condition of Afghanistan did not advance in accordance with either the ISAF-desired effects or the expected 
outcomes of the Afghan national government as articulated in the ANDS during the period under study. While the ANSF increased dramatically in size, and some indicators of governance and the economy have improved, 
this is generally attributed to significant levels of external aid and the presence of the international community in various forms. As such, the concern going forward is the ability and capacity of the indigenous government 
to maintain these gains and build upon them. That said, the summary evaluation of the country must remain as one of a failing, if not failed state, and this is the common conclusion of three leading international evaluation 
instruments for 2012: the UNDP Human Development Index; the Fund for Peace Failed State Index and the Carlton University Indicators for Foreign Policy Report. 
 
The UNDP Human Development Report publishes the Human Development Index (HDI) which was introduced as an alternative to conventional measures of national development, such as level of income and the rate of 
economic growth. The HDI represents a push for a broader definition of well-being and provides a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education and income. Afghanistan’s HDI is 
0.398, which gives the country a rank of 172 out of 187 countries with comparable data. The HDI of South Asia as a region increased from 0.356 in 1980 to 0.548 today, placing Afghanistan below the regional average.
77
 
 
The Failed States Index (FSI), produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state 
towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, the FSI—and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built—makes political risk assessment and early 
warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large. 
 
In 2006, the Fund for Peace Failed State Index conferred a score of 99.8 on Afghanistan placing it at number 10 overall (1 being worst, 144 being best in 2006). This score positioned the country within the “warning” 
category. Between 2006 and 2012, Afghanistan fell to number 7 with a score of 107.5 and this downward trend continued in the 2012 with Afghanistan falling one more position to number 6; this score is worse than Haiti 
and Yemen and places the country in “high alert” status with only Somalia and the Congo in “very high alert” status.78 The FSI 2012 Summary for Afghanistan is as follows: “Afghanistan’s dire security conditions make it 
one of the most dangerous countries in the world. With a whole host of pressure groups—from drug lords to the power-hungry Taliban—Afghanistan’s central government in Kabul faces many threats to its stability and 
permanence. About 80% of civilian deaths were attributed to the Taliban’s militant campaign in 2011, with the numbers increasing over 2010 figures. The lack of political cohesion exacerbates the government’s inability 
to provide for its citizens. As major portions of the Afghani society prescribe to nomadic and traditional ideals, many do not view Kabul as the primary authority over national politics. Additionally, the provision of public 
services and economic development outside of populated areas are severely underdeveloped, which will likely remain so until Afghani security conditions ameliorate. It remains to be seen what effect the 2014 NATO 
withdrawal will have, especially given Kabul’s high dependence on the assistance of external actors.”79 
 
The Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carlton University Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Report provides a global fragility ranking for 2011 for 197 countries. The global rankings indicate that the 
most fragile country in 2011 was Somalia, followed closely by Afghanistan. Their study of the evolution of fragility over a period of 1980 to 2010 indicates countries that are stuck in a “fragility trap,” those that move in 
and out of fragility and those that have successfully exited fragility in the last decade or so; Afghanistan has remained constantly in the top 20 persistent fragile states for the entire period of analysis, and there is no 
indication that this is likely to change for the foreseeable future.
80
   In summary, Afghanistan may be evaluated as a failing, if not failed, state and that state-building initiatives by NATO and other entities failed to 
achieve their objectives. More specifically, the desired end state of the 2006 ISAF campaign design was not achieved nor were most of the expected outcomes of the ANDS. 
                                                 
77. UNDP Human Development Report 2012. 
78. Fund For Peace Failed State Index, 2006 and 2012. 
79. Ibid. 
80. Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carlton University Ottawa, Canada, Assessing State Fragility – A Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Report, June 15 2012. 
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Chapter 5: NATO and the Effect of Strategic Failure in Afghanistan 
 
Aim 
 
Having now analysed and assessed NATO’s Comprehensive Approach strategy in some 
detail, this chapter seeks to answer the following question: if it has been demonstrated 
that NATO failed to achieve its strategic objective in Afghanistan, what does this imply 
for the Comprehensive Approach as strategy and what are the potential impacts of this 
failure for NATO going forward? 
 
NATO in International Society 
 
The challenges posed by fragile, failing and failed states were identified as “the main 
security challenge of our time.”1 Whether this proves to be prescient or not, there is no 
doubt that the number of states which qualify for inclusion in that unfortunate club 
remains distressingly high.
2
 Of the several cases which have confronted the international 
community in the past decade, Afghanistan has come to epitomize this challenge, given 
the duration, scale and cost (both human and financial) of the Western intervention, 
which was initiated in 2001. Even though it is not yet entirely clear what the future of 
Afghanistan holds, it is clear that while the operational objectives to overthrow the 
Taliban and eliminate the Afghan-based al-Qaeda threat were achieved, the strategic 
objective of transforming the Afghan state into a secure, stable and prosperous one was 
not, and the potential for future re-emergence of the Taliban and their terroristic allies 
remains high, as does the potential for civil war following the withdrawal of Western 
military forces in 2014 or later.
3
 
 
                                                 
1. Robert Gates, “Helping Others to Help Themselves,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (May–June 
2010): 2. 
2. See the Fund for Peace Failed State Index for a detailed overview of the “club,” 
http://ffp.statesindex.org. 
3. See, for example, Anthony Cordesman, http://csis.org/publication/afghanistan-real-world-
choices-staying-or-leaving.  
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Suhrke argued that two visions for post-2014 Afghanistan were possible: the first rooted 
in a long-term partnership between NATO and Afghanistan as declared at the 2012 Bonn 
Conference; the second rooted in a “Heart of Asia” strategy in which “Afghanistan’s 
security and development are anchored in a regional web of co-operation among 
countries that identify themselves as Afghanistan’s ‘near and extended neighbours’”4 and 
which does not include any form of permanent Western military presence. At time of 
writing, it was not clear if either of these visions were being actively pursued or if 
frequent statements about NATO’s ongoing engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2014 
were sufficient to dispel the abandonment narrative, which claims that “Western nations 
must not again abandon Afghanistan as they did after 1989. From this narrative flows the 
conclusion that Western military engagement has been, and will continue to be, a 
stabilising force.”5  
 
Rich makes a link between the choice of some form of continuous engagement or 
complete disengagement from Afghanistan and a potential shift in the strategic posture of 
Western states in terms of their domestic approach to counter-terrorism. His concern is 
that a complete disengagement from Afghanistan would signal the end of the war on 
terror (in the sense that it was being conducted “over there”) and that the focus would 
shift to “an intense counterinsurgent campaign against Islamic militants in Western cities, 
leading to a de facto militarisation of security policy, a heightening of domestic 
surveillance, and a likely further diminution of civil liberties in the process.”6 To the 
extent that aspects of all of these trends have been arguably ongoing for some time, the 
final disposition of Western in forces in Afghanistan is not likely to have the direct effect 
he proposes.  
 
A more vexing, and more probable, challenge potentially precipitated by a total Western 
disengagement relates to the size and capabilities of the Afghan Security Forces at the 
point of disengagement. To the extent these forces are unable resist a concerted offensive 
                                                 
4. Astri Suhrke, “Towards 2014 and beyond: NATO, Afghanistan and the “Heart of Asia,” 
Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, NOREF Policy Brief (August 2012), 1. 
5. Ibid, 7. 
6. Paul B. Rich, “Counterinsurgency or a war on terror? The war in Afghanistan and the debate on 
Western strategy,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 21, no.2 (2010): 415. 
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from indigenous or foreign insurgents, this risks the country reverting back to pre-2001 
status. This, however, is only one aspect of this challenge in that the ANSF itself may 
become engaged in internal conflict as various powerbrokers, aligned along ethnic or 
tribal lines, attempt to re-assert their former prominence. As Thruelsen explains:  
An early transition of security responsibility in a fragile political 
environment would be risky and needs to be anchored in more long-
term programmes offered as part of the SSR package. Otherwise one 
might simply end up creating more informally empowered structures 
that fill the vacuum left by the departure of the international forces, 
but which are accountable to neither the local population nor the 
host nation.
7
 
 
Chellaney’s focus is less fixed on external sources of security for the country and more 
concerned with the potential for outright partition of Afghanistan along tribal, ethnic 
and/or linguistic lines. He posits that such divisions are already the de facto condition in 
Iraq and Libya and that a partition of Afghanistan may further destabilize the region. He 
opines:  
With a war-exhausted United States having run out of patience, 
outside forces are in no position to prevent Afghanistan’s partition 
along Iraqi or post-Yugoslav lines, with the bloodiest battles 
expected to rage over control of ethnically mixed strategic areas, 
including Kabul. In this scenario, Pakistani generals, instead of 
continuing to sponsor Afghan Pashtun militant groups such as the 
Taliban and their allies such as the Haqqani network, would be 
compelled to fend off a potentially grave threat to Pakistan’s unity.8 
 
Such potentially dire outcomes underscore the reality that the West’s and, more 
specifically, NATO’s failure to achieve its strategic state-building objectives in 
Afghanistan are far-reaching and of greater significance than to that country alone. As an 
institutional experiment in out-of-area operations, the Afghan experience exposed 
                                                 
7. Peter Dahl Thruelsen, “Security sector stabilisation in counterinsurgency operations: the case of 
Afghanistan,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 22, no.4 (2011): 629. 
8. Brahma Chellaney, “Afghanistan’s looming partition – it may be time to think outside the 
borders,” Article in the Washington Times, July 9, 2013, accessed 5 September 2013; available from 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/8/afghanistans-looming-partition/?page=1. 
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differences amongst Alliance members across a number of significant dimensions, 
including risk tolerance and force generation capacity, and there is a burgeoning 
analytical industry concerned with the impact of NATO’s failure in Afghanistan on the 
Alliance itself going forward. While this line of inquiry is indeed worthy of study, a 
second, and arguably more important, inquiry concerns how its failure in Afghanistan 
will impact NATO’s approach to future crisis management scenarios based on two 
assumptions—first, that such crisis management scenarios will continue to manifest in 
the international security environment due to the already cited prevalence of fragile, 
failing and failed states, and second, that while the Afghan experience has indeed had a 
deleterious impact on the Alliance and will potentially constrain its range of options 
going forward, the Alliance itself will survive as a viable entity and will be called upon to 
respond in some fashion to future crises.
9
  
 
In order to assess the impact of NATO’s failure to achieve its strategic objective in 
Afghanistan and specifically the failure of the Comprehensive Approach strategy which 
was at the core of the Alliance efforts to build the Afghan state, it is necessary to 
recognize that NATO has evolved from a traditional military alliance based on a clearly 
identified threat to one in which members now view their participation as one facet of a 
less tightly bound security policy menu. That menu provides members with options to 
participate with varying levels of commitment to Alliance operations, as they seek to 
pursue security policy agendas sometimes with or through NATO, sometimes with or 
through smaller groups of states that may or may not also be members of NATO, or 
outside the Alliance sphere altogether.
10
 At the same time, the size of the Alliance has 
increased, and this has resulted in both a widening of the range of capabilities that 
members may (or may not) contribute and a greater divergence of opinion as to the role 
of the Alliance in the evolved security environment. In spite, or perhaps as a result, of 
this trend, the institutional dimension of the Alliance has developed into a highly 
                                                 
9. For example, NATO was requested by the US to lead the campaign to protect Libyan citizens 
under assault by the Gadhafi regime in 2011. 
10. An example would be Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in 2011 (Libya) in which several 
Alliance members, notably Germany, refused to participate, while several non-NATO states were heavily 
involved. Also, the French mission to Mali in 2013 was undertaken outside of NATO, and the mission was 
eventually turned over to the UN as a peacekeeping mission with other organizations, including the EU, 
overseeing a training mission that included UK troops.  
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complex and sophisticated bureaucracy with large headquarters, large staffs as well as 
operating rules and standards which address a vast array of subjects. 
 
While membership and institutional facets are important lenses through which to assess 
the evolved complexion of the Alliance, they are inherently elastic in nature, as it is 
conceivable to imagine both increased and (less likely) decreased membership levels as 
well as institutional transformations resulting from internal necessities or external 
pressures. Of a more enduring nature, and arguably more germane to this thesis, is an 
appreciation of the Alliance as a type of community operating on a common set of values 
and norms.  
 
According to Williams, the realist reluctance to acknowledge the social creation of reality 
puts NATO at a disadvantage. He argued, as Kitchen did, that NATO was always more 
than just a military alliance and that it was also a social creation with a clear values base 
related to “democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”11 This, in turn, would 
generate the requirement to define “new interpretations of international political norms 
and international law”12 in order to address the contemporary security environment. 
 
The concept of a generic international society is differentiated from the idea of human 
society as a whole or a specific society in a given state. An international society consists 
of a group of states that have opted to be associated with one another because, in so 
doing, it is deemed beneficial for them. While this reason could be based solely on 
defensive or security requirements, the strength of a self-defining international society is 
that it not only creates opportunities to generate concrete benefits for the participants but 
may also be reflective of the core values of the participating states, and as a result, a 
values-based international society is more likely to endure. In this sense, the 
conceptualization of NATO as an exemplar of an international society based on set of 
                                                 
11. Williams, NATO, Security and Risk Management, 39. 
12. Ibid, 121. 
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common values and norms is, therefore, arguably the key determinant for how the 
Alliance may be expected to act over time.
13
 
 
Having identified NATO as a unique international society, the question then turns to how 
it can both respond to and shape other international societies or individual states that 
potentially threaten the security of the Alliance community. In the Cold War version of 
the Alliance, the answer to this question was relatively straightforward, in that the 
essential role of the Alliance was to respond with military force to threats from potential 
aggressors, specifically the Soviet Union; this recalls the role of the Alliance as a 
defensive organization. Considering the post-Cold War version of the Alliance, we now 
see the organization operating as a form of security manager, responding to a wide range 
of complex threats from both state and non-state actors.
14
 
 
With respect to threats that are deemed to emanate from fragile, failing and failed states, 
the NATO community does not permit membership to such entities within its own 
community; therefore, these types of problematic states are outside of that community. 
While it would perhaps be a fruitful study to identify and analyse the dominant values 
and norms of such states in order to identify potential causality between those values and 
norms and the linkage to state fragility, for the purpose of this exercise, it may simply be 
noted that, for whatever reason, such states will not likely embody the values and norms 
identified with the Alliance community. Here again, while this supposition is not 
designed to ascribe a level of uniformity across all Alliance members, the overall picture 
will be one of a group of states that are essentially liberal, democratic and supporting 
market-driven economies.
15
  
 
The Effect of Strategic Failure on NATO 
 
I turn now to the potential impacts and implications of NATO’s strategic failure in 
Afghanistan with a view to understanding how the Alliance’s experience in that setting 
                                                 
13. NATO, “Multiple Futures Project—Navigating Towards 2030: Findings and 
Recommendations,” accessed 5 September 2013; available from 
www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/20090503_MFP_finalrep.pdf, 8. 
14. Webber, Sperling and Smith, 39. 
15. The evolving political environment in Turkey may present a challenge to this theory. 
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may influence future choices concerning crisis management, generally, and the 
engagement with fragile, failing and failed states, specifically. Deliberation over how the 
Afghan experience may influence the Alliance going forward may be assessed in a 
context of three predominant analytical frameworks.  
 
The first relates to the ongoing debate over the status of the Alliance as one that is strong 
and enduring or weak and in decline. As the literature is replete with arguments that 
support both conclusions, it may be posited that factors affecting these latent trajectories 
remain complex and the ultimate fate of the Alliance uncertain. That it has survived as a 
viable entity through numerous crises and over a significant period of time (a unique feat 
in the history of alliances) would suggest that—while the impact of this latest crisis, the 
strategic failure in Afghanistan, will certainly influence the Alliance going forward— it is 
unlikely that it will be the decisive cause of Alliance disintegration. 
 
The second relates to the role of the Alliance in the evolved security environment, in 
particular, its ability and willingness to act as manager of security crises on a global basis 
or remain as a defensive alliance focused on the European theatre. This question, and the 
factors which are likely to influence the decision, is not a result of the Afghan experience 
alone but includes other shifts and drivers in the international security environment, 
including the grand strategic shift from offensive to defensive liberalism, the US pivot 
towards the Asia–Pacific region, the so-called “Arab Spring” as well as the state of the 
global economy in general, and the Euro-centric crisis, in particular. 
 
The third relates to the ability of the Alliance to generate the capacity required to operate 
in the complex security environment and, if not, how to maintain relevance and 
legitimacy going forward. This issue raises the possibility that the primary threat to the 
Alliance is not external, but internal, and implicates the ability of the Alliance to maintain 
and build upon nascent relationships developed as a result of its Afghan experience ( i.e., 
how to leverage that experience and those relationships such that the Alliance may 
contribute to the international crisis management “team” without exposing members to 
choices that risk participation in NATO operations and, therefore, weaken the Alliance). 
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Of vital importance are the role of the US as provider of much of the capacity required to 
operate out of area and the potential impact of “cross-Atlantic fatigue.”16 
 
These frameworks—status, role, and relevance—both influence and are influenced by the 
Alliance experience in Afghanistan. As the Afghan mission evolved towards a state-
building project it not only consumed the Alliance (which recognized the importance of 
the mission to its reputation) but exposed internal rifts and generated frictions amongst 
Alliance members.
17
 Divisive issues (such as burden sharing, caveats, casualties and 
differing conceptions of the mission) suggest that at least two theories surrounding these 
problems may be offered. The first would suggest that the Afghan mission simply 
illustrated the degree to which the Alliance was not structured, resourced or otherwise 
prepared to operationalize the strategic concepts that it had adopted following the end of 
the Cold War, in other words, that the Afghan mission brought these shortcomings into 
fruition. The second would suggest that tensions, disparities and disagreements amongst 
Alliance members were characteristic of the Alliance from its inception and that the 
Afghan mission merely exposed these latent factors in an accentuated fashion.
18
 
 
In either case, the failed state-building project in Afghanistan has impacted the Alliance 
in numerous respects. For example, while some observers have suggested that NATO’s 
strategic failure in Afghanistan may trigger the end of the Alliance itself,
19
 it is unclear 
the degree to which NATO’s willingness to operate out of area and subsequently engage 
in the Afghan state- building project is truly reflective of a committed long-term policy, 
or if its failure to achieve its strategic objectives in this scenario is a one-off, albeit 
humbling, experience.  
 
While the breakup of the Alliance remains unlikely, the Afghanistan mission exposed 
serious rifts between various members within the Alliance and between the Alliance and 
                                                 
16. Charles Barry and Hans Binnendijk, “Widening Gaps in US and European Defense 
Capabilities and Cooperation,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, Transatlantic Current (July 2012): 
11. 
17. Osinga, Frans and James A. Russell in Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James A. Russell, eds., 
Military Adaptation in Afghanistan. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013, 312. 
18. Tarn D. Warn, “ISAF and Afghanistan – The Impact of Failure on NATO’s Future,” Joint 
Forces Quarterly, NDU Press, Issue 59 (4
th
 Quarter 2010): 50. 
19. See for example, Richard E. Rupp, NATO after 9/11 – An Alliance in Continuing Decline (NY: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2006). 
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the US. These rifts are based primarily on internal debates regarding the types of 
missions NATO should be engaged in and a lack of capacity to deal with the most 
pressing issues which, in turn, calls into question the relevance of the organization. This 
may be characterized largely as a collective defense versus global security debate writ 
large.
20
 This debate gives rise to three potential scenarios for how the Alliance may be 
affected by its experience in Afghanistan. 
 
The first scenario implicates the framework of NATO’s future status, as the Alliance may 
be seen in America as a weakened military alliance that cannot be trusted to defend the 
West’s interests (as America sees them), and the US may elect to act in crisis situations 
without the involvement of NATO (as it did immediately following 9/11). It may, 
therefore, reduce or withhold the types of technology and support the Alliance requires to 
operate in the future security environment, and this would constrain the ability of the 
Alliance to participate in such ventures or require the Alliance itself or European 
members to acquire the necessary resources.
21
 This scenario is exacerbated by the US 
pivot towards the Asia–Pacific region, which is viewed by the US as a potential focus for 
future conflict due to the rise of Chinese economic and military power and the presence 
of several unresolved political and territorial disputes. This was underscored by Jamie 
Shea who stated: 
NATO members will have to come to terms with these strategic 
game changes, obvious from the moment that China emerged as the 
first non-democratic global economic superpower for several 
centuries … . The bad news, however, is that the U.S. pivot occurs 
at a time when the Europeans face a number of security headaches in 
their neighborhood (Mali, Sahel, Middle East, Balkans, Gulf of 
Guinea, Gulf of Aden, etc.) that will certainly obligate European 
NATO members to preserve a certain number of operational forces 
in order to respond to these pressing challenges, instead of the 
temptation of restructuring their armed forces that could have been 
felt after 2014 and the end of the NATO operation in Afghanistan.
22
 
                                                 
20. Williams, NATO, Security and Risk Management, 123. 
21. Kashmeri, 142. 
22. Jamie Shea, “NATO and the U.S. Pivot to Asia: To Follow or Not to Follow?,” German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Security Task Force Series, Policy Brief (May 2013), 2. 
Mr. Shea is NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges. 
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Cuccia extended the analysis of potential NATO futures to emphasize the central role of 
the US in the Alliance and he outlined four potential scenarios:  
Scenario A: US leadership relationship with NATO continues on 
the same path;  
Scenario B: US  leadership in NATO increases; 
Scenario C: EU leadership in NATO increases; and 
Scenario D: The NATO Alliance breaks apart.
23
  
 
With respect to Scenario D, this could manifest if US national security interests diverge 
from the Alliance and if the European members develop diverse individual concepts for 
their own or collective security or defensive requirements. Given the combination of the 
US strategic pivot towards Asia–Pacific and the struggles arising out of the “European 
project,” such a future cannot be entirely discounted. In order to forestall this eventuality, 
it would logically appear to necessitate that one of the remaining three scenarios plays 
out. An alternative possibility exists wherein a re-balancing of leadership between the US 
and European allies occurs and the Alliance acquires additional capacities from non-US 
members; this would obviously require a re-invigorated Euro-zone and a significant 
improvement in European finances. If such changes are not possible, the Alliance may 
yet survive but be reduced to a “paralyzed political forum.”24  
 
The second scenario implicates the framework of NATO’s role in that Alliance members 
may be reluctant to take up new risks that are not seen as a direct threat to the Alliance 
and its members. As observed by Hoehn and Harting “the Alliance’s new strategic 
concept will undoubtedly seek to balance NATO’s various roles at home and abroad, but 
there should be little doubt that, for the time being, NATO’s focus will be at home. The 
away game appears to be beyond NATO’s reach.”25 If such an attitude prevails, it will 
reduce the Alliance’s opportunity to function as an important secondary institution in the 
                                                 
23. Cuccia, 30–34. 
24. Martynas Zapolskis, “NATO Transformation Scenarios,” Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, 
Chapter 3 (2009–2010), 72. 
25. Andrew R. Hoehn and Sarah Harting, Risking NATO: Testing the Limits of the Alliance in 
Afghanistan (Santa Monica CA, RAND, 2010), 76. 
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international security environment and could shift the emphasis back to a purely 
defensive alliance.
26
 This scenario is described by Wendling as a “worst case” in that: 
NATO would experience strong dissent about its future 
engagements. No doubt it would continue to exist, because many 
European countries have hardly any alternative for their defence, but 
would have to refocus on the defence of its territory and the vital 
interests of its member countries. On the other hand, there would 
undoubtedly be no more new wide scale operations outside allied 
territory. This would obviously profoundly affect transatlantic 
relations, and probably open the way for new cooperation 
configurations between the European countries and the United 
States, with consequences that are difficult to foresee in terms of the 
cohesion of the Europeans.
27
 
 
The third scenario implicates the relevance of the Alliance going forward. It is possible 
that the problems the Alliance encountered in Afghanistan were symptomatic of 
problems existing within NATO and not necessarily related to the specific Afghan 
setting. These problems were fuelled by increasingly divergent conceptions of world 
order and belief in the efficacy of military force amongst the allies.
28
 In order to 
overcome this conceptual/policy gridlock, the Alliance must choose to remain primarily a 
means of organizing military force on behalf of the UN in only limited scenarios or 
acquire a broader set of capabilities to transform the organization into one able to 
participate in a wider range of missions on a global basis.
29
  
 
While it has been argued that “NATO will continue down the path of global 
engagement,”30 evolving conditions may militate against this, including aging 
populations; a growing Muslim population in many European allied nations; a lack of 
financial capacity to acquire the technology, equipment and transportation means 
                                                 
26. Williams, The Good War, 139. 
27. Dr. Cecile Wendling, The effects of managing the crisis in Afghanistan on the future of NATO, 
paper presented at the SGIR 7
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 Pan-European International Relations Conference (Stockholm, September, 
9–11, 2010), 12. 
28. Williams, NATO, Security and Risk Management, 114. 
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necessary for such operations;
31
 and the changing nature of conflict, which calls into 
question the “common understanding of what constitutes an Article 5 attack.”32 
 
So while it is highly probable that NATO will continue to exist as a viable entity, it is 
clear that its failure to achieve its strategic objective in Afghanistan may constrain its 
ability and willingness to operate outside its traditional European theatre or play a 
significant role in future complex crisis scenarios. While an analysis of NATO’s status 
following this failure could be suggestive of an alliance in decline, operations undertaken 
in Libya and Turkey
33
 and a stated commitment to Afghanistan’s post-2014 security 
would indicate that this is not necessarily the case.  
 
With respect to NATO’s role going forward, the argument that it must choose between 
remaining a purely defensive alliance focused on territorial defence of its traditional 
European theatre or evolve into a globally focused security manager excludes the 
potentiality of the Alliance accepting both responsibilities. While constrained resources 
would presuppose a focus on the defensive role, the complexity of the international 
security environment and extant threats posed by both state and non-state actors cannot 
be ignored, and it is likely that it is not a question of if the Alliance will respond to these 
threats, but how.  
 
This then implicates the issue of Alliance relevance going forward. If it unwilling or 
unable to respond effectively to these threats, individual nations or coalitions of the 
willing will address them, and the Alliance may become but one (infrequently used) 
option in a wider array of security instruments. This recalls the earlier discussion of the 
temporality of membership and institutional factors and downplays, however, the 
importance of values and norms which remain the core strength of the Alliance and the 
most likely factor to influence future Alliance actions.
34
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Conclusion 
 
In order to address the multifaceted and multi-disciplinary nature of this inquiry, the 
thesis sought answers to the following questions: 
 
What is the Comprehensive Approach, where did it come from 
and why was it viewed as a viable strategy to address fragile, 
failing and failed states? 
Why did NATO choose to adopt the Comprehensive Approach 
as its primary strategy in Afghanistan?  
What evidence may be identified to argue that the strategy 
failed? 
If the evidence for failure is compelling, is it possible to 
understand why the strategy failed in the Afghan setting?  
What are the implications for this failure for the Alliance going 
forward? 
 
Defining and conceptually situating the Comprehensive Approach was undertaken in the 
context of a literature review that opted to present and analyse the strategy as both a pure 
model of exogenous state building and as a formalized strategy adopted by NATO in 
Afghanistan in order to secure, stabilize, reconstruct and develop the country between 
approximately 2006 and 2011.  
 
With the end of the Cold War, the balance of threat model dissipated with the expiration 
of the Soviet empire and previously muted intra-state conflicts emerged in Europe, 
Africa, Asia and elsewhere. From these, the emergence of fragile, failing and failed states 
prompted the West, and the US in particular, to adopt an offensive liberalist grand 
strategy whereby the relatively unrestrained power of the US and its NATO allies could 
be utilized to enforce compliance in the international security environment by means of 
direct military intervention in order to force transition towards an acceptable state model 
in the Western cast. This was the approach undertaken in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 
2003, and these two state-building projects epitomized the conceptualization and 
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manifestation of integrated approaches, that is, the application of instruments of national 
or alliance power, both military and civilian, to transform an object state into an 
acceptable member of the international community. While the Comprehensive Approach 
was deemed highly innovative, various antecedent concepts, including civil-military 
cooperation, the effects-based approach to operations and counter-insurgency, had 
previously addressed theoretical and pragmatic aspects of state building.  
 
As a model, the comprehensive approach was reasoned to be the appropriate strategic 
choice for addressing weaknesses inherent in fragile, failing and failed states, given that it 
aimed to “promote the external and internal coordination of policy instruments and the 
coherence of objectives between different actors,”1 including military forces and all other 
organizations, agencies or actors engaged in an intervention (including the “host nation”), 
practices which appeared to be lacking in earlier interventions undertaken by NATO and 
other Western nations. The model called for effective interaction of actors operating at 
the same tactical, operational or strategic level as well as effective interaction between 
these levels. While no single, agreed definition of a comprehensive approach was 
universally adopted, similar language and concepts appeared in national and supra-
national variants of the model, and it was generally conceded that any conceptual or 
pragmatic deficiencies in it will and must be overcome; a conclusion not borne out by 
this thesis. 
  
With respect to NATO’s adoption of the Comprehensive Approach as its primary strategy 
in Afghanistan, this may be approached from at least three perspectives. First, it may be 
considered a logical institutional response, which was linked to its decision to accept 
responsibility for the ISAF mission in the first instance. That decision was the result of a 
combination of external and internal pressures (including the desire of the US to handoff 
Afghanistan to a reliable partner such that the evidently more pressing issue of Iraq could 
be addressed) and the fact that various Alliance members were already engaged in 
Afghanistan and pressing NATO to bring in additional players in order to spread the 
leadership burden. Once the decision to accept leadership of ISAF was taken, NATO 
found itself at the helm of a complex mission to stabilize the country, and by 2006, 
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Afghanistan had risen to the top of NATO’s priorities. During the Riga Summit of that 
year, a commitment was made to the Afghan government to support its reconstruction 
and development objectives as a means of building indigenous Afghan capacity, and 
these objectives were incorporated into the ISAF campaign design. 
 
Second, the Comprehensive Approach as NATO strategy evolved out of extant state-
building theories which built on Alliance and national-level experiences in the former 
Yugoslavia and elsewhere as well as on earlier concepts and models that the Alliance had 
adopted formally or informally, particularly civil-military cooperation (for which NATO 
had developed doctrine) and the effects-based approach to operations (for which NATO 
was developing doctrine). State- building theory itself rested on assumptions embedded 
in the West’s extant grand strategy of offensive liberalism which posited that fragile, 
failing and failed states could be transformed into compliant and acceptable members of 
the international community if the state could achieve a reasonable level of maturity 
within its security, governance, economic and social pillars. To the extent an object state 
could be transformed into one that was based on fundamental liberal principles, it was 
assumed that this would be sufficient to ensure that it would not countenance conditions 
that would be harmful to its own population or pose threats to the larger international 
community. In this sense, NATO’s adoption of the Comprehensive Approach to state 
building in Afghanistan was entirely consistent with theories which were prevalent and 
largely accepted in academic, development and policy spheres. 
 
The third perspective was NATO acting on commonly held ideals and norms; the 
Comprehensive Approach arguably represented the embodiment of those ideals and 
norms and supported views held by various Alliance members, which perceived the 
Afghan mission through a humanitarian lens. By the time NATO accepted command of 
ISAF in 2003, the Taliban threat had all but disappeared, and ISAF was regarded not as a 
combat mission but as one that stressed the provision of stability such that reconstruction 
and development action could occur. The PRT model, which combined both civilian and 
military assets, was already in existence and operating in limited areas of the country, and 
this model appealed to various Alliance members who saw an opportunity to 
simultaneously support NATO and “show the national flag” in a positive light. For those 
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nations which were particularly concerned with the domestic political implications of a 
potential combat mission (Germany is a prime example), the opportunity to establish 
PRTs in the relatively benign northern or western sectors of the country represented the 
perfect balance of participation and risk management.  
 
This idealist explanation for NATO’s willingness to participate in the Afghan state-
building project must, however, be tempered with an appreciation that some Alliance 
members were opposed to the US pursuit of a global war on terror and were reluctant to 
participate in the Afghan mission, which was ostensibly its first major engagement. 
Several Alliance members refused to participate in the US coalition of the willing in Iraq 
and some, like Canada, preferred to support NATO’s Afghan mission not out of national 
security or humanitarian concerns but rather as a form of national compensation to the 
US (although this was never offered as an official reason). That said, once engaged, 
participants supported the mission, taking into consideration their various domestic 
polities and priorities, and NATO’s increasing level of effort was unanimously supported, 
at least in public, if not behind every closed door.  
 
The evidence I offered for the failure of the Comprehensive Approach strategy in 
Afghanistan was based on an analysis of changes in conditions of specific development 
indicators between 2006 and 2011. These indicators were selected from the ANDS and 
the ISAF campaign design for Afghanistan and were, to the greatest extent possible, 
mapped to each other. This process mirrored that of a campaign assessment that would be 
recognizable to operational analysts in a NATO headquarters, although the assessment 
undertaken for this thesis had the benefit of capturing historical data; most campaign 
assessments utilize data sources in real time and are designed to provide forward-looking 
trends in order to adjust actions or resources in an active campaign.  
 
The results of this assessment highlighted that in virtually all major pillars of 
development, the indicators did not show any significant improvement over the five-year 
time frame under study and, further, that the absolute levels of progress remained 
extremely low. Open source data from a wide variety of organizations and agencies, both 
public and private, painted a consistent picture of a state that was under constant threat of 
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failing, and indeed, the most recent evaluation from Foreign Policy’s Failed State 2012 
Index has Afghanistan declining in overall functionality as compared to 2011.
2
 As such, 
there is no requirement to alter the conclusion of Chapter 4 that Afghanistan may be 
evaluated as a failing, if not failed, state and that state-building initiatives by NATO 
failed to achieve their objectives. More specifically, the desired strategic end state of the 
2006 ISAF campaign design was not achieved nor were most of the expected outcomes 
of the ANDS. 
 
Prior to that analysis, I sought to identify how NATO attempted to actualize the 
Comprehensive Approach at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This was 
accomplished by means of an integrated interrogational framework that identified 
specific NATO initiatives at all three levels in a context of conceptual, institutional and 
capability gaps. Underlying this investigation was the assumption that the core theory 
supporting the strategy was the requirement for civilian (particularly NGOs) and military 
organizations to cooperate and collaborate in order to achieve common development 
objectives. In order to test this theory, the investigation attempted to identify fundamental 
characteristics of civilian and military organizations, and it was posited that the engrained 
nature of these characteristics was such that the desired levels of cooperation and 
collaboration were not only extremely difficult (if not impossible) to achieve in the 
Afghan setting, but also may not be achievable in any other. This investigation also led to 
a conclusion that as evidence for stagnant development in Afghanistan mounted through 
2009 onwards, the adoption by the US and NATO forces of counter-insurgency doctrine 
was undermined by under-resourced force levels and the unwillingness of many Alliance 
members to retract caveats which further enervated the COIN effort. 
 
The failure to achieve its strategic objective in Afghanistan resulted in a wide-ranging 
discussion concerning the effect of this failure on the future of the Alliance. Although 
this failure will not likely presage the break-up of NATO, it will likely cause a period of 
internal and external evaluation of its status, role and relevance in the evolving 
international security environment. Going forward, NATO will be faced with a series of 
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_state_index_2012_interactive. 
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grand-strategic choices, most notably its willingness to engage globally across the full 
spectrum of security challenges or revert to its more traditional role as a Euro-Atlantic 
defensive alliance. The decision will have significant impact on the future international 
security environment to the extent that no other organization or single nation (including 
the United States) is in possession of the full range of capacities and capabilities wielded 
by the Alliance. As both a highly significant institution in the global context and a values-
based organization in its own right, a retreat from future complex crises emanating from 
fragile, failed and failed states puts at risk vulnerable populations and weakens the global 
community; clearly effects that are not consistent with NATO’s stated values and norms. 
While NATO’s mission to assist Afghanistan may have been seen as a noble cause in and 
of itself, state building as strategy clearly failed.  
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Abbreviations 
 
3D diplomacy, defence and development 
9/11 11 September, 2001 
7S strategy, structure, systems, shared values, style, staff, skills 
ABP Afghan Border Police 
ACO Allied Command Operations (NATO) 
ACT Allied Command Transformation (NATO) 
AFG Afghanistan 
AFNORTH Allied Forces North (NATO) 
ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Human 
Action 
AMDG Afghan Millennium Development Goals 
ANA Afghan National Army 
ANATC Afghan National Army Training Command 
ANCOP Afghan Civil Order Police 
ANDS Afghan National Development Strategy 
ANP Afghan National Police 
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces 
ASP Afghanistan Stabilisation Program 
  AQ                   al Qa’ida 
C2 command and control 
CA comprehensive approach 
CD&E concept development and experimentation 
CF Canadian Forces 
CFC Civil-Military Fusion Centre (NATO) 
CFOPP Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process 
CFPDS Canadian Forces Professional Development System 
CIMIC civil-military co-operation 
CMCoord  civil-military coordination 
COIN counter-insurgency 
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COMISAF Commander of International Security Assistance Force 
COPD Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (NATO) 
CPAI Concerted Planning and Action Initiative (NATO) 
CPAD Concerted Planning and Action Directive (NATO) 
CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy (EU) 
CQ cultural intelligence 
DABS Afghan Electrical Power Authority 
DND Department of National Defence (Canada) 
DP decisive point 
EBAO effects-based approach to operations 
EBO effects-based operations 
ELRHA Enhanced Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance 
EU European Union 
FCCMI Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction (NATO) 
FSI Failed State Index 
FY fiscal year 
GDP gross domestic product 
GSWC general system of war and conflict 
ha hectare 
h/h household 
HDI Human Development Index 
HQ headquarters 
JFCB Joint Force Command Brunssum (NATO) 
IAG illegally armed group 
I-ANDS Interim Afghan National Development Strategy 
IDLG Independent Directorate of Local Governance  
IDP internally displaced person 
IEC Independent Election Commission 
IED improvised explosive device 
IFOR Implementation Force (NATO) 
IO international organizations 
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IR international relations 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
ISS international security studies 
JALLC Joint Allied Lessons Learned Center (NATO) 
JDN joint doctrine note (UK) 
JHQ CENT Joint Headquarters Central (NATO) 
JIMP joint, integrated, multinational and public (Canada) 
JOA joint operational area 
km kilometers 
MDG Millennium Development Goals (UN) 
MNE multi-national experiment (NATO) 
MOE measure of effectiveness 
MoF Ministry of Finance (Afghanistan) 
MOP measure of performance 
MW megawatt 
NAC North Atlantic Council 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO non-governmental organization 
NMAA National Military Academy of Afghanistan 
NTM-A NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan 
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) 
OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 
OPP operational planning process 
OR operational research 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PC provincial council 
PDC provincial development council 
PRT provincial reconstruction team 
R2P right to protect 
RC regional command 
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RHQ regional headquarters 
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO) 
SSR security sector reform 
TBD to be determined 
UK  United Kingdom  
UN United Nations 
UNDOC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNISCI Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation 
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution 
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
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